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ABSTRACT 
 Despite the existence in Latin America of a highly developed norm to collectively 
promote and defend democracy, there is variation in its application during democratic crises in 
the region. What explains the variation in responses to democratic crises? This dissertation 
makes three major arguments. The first is that the variation in responses is a result of the clarity 
and severity of the democratic crisis. Crises that present a clear threat to the constitutional 
underpinnings of democracy receive the strongest responses, while threats that are neither clearly 
undemocratic nor democratic receive the weakest. The second argument I make is that when 
there is variation to threats that are not clear, the factors of time, polarization within the 
organization, information, and uncertainty regarding the consequences of responding determine 
which cases receive responses and which do not.  Finally, I demonstrate empirical evidence for 
the hypothesis that regional intergovernmental organizations in Latin America can be 
characterized as “clubs of presidents.” These findings have implications for our understanding of 
the various threats to the consolidation and quality of democracy. The data covers 31 cases of 
presidential crises from 1990-2012. The project uses cross-tabulations as well as in-depth case 
studies drawing from personal interviews with the former presidents, ambassadors of the 
Organization of American States, and ambassadors of member-states of IGOs directly involved 
in the crises.  
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1 Chapter One: The Defense-of-Democracy Paradigm and the Responses of 
International Organizations 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the third wave of democracy swept the region of Latin America, the field of 
political science has turned its attention to democratic transition and consolidation and the role of 
the international community in both of those processes. The early “nativists” literature argues 
that the role and impact of international actors and influences is limited (Schmitter 2001; 
O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Munck and Leff 1997; Karl 1990). However, other 
literature and understanding of the influence of international actors has allotted them more 
importance in the processes of transition and deepening of democracy (Remmer 1989; Linz and 
Stepan 1996; Whitehead 1996). In addition, international actors and, in particular, 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have created a role for themselves in the processes of 
democratic deepening and defense of democracy. For example, the Organization of American 
States (OAS), under the processes laid out in the Santiago Commitment, Resolution 1080, and 
the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC), has been actively involved in commenting on 
and responding to democratic crises inside of its member-states.  
Traditional explanations of interstate behavior would maintain respect for sovereignty as 
the predominant foreign policy guide for states, and yet, the time, money, and commitment 
devoted to involvement with politics at the domestic level, whether explicitly welcomed or not 
for each event, continue to grow. Even more interesting for our understanding of democratization 
is that intergovernmental organizations are not only responding to democratic crises when it 
appears the entire regime of democracy in a country is threatened, but they are also involved 
when an alteration in the democratic process occurs that is threatening the deepening of 
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democracy. Since 1990 there has been a concerted effort by regional organizations to develop a 
norm to collectively promote and defend democracy backed by charters and agreements among 
member-states as part of their obligations in an intergovernmental organization. Yet, even though 
this norm is listed as part of the fundamental characteristics of these intergovernmental 
organizations, there is variation in the application of the norm, including in cases that present a 
threat to presidential survival. This leaves us with a key question: what explains the variation in 
responses by regional intergovernmental organizations to presidential crises?  
1.2 The Puzzle 
 This variation in responses by regional IGOs to domestic crises in Latin America can be 
demonstrated by reviewing how the largest and most inclusive IGO in the region, the 
Organization of American States (OAS), has responded to threats to the executive since 1990. 
The OAS has the most extensive defense-of-democracy regime in the region, with numerous 
documents outlining the expectations of representative democracy for its member-states as well 
as allowing for actions, in some instances without the authorization of the crisis state, from the 
member-states in response to alterations or interruptions to democracy. However, in the 31 cases 
of presidential crises in my study that have occurred in the region since 1990, the responses from 
the OAS have been mixed, ranging from no response at all to the invocation of the “primary 
democratic instruments” (Boniface 2007), such as Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter (IADC). Figure 1.1 below demonstrates this variation in responses from the 
OAS. 
 Figure 1: Responses from the Organization of American States
 This variation deserves further explanation. Despite the proliferation of commitments to 
democracy in the region, the OAS is more likely to not respond to a crisis at all than invoke the 
primary democratic instruments. The most likely response of the OAS i
Council meeting, but the agreement by the OAS P
that was a good offices mission, fact
likely to occur. This variation in responses 
crises, such as the conflicts over the rules of constituent assemblies in Bolivia and Ecuador 
between 2007 and 2008. The OAS sent a political mission to help mediate the conflict in Bolivia, 
but limited the response to the conflict in Ecuador to press statements (most of which supported 
the process and the government of President Rafael Correa, with little direct mention of the 
conflict). In other words, the variation of responses exists in spite of similar
variation also exists regardless of when the crisi
 
 
s to hold a Permanent 
ermanent Council to send a mission, whether 
-finding mission, or representatives for mediation, was less 
to crises in the region occurs even during similar 
 types of crises. This 
s occurred, as demonstrated in Figure 1.2
3 
 below.  
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Figure 2: Responses of the Organization of American States (OAS) Over Time 
 
Figure 1.2 demonstrates that responses from the OAS to presidential crises in the region 
have varied regardless of the time period. Particularly in the post-1995 period, this variation 
becomes more extreme, with some cases receiving no response to others receiving threats of 
suspension or actual suspension from the regional organization. It is important to note the 
apparent lack of low-level responses in the early 1990s. This is largely due to the nature of the 
universe of cases and the increase in presidential crises since the early 1990s. The only crises 
from the 1990s included in my case selection are Peru 1992, Guatemala 1993 (both autogolpes) 
and Venezuela 1992 (attempted coup d’etat). As a result, it is not surprising that there appears to 
be little variation there, as there are few cases in the time period and the cases are similar. 
There is a small, but growing, literature regarding the responses of regional IGOs, 
particularly the OAS, to democratic crises in Latin America. While many of the arguments are 
compelling, I argue that they only present a partial picture of the reasons underlying the variation 
in responses from IGOs in Latin America. Before I turn to my argument, it is important to review 
the literature that has attempted to address when intergovernmental organizations have 
responded to democratic crises in the region and what those authors argue about the underlying 
mechanisms that determine IGO action. By reviewing the prior arguments regarding this puzzle, 
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I seek to demonstrate that the prior explanations capture only a portion of the underlying 
mechanisms that drive responses to democratic crises from regional intergovernmental 
organizations. My explanation for the variation in responses from IGOs will incorporate some of 
the relevant components of prior theories, while adding what I consider to be the missing pieces 
of the puzzle. 
1.3 Existing Literature 
The first set of literature that has addressed the causes for variation in responses to 
democratic crises rests its theoretical argument in the realist tradition. The realist explanation of 
motivation is based on the idea of unitary states acting in their own self-interest in an anarchic 
system. It is power-based with considerations of relative gains as well as a limited, and certainly 
not autonomous, role for international organizations (Mearsheimer 1994; Morgenthau 1965; 
Waltz 1979; Owen 2002). With respect to intervention in the domestic affairs of other states by 
international organizations, realists argue that international institutions are only minimally 
influential on states and function as an extension of the hegemon (Mearsheimer 1994). In this 
sense, the use of an international institution such as the OAS, UNASUR, or Mercosur will only 
be employed for international responses to democratic crises when it is in the interest of the most 
powerful state within those organizations, usually the United States or Brazil, to get involved.  
In the realist tradition, a state will only respond to crises of democracy when it stands to 
gain by intervening or if it feels that its stability is at stake if a crisis continues. For example, if a 
state’s material interests are at stake (i.e. access to oil), it is more likely that a powerful state will 
intervene to maintain its interests and restore stability, regardless of the cost to democracy. 
According to realists, it is possible that economic and political interests align with the promotion 
of the democratic norm, but the driving factor behind international involvement in democratic 
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crises in other countries is based on material interests and not on a normative commitment 
(Burges and Daudelin 2007).    
 Burges and Daudelin (2007) specifically look at the role of democratic norms versus 
material interests to explain Brazil’s promotion of democratic norms in the region. While it is 
often the case that “Brazil’s interests could be promoted in unison with the defense of 
democracy,” when Brazil’s interests and the promotion of democracy were not in unison, 
Brazil’s government chose one of three different responses: move consideration of the crisis to a 
smaller, less institutionalized regional forum for discussion; demonstrate indifference to a crisis; 
and/or work to reduce the power of the involvement of the United Nations or the OAS (128). 
Shaw (2007) finds a similar explanation when comparing the actions of the United States in light 
of its rhetoric on democratic deepening. She finds that when national interests and normative 
interests are at odds, the United States will take actions based on its national interests. However, 
there are cases when normative and national interests coincide, leading to actions to address 
democratic deficiencies. In other words, if these realist explanations were to hold, we would 
expect to see the United States and Brazil push the regional IGOs to respond only when it is in 
the national interests of either of the two major countries in the region to do so. If national 
interests are served by addressing the democratic crisis through the regional IGO, then the 
United States and Brazil will do so. However, if it is not in the interests of either of those two 
states, then the national interests will take precedence over the normative interests and pressure 
from the United States and/or Brazil for the regional IGOs to respond will be minimal. 
The impact of intervention on the security and stability of the crisis state may also affect 
international motivation. According to Bloomfield (1994), intervening states take into 
consideration the potential for unintended consequences of responding to a crisis in another 
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country. As Bloomfield points out in his article on Peru and the OAS, international actors felt 
that pressure on the government after the 1992 autogolpe could destabilize the state even further 
amidst the internal struggle with the rebel group Sendero Luminoso. In these cases, even though 
a situation (the behavior of the executive branch) within a country is clearly undemocratic, the 
tradeoff between democracy and stability becomes a key factor of consideration. This tradeoff 
may also explain why states and organizations seem willing to accept that an overthrown 
president will not be returned to office but that a constitutional succession or free and fair 
elections will be held to determine his or her replacement. 
An argument that can be based in realism is the theory that self-interested states push for 
international action based on the ideology of the government within the crisis state. The rise of 
leftist politics in the region has provided a basis to counter the dominance of the United States. A 
realist might argue that if a democratic crisis is occurring in a state led by a leftist leader, the 
United States, especially when the President of the United States is a Republican, would be more 
likely to push the Organization of American States to limit their response, potentially out of the 
hope that the leftist politician would be overthrown and a more U.S.-friendly leader would 
assume power.  
The realist explanations for the variation of international responses to democratic crises 
in Latin America focus primarily on the role of individual self-interested states and how those 
states pressure intergovernmental organizations to respond to a crisis. The arguments from Shaw 
(2007) and Burges and Daudelin (2007) focus on the responses of Brazil and the United States 
and their role in pressuring the organizations to act only when in their own interests. Concerns 
regarding stability for the crisis country and surrounding areas have also been presented as 
explanations for the variation in responses to democratic crises in the region. Although realist 
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theory has been used as a basis for explaining variation, other authors writing on this topic have 
countered realist explanations for variation in responses by appealing to neoliberal institutional 
theory, theories citing domestic politics, and constructivist theories as the key motivation for 
responses from IGOs. Authors writing from the liberal tradition have also argued that realist 
explanations do not explain why the OAS would respond to crises that were not in the strategic 
or material interests of the United States, such as the crises in Guatemala 1993 and Paraguay 
1996 (Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007; Horwitz 2010; Shaw 2003).  
The literature originating from the liberal school of thought covers a wide range of 
potential explanations for when and why international organizations will intervene in a domestic 
democratic crisis. Liberal institutional theories see a primary role for institutions in transforming 
calculations of costs and benefits through membership conditionality and socialization-based 
methods (Kelley 2004), bestowing international legitimacy on states (Hyde 2011; Kelley 2012; 
Pevehouse 2005) and by creating norms of accountability (Pevehouse 2002; Halperin and 
Lomasney 1998).  
Halperin and Lomasney (1998) argue that by creating norms of accountability with 
regards to democracy, or “guarantee clauses” for democracy, these regional organizations create 
the ability to intervene multilaterally and help restore the democratic order (Halperin and 
Lomasney 1998: 134). As a result, member-states not only have norms of accountability 
regarding a democratic system within the state, but also have the norms of accountability 
regarding the organization’s response to a violation of the democratic order. Due to the existence 
of these norms, Halperin and Lomasney demonstrate that the motivation, or the “why” for a 
response from an IGO is present, but they do not explain the reasons for the variation of “when” 
regional IGOs will respond to a crisis. 
9 
 
Within international organizations, the politics within the organization among the 
member-states and the strength of the organization may affect when an IGO responds to a 
domestic crisis. Putnam’s (1988) two-level games theory would argue that there is variation in 
the responses to democratic crises due to different preferences and bargaining powers among the 
domestic and international level players. At the intergovernmental level, Barnett and Finnemore 
(1999) would argue that the variation in responses to crises is due to the bureaucratic pathologies 
that have developed over time, such as how the organization determines success (i.e., is it the 
return to stability or the return of the ousted leader that determines success) or the existence of 
different competing perspectives that will then lead to different goals and, eventually, outcomes 
(724). Finally, the ability of international organizations to intervene is important to note. Tulchin 
and Espach (2001) and Klaveren (2001) argue that the ability of regional IGOs in Latin America 
to respond to democratic crises has increased, but is still limited and will remain so until there is 
a focus on policies designed to strengthen the states in the region, with or without the influence 
and support of the United States. However, the ability of IGOs to intervene in the region has 
varied across organizations and over time. As a result, when the international organization is 
facing a bureaucratic or organizational crisis itself (as the OAS did in 2004), it is less likely that 
the OAS will respond, although other international organizations may step in to address the 
crisis. The arguments above would lead us to expect that when an international organization has 
the ability to intervene, it is likely to do so, but the way it intervenes is moderated by the 
bureaucratic pathologies developed in the organization. In their arguments, if you can understand 
the bureaucratic pathologies and weaknesses of the organizations, you can understand why the 
organizations responded to some crises but not to others. 
10 
 
The importance of domestic politics within the member-states and how those affect the 
actions of member-states within IGOs has also been offered as an explanation for the variation in 
responses to democratic crises. Levitt’s (2006) article argues that domestic politics, specifically 
how the governments of the various member-states view their own positions in and outside of the 
OAS, explains the variation in responses to democratic crises in the region. He finds that the way 
the governments in the other member-states view their own positions in terms of democracy 
determines the type of response the member-state will push for in the IGO. For example, if the 
government in a member-state is also feeling vulnerable to accusations of breaches of democracy 
at home, that government will oppose enforcement of the democratic regime. On the other hand, 
if a government fears an authoritarian seizure of power at home, that government will support 
enforcement of the democratic regime. This “reciprocity” motivation, where presidents may be 
more willing to involve themselves in the domestic affairs of other states by condemning the 
threat to the president, offers an explanation for why there is variation among crises. In other 
words, the worry of other presidents that they may face a similar crisis and be left without 
support by their regional community may encourage them to condemn and respond to threats to 
their fellow presidents, even when it’s not considered in their state’s military or economic 
interests. While Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin (2007) argue that member-states within the OAS are 
less likely to encourage intervention during a crisis that threatens democratic deepening, that 
wouldn’t necessarily hold true when there are protests and intragovernmental crises that threaten 
the president from power (96). In those cases, presidents may want to pressure regional 
organizations to support their position as democratically elected president, even if this means 
there could be additional scrutiny paid to the president in the short-term. This could be 
considered a self-preservation hypothesis, wherein a president within a region where 
11 
 
consolidation is not complete, meaning his own position as president could be challenged, 
chooses to use institutional mechanisms (such as the democracy clauses of the OAS or 
Mercosur) to punish threats against another president in order to create a precedent in the 
organization to protect the current elected president against threats.  
The logic used in the arguments above concerning reciprocity and self-preservation may 
also explain why regional intergovernmental organizations are limited in their responses when it 
is a president abusing power. While a president might seek to have more attention paid to 
domestic politics in his country when his position is threatened, he may not want that same 
amount of attention to be paid when he is the one violating the democratic order. As a result, 
with the exception of the most egregious violations of the democratic order, i.e. an autogolpe, 
presidents of the region are likely to avoid openly criticizing and calling for action against 
another president. As a result, the responses of regional intergovernmental organizations are 
likely to be skewed towards action when the president in office is being threatened, but not when 
the president is abusing the powers of his office. Boniface (2007) points out that since the 
signing of the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) in 2001, the IADC has “never been 
invoked by the OAS against a sitting president” (57).1  
Even though this project will be focusing on the role of intergovernmental organizations 
in responding to domestic democratic crises, the role of domestic groups and individuals in the 
crisis state is an important topic to discuss. The most obvious explanation for whether there will 
be an international response is whether the domestic actors of the crisis country request help 
(Levitt 2006). Without the authorization from a domestic actor, especially the president, to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of the state, international organizations will be limited in what 
                                                 
1
 The United States did threaten to request the invocation of the IADC against the Venezuelan government led by 
Nicolás Maduro in 2014, however, as of October 31, 2014, the OAS Permanent Council has not passed a resolution 
invoking the IADC against the Maduro government. 
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kind of assistance they can provide. Despite the rise of the acceptability of international 
involvement in democratic affairs, the norm of sovereignty is still salient. However, even if the 
domestic actors within a crisis state do not directly ask for external involvement, the state’s 
membership in these regional organizations means the traditional notion of sovereignty and non-
interference is at least balanced by the charters and resolutions that authorize international 
organizations to convene and discuss the domestic situation of a member-state, at times even 
without the request or explicit support of the member-state in question.2   
When a domestic actor does request support, the international community may be more 
likely to get involved and use a broader range of responses to assist the crisis country. For 
international responses such as mediation and dialogue, there generally has to be some kind of 
request and acceptance from all parties for the dialogue to take place. However, international 
actors can offer mediation or dialogue, regardless of whether it is rejected. Offers of mediation 
do not exist in every case of democratic crisis, and there are clear instances when mediation 
could have been beneficial but was not offered. Focusing simply on whether domestic actors 
request or accept international action means we miss the potential for understanding why 
international actors are likely to offer mediation as a response, and thus, we miss an example of 
regional IGOs attempting to respond to a crisis, but being rebuffed by the domestic actors, 
thereby limiting the action of the regional IGOs.  
In terms of capacity to affect any real change, Levitsky and Way’s (2010, 2006) 
arguments on linkage and leverage can potentially provide a theoretical basis for when 
                                                 
2 For example, the Inter-American Democratic Charter states that any member-state or the Secretary General of the 
OAS can, in the event of an “unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration 
of the constitutional regime,” convene the Permanent Council to discuss and assess the situation and determine if 
further action is merited (Article 20 of IADC). This is important due to the reality that any member-state can request 
a meeting and place its concerns about the domestic situation of another country on the agenda for discussion, if the 
government of the member state believes there has been an unconstitutional alteration or interruption. 
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international actors respond to crises. According to their theory, higher levels of linkage (dense 
political, economic, social, diplomatic, and/or social ties) and leverage (a governments’ 
vulnerability to external democratizing power) lead to higher costs for autocratic abuses because 
those ties make the actions of autocratic abuses more internationally salient. As a result, when 
there are higher levels of linkage and leverage autocratic governments are more likely to respond 
to both the domestic and the international pressures to democratize. As a theory, it can also be 
applied to explaining why international actors will intervene and why they choose the policies 
they do.  
The application of linkage and leverage as an explanation for the variation of responses to 
democratic crises by regional IGOs means we would expect to see that higher levels of linkage 
and leverage on the part of potential intervening states would lead to a wider variety of responses 
from the international community. If a state has a high level of leverage and linkage with a 
particular country, that state is expected to not only become more involved in the domestic crisis, 
but also to put more resources and pressure on the domestic situation to resolve the crisis in a 
way that is conducive to the democratic process and preserves the interests of the intervening 
state.  
Finally, the scholars who have done the most definitive work on the answer of 
international involvement in domestic democratic crises have identified the nature of the issues 
as the driving factor determining how international actors will respond (Arceneaux and Pion-
Berlin 2005; 2007; Boniface 2007). Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin (2005), borrowing the terms high 
and low politics from Keohane and Nye (1977), argue that when the issue is one of the high 
politics realm (affecting state self-interest, might, and material assets,) then state interests will 
override the traditional notion of sovereignty and international actors will respond to the crisis in 
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the country. They put neoliberal reform and regional security into the realm of high politics that 
are likely to be addressed by the international community, as those issues affect the security and 
material interests of external states. Democratic deepening, issues of human rights, and issues 
concerning the environment, on the other hand, are considered areas of low politics. During 
crises in this realm we would expect to see limited or no responses to the crises. Finally, 
democratic defense and issues regarding immigration and drug trafficking exist somewhere in 
the middle. One of the key parts of their theory, however, is that issues can move along the high-
low politics continuum. As international organizations such as the OAS intervene in issues 
relating to democratic defense, their action moves democratic defense along the continuum to the 
realm of high politics (88).  
When an issue falls in one of the low politics realms, such a democratic deepening, 
international organizations tend to be more hesitant to respond.  According to Arceneaux and 
Pion-Berlin (2005), states tend to be hesitant to focus on democratic deepening in other countries 
out of fear that it crosses the line too far into illegitimate intervention as well as being concerned 
about other countries turning their attention to the domestic processes of their home state. As a 
result, the Western Hemisphere “now embraces a system that shores up ‘low quality 
democracies’ of decreasing legitimacy to their own populations” (20).  
Despite their distinction between democratic deepening and democratic defense, we still 
see variation in the responses not only in cases of the more medium-high politics realm of 
democratic defense, i.e. during a military coup d’etat, but also during cases within the low 
politics realm of democratic deepening, i.e. during conflicts over constitutional assembly rules or 
changing constitutional rules to increase the power of the office of president3. They note this 
                                                 
3
 For example, during a conflict over the rules of the Constituent Assembly in Bolivia in 2006, the international 
community failed to issue any response to the domestic conflict. However, just two years later during another 
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variation, but only explore it with minimal depth in short case summaries, focusing on the roles 
of domestic public opinion regarding the crisis, the position of the hegemon with regards to 
promoting reforms, the influence of external events, and whether the domestic actors in the crisis 
country are divided or united in support for democratic strengthening (11).  
Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin (2007) also argue the extent to which a crisis presents a clear 
threat to the member-state and to other states determines whether the OAS will respond.  Where 
crises are more clearly a threat to democratic stability and continuation, such as a coup d’etat 
(golpe de estado) or autogolpe, responses from the OAS are more likely to be stronger. 
Conversely, when the issue is one of ambiguity, such as constitutional crises, the clarity of the 
threat is lower and therefore the response is weaker. In other words, the clarity of the threat acts 
as the “gatekeeper” for responses: the clearer the threat, the stronger the intervention (Arceneaux 
and Pion Berlin 2007: 2). Boniface’s (2007) argument is similar to the argument put forth by 
Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin (2007) in that it focuses on the type of crisis and how the crisis 
represents a threat to democracy. Boniface argues that there are three types of crises: those that 
represent a direct threat to democracy (coups and autogolpes), those that are near coup crises, 
where there is “significant violence, the resignation (and eventual exile) of a sitting president, 
and allegations of a coup”, and finally, those that are of a “second-order nature”, such as 
electoral crises and constitutional crises (Boniface 2007: 49). The OAS is likely to invoke the 
primary democratic instruments when a crisis is a coup or autogolpe, whereas the member-states 
of the OAS are likely to disagree on whether to invoke the primary democratic instruments 
during the near coup crises, and thus the likelihood of invocation is lower. For the second-order 
crises, the OAS is likely to decide how to respond on a “case-by-case basis” (50).  
                                                                                                                                                             
conflict related to the new constitution, the international community responded with offers for dialogues and good 
offices. This variation in responses occurs in multiple cases. 
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Daniella Donno (2010) looks at intergovernmental responses to violations of democratic 
norms, specifically focusing on how intergovernmental organizations have responded to electoral 
fraud. She argues that the variation in responses from IGOs to electoral fraud in Latin America, 
the Caribbean, and the former Soviet Union countries is due to two factors: competing 
geopolitical interests and uncertainty about the nature and scope of the norm violations. She 
argues that international observation plays a mitigating role in international response, in that 
even if a country is geopolitically important, when there are international observers in a country 
for elections, there is more likely to be a response from the regional IGO, since uncertainty about 
the violations is reduced. Her argument can be transferred easily to questions regarding the 
variation in responses to other types of violations of democratic norms. When regional 
organizations have more information (and as a result, less uncertainty) regarding a crisis, they 
will be more likely to respond to the violations, even in countries with more geopolitical 
importance. However, when that information is limited, the response from regional organizations 
is also limited, as they are unable to agree on what the crisis is and how to respond to the crisis. 
As a result, the quality and extent of information the regional organizations have regarding a 
crisis, the more likely they are to agree on and approve of a response to the norm violation. 
Scholars writing in the liberal and neoliberal institutionalist traditions argue for a wide 
variety of explanatory factors for the variation of responses to democratic crises. The impact of 
organizational efficiency and ability, the importance of the type of crisis and the threat it poses to 
democracy, how presidents in the other member-states view the stability of their own positions, 
and the mitigating effects of information have been offered as explanations for the variation in 
responses from intergovernmental organizations. The liberal and neoliberal institutionalist 
17 
 
literatures offer the strongest base from which to build a theory regarding international responses 
to presidential crises and I will return to them in more depth in the theoretical chapter.  
The final set of literature to review is the literature based in the constructivist tradition. 
The constructivist literature emphasizes the role of norms and ideas, and how these norms and 
ideas shape and are shaped by actor’s perceptions (Wendt 1992; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 
1998). Norms of democracy have made their way into the charters and resolutions of 
international organizations as a way to influence member-state behavior by warning what 
happens if a state violates the norm (Kegley Jr. and Raymond 1990; Raymond 1997). Although 
normative explanations are potentially useful in explaining the creation of the defense of 
democracy regime, they are more limited in explaining the variation of responses to democratic 
crises.  
The role of institutions and their ability to create and disseminate norms is especially 
salient for a discussion on democratic defense in Latin America, despite the limited ability of 
constructivist theory to explain variation in the application of the norm. The history of the OAS 
in particular represents an example of an institution building a normative basis for intervention 
during democratic crises. During the creation of the OAS, the concept of democracy was 
included in the founding charter, although during the Cold War, security concerns of the United 
States tended to trump the promotion of democracy. It wasn’t until the demise of the Soviet 
Union and the decline of the concern over communist infiltration in the Americas that a renewed 
focus on finding ways to bolster democratic governments emerged. 
The creation of the democratic paradigm happened over time in the Americas, but a few 
key events helped to ground the growth of the importance of democracy as a part of the 
hemispheric identity of the Americas. The Organization of American States, for example, 
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mentions representative democracy as part of its founding charter, although throughout the Cold 
War security interests more often trumped concerns over democratic quality. Despite the triumph 
of security interests during the Cold War, however, the member-states of the OAS signed onto 
numerous agreements regarding human rights and democratic practices. For example, the 
Declaration of Santiago signed in 1959 addressed free elections, freedom of the press, fair 
judicial procedures, and respect for human rights (Herz 2011, 62). It was also during the Cold 
War that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) was established. In 1979, the 
OAS even issued a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in 
Nicaragua (Herz 2011: 63). Despite the increase in the number of documents and institutions 
designed to bolster the notion of democracy in the region, the hegemony of the United States in 
the region meant that the norm of democratic promotion and defense was subsumed to national 
security. As the Cold War ended and Latin America entered a new period of democratic 
governments, hemispheric organizations began to reconsider ways to incorporate the role of 
democracy as part of the identity of the region as well as ways to ensure the reversal to 
authoritarian rule that occurred throughout the Cold War would not recur. Between 1990 and 
2001, the proliferation of documents regarding democracy in the hemisphere reached a pinnacle. 
In 1991, the Santiago Declaration and Resolution 1080 reaffirmed the belief that “representative 
democracy is an indispensible condition for the stability, peace, and development of the region” 
(OAS AG/Res. 1080 (XXI-0/91)). Resolution 1080 builds on the Cartagena Protocol by, for the 
first time, more clearly outlining the steps that the OAS would take in order to address the 
“sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the 
legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the 
Organization’s member states” (OAS AG/Res. 1080 (XXI-0/91).  
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The OAS also created the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, a part of the OAS 
dedicated to the issues of democratic defense and democratic deepening. In 1992, the Protocol of 
Washington was signed, authorizing the suspension of a country in cases of the overthrow of a 
democratically elected government (Herz 2011). Most recently, in September of 2001, the Inter-
American Democratic Charter (IADC) was adopted. The IADC outlines not only the steps to be 
taken if there is an unconstitutional interruption or alteration in the democratic regime, but also 
begins to define what the term “representative democracy” means for the Organization of 
American States in Articles 3 and 4 of the Charter (Herz 2011: 67). The Inter-American 
Democratic Charter was invoked during the 2002 coup crisis in Venezuela (CP/RES. 811 
(1315/02), although the coup was over and Chavez restored to power before the General 
Assembly could meet.  
 The Organization of American States is not the only regional organization to contain 
clauses related to the expectation of democratic institutions of its member-states. The member 
states of Mercosur, the economic and political agreement between Uruguay, Paraguay, 
Argentina, and Brazil, signed the Protocol of Ushuaia in 1998.4 The Protocol of Ushuaia affirms 
the democratic commitment of its member-states and allows for the organization to suspend a 
member-state if there is a rupture in the democratic process in their state. The Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR) also passed a democracy clause in 2010, which authorizes 
UNASUR to suspend a country in the event of a “rupture or threat of a rupture to the democratic 
order, a violation of the constitutional order, or to any situation which presents a risk to the 
legitimate exercise of power and the validity of democratic values and principles” (Article 1).  
Finally, the recently formed Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) 
                                                 
4
 Venezuela was added to the regional bloc during the suspension of Paraguay in 2012. 
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issued the Special Declaration About the Defense of Democracy and Constitutional Order In the 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) on December 3rd, 2011. This 
document outlines the expectations of democracy in its member-states and describes the steps to 
be taken if there is a “rupture or alteration of the democratic order that affects it [the 
constitutional government of a member state] substantially.” Of note is that the declaration puts 
the onus of action on the crisis government to reach out to the organization for assistance and 
does not appear to authorize the organization to condemn or respond to the rupture or alteration 
within a country without the country’s request.  
Horwitz (2010) argues that the Organization of American States, along with other 
international organizations, played an instrumental role in establishing a normative framework 
regarding democratic norms and values in the Western hemisphere.  In her argument, she creates 
a multi-layered analytical model to describe the process of norm creation, diffusion, and 
implementation with regards to the democratic paradigm in Latin America. Despite the success 
of the OAS in spreading democratic norms and values, a success Horwitz argues is a 
“phenomenon particular to the Western Hemisphere”, that success has not translated into 
significant or consistent responses to violations of the democratic norms or rules (167). In her 
study on the changing role of the Organization of American States, she finds that the OAS has 
steadily grown independent of the United States and has, as a result, developed “a common legal 
framework to defend democratic regimes” (173). Based on her discussion of the evolution of the 
OAS, it is clear that the OAS has made significant steps in moving towards a defense of 
democracy paradigm. A key issue area to further this discussion is to evaluate when the defense 
of democracy paradigm fails and explain the reasons why states may not respond when there is a 
crisis in a democracy in the region. 
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The role of international actors in activating normative change in domestic politics has 
been studied by a variety of different scholars and within different regions. Two well-known 
explanations on norm creation and international pressure to affect change come from the works 
by Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Finnemore and Sikkink (2001). In the work by Keck and 
Sikkink (1998) they argue that domestic actors, particularly NGOs, will seek international allies 
to put pressure on their states to push for a change in behavior. International allies, both NGOs 
and the states they can pressure, then put pressure on the offending state in an effort to change 
their policies. This “boomerang model” is most often seen in human rights cases (Keck and 
Sikkink, 12). Audie Klotz (1995) explains how international pressure on apartheid South Africa 
affected the domestic politics of the state and reinforced human rights norms. The sanctions used 
by the international community were imposed to change the incentives facing key domestic 
actors in the country in question. However, the punishments also serve to demonstrate that the 
reason for such sanctions is the violation of a norm in the regional or international community. 
Kacowicz (2005) argues that international organizations influence behavior by warning what 
happens when a state violates the norm and by punishing states when they violate the norm. He 
additionally argues that norms have changed how actors behave in the region of Latin America, 
focusing specifically on international norms of peace and security in the region. 
The role of international election monitoring (IEM) and its effect on the notion of 
sovereignty has also brought up a discussion of the Western Hemisphere Idea (WHI) and why 
the Americas have been on the forefront of redefining the conflict between state sovereignty and 
normative issues such as democratic defense and human rights. In discussing the rise of election 
monitoring as a norm in the Americas, Santa-Cruz (2005) discusses the role of the WHI as a key 
normative structure that allowed for the emergence and acceptance of international election 
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monitoring. His argument is that election monitoring has fundamentally changed the notion of 
sovereignty in the region and the Western Hemisphere Idea, the notion that the peoples of the 
Western Hemisphere “stand in a special relationship to one another which sets them apart from 
the rest of the world” is what has allowed the acceptance of international election monitoring 
gain so much traction in the region (Santa-Cruz 2005a; Whitaker 1954). Part of his argument 
regarding the WHI is that the elements of nonintervention and representative democracy are 
constitutive, despite their inherent tension (Santa-Cruz 2005: 672). Over time, as the discourse 
within the hemisphere on the tension between nonintervention and representative democracy 
continued, the states within the region and the organizations they created reflected an 
understanding of sovereignty as limited by the expectation of democratic government. In fact, at 
the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in 1962, the representatives of the Dominican 
Republic, Venezuela, Honduras, and Costa Rica declared, “The exercise of representative 
democracy and respect for human rights has ceased to be an internal matter of each state and has 
become an international obligation” (Santa-Cruz 2005: 678). The WHI and the inclusion of 
representative democracy as part of the WHI made the emergence of IEM in the Americas more 
likely than in other regions and changed not only the notion of sovereignty, but also the 
expectations of democratic governments. It can be argued then, that the WHI and the emergence 
of IEM also encouraged IOs and states with the region to reevaluate the role of the international 
community in encouraging international responses to events that traditionally would be 
considered the realm of internal affairs. 
Dexter Boniface (2002) discusses the defense of democracy norms that have developed in 
the Americas and raises the question of whether the OAS is motivated by strategic factors or by 
normative considerations when defending democracy. He finds that both strategic (realist) and 
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normative (constructivist) explanations are useful, but for different reasons. Normative 
explanations are best for explaining why the OAS intervenes but that strategic factors, 
particularly the interests, political will, and capabilities of the United States, explain how the 
OAS intervenes. This multi-layered approach using explanations from multiple theoretical 
traditions is also discussed in Horwitz’s (2010) argument regarding the transformation of the 
Organization of American States as a norm-promoter and defender of democracy. 
 The key question to take from constructivism in regards to this project is whether norms 
have an impact on how states behave and how we would define and measure norms and their 
impact on state behavior. Are international organizations responding to democratic crises 
because they are norm-driven actors? Is the explanatory variable in this situation the 
development and institutionalization of the defense of democracy regime? Kacowicz (2005) 
argues that norms influence the behavior of states; especially once those norms have been 
institutionalized into the international society (39).  Under this theory, however, the norm would 
be institutionalized over time, so we should see an increase in the number of responses as the 
norm develops. However, we see a relatively consistent variation in responses by the 
international community over time. If the idea of norm driven actors should hold, we should see 
the increase of responses as the norm deepens in the organization.  
The constructivist tradition explains very clearly the formation and internalization of 
norms through ideas such as the boomerang theory and the advent and spread of international 
election monitoring. While the constructivist tradition is useful for explaining the formation and 
spread of norms, it does not often address compliance with and enforcement of those norms after 
their initial creation and spread. While this may be the case, the constructivist tradition can 
demonstrate how issue areas may change from low politics issues to high politics issues or 
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explain why or how member-states and international organizations are using the norms of 
defense of democracy to motivate action to address crises.  
1.4 Hypotheses and Variables 
  Based on the strengths and drawbacks of the literature reviewed above, the main 
hypotheses are listed below. My argument partially builds on the works of Arceneaux and Pion-
Berlin (2007), Boniface (2007), and Donno (2010) by focusing on not only the type of crisis, as 
the other authors argue, but also on how clear that crisis is a violation of the primary democracy 
clauses of the OAS (Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter). The clarity of 
the crisis determines the way the OAS responds to a crisis by determining how member states 
categorize the crisis and, if a crisis is collectively agreed upon as clear, the mechanisms that 
should be invoked. It also means that other factors, such as ideological polarization within the 
OAS, imperfect information, time, and uncertainty, are less likely to influence the decision to 
react. However, when a crisis is not clear, those competing factors play a much larger role and 
hamper, or even prevent, a response from international organizations. 
Hypothesis 1 can therefore be stated as: 
H1: As the clarity of a violation increases, the likelihood of a response that invokes Resolution 
1080 or the Inter-American Democratic Charter increases.  
 Clarity is coded based on how the Organization of American States (OAS) views and 
discusses the crisis in either Permanent Council Meetings or through statements from the 
Secretary General through the official OAS record of Press Releases. I first look through the 
minutes of the meetings corresponding to each crisis when a meeting of the Permanent Council 
takes place. If there is agreement among the member-states and they refer to the crisis using the 
language of the IADC or Resolution 1080, such as using the phrases “sudden or irregular 
interruption,” “unconstitutional interruption or alteration,” “autogolpe,” or “golpe de estado,” I 
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code that as a clear crisis. However, if there is a debate on whether the crisis falls under that 
language among member-states in the OAS, it is coded as not clear, as the presence of a debate 
on the extent of the crisis implies a lack of consensus on whether the crisis is a violation of the 
primary democratic clauses and documents. If there was no meeting regarding the crisis, I look 
through the press releases from the OAS to determine if any member-states [as members of the 
OAS] or the Secretary General spoke out regarding the crisis and how they labeled it. Again, the 
same language is the key for coding the crisis as a clear crisis. If there is no Permanent Council 
meeting held and/or no press releases regarding the crisis, it is coded as not clear. If the language 
above is not used in the minutes of the meetings or in the press releases, it is coded as not clear. 
The use of the impressions, discussions, and understanding of what the crisis is and where it fits 
with regards to the clauses and charters referring to democracy of the Organization helps 
illustrate how the organization viewed the crisis and what actions the member-states took to 
respond to the crisis. While endogeneity may be a problem here- member-states are likely to 
invoke the primary democratic instruments when they use the language of those documents in 
their discussions regarding the events in a country, there are cases where the member-states use 
the language of the clauses and democratic charters but do not invoke Resolution 1080 or the 
IADC. In addition, the variation in responses of other cases that are unclear or where the 
language is used but the outcome differs present key cases to review as indicators of the 
evolution of the understanding of how and when the defense-of-democracy regime should be 
invoked. 
The second component of my explanation for the variation of responses to democratic 
crises, and one that I add to the literature, is that the severity of the crisis, or the extent to which 
the crisis threatens the fundamental foundation of democracy in the crisis state, also affects the 
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extent of the international response. In the primary democratic instruments of the OAS, the focus 
is on preserving representative democracy because the belief is that representative democracy is 
“indispensible for the stability, peace, and development of the region” (Inter-American 
Democratic Charter Preamble). When a crisis is more severe, it threatens to undermine the 
system of democracy that provides the basis for other goals, such as poverty reduction, economic 
growth and human rights. As a result, when a crisis is more severe, the regional community has 
more of a responsibility and more incentive to help solve the crisis to preserve the democratic 
order, and with it, the goals the OAS and other regional organizations have described as part of 
their fundamental normative commitments.  
The literature so far has only addressed this concept in passing and has not directly 
looked at the impact of severity on the variation in responses. Boniface’s (2007) chapter 
primarily lays out the different types of crises and their responses, but he does not go deeper into 
the reasons for the connection between the type of crisis and response nor does he look with 
significant detail into why there are cases that were more severe but did not receive the same 
extent of a response from the OAS. Therefore, it is important to include the severity of a crisis as 
a variable to consider when determining the causes for variation in intergovernmental responses 
to democratic crises. Hypothesis 2 can thus be stated as: 
Hypothesis 2: As the severity of a crisis increases, the likelihood of a response that invokes 
Resolution 1080 or the Inter-American Democratic Charter increases. 
  I code the severity of a crisis in two ways in order to get a well-rounded understanding of 
severity and to determine how the coding of severity may affect the results. The first is derived 
from Boniface’s (2007) chapter regarding the OAS and its record of responses to democratic 
crises. He argues, based on the wording of the various charters and agreements of the OAS, that 
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there are essentially three types of crises. Those that represent a direct threat to democracy, such 
as coup d’états and autogolpes, are most likely to clearly fit the definition of an interruption of 
the democratic order and thus the OAS is more likely to invoke its “primary instruments for the 
defense of democracy” such as Resolution 1080 or the Inter-American Democratic Charter (49). 
These crises include the use of force to unseat elected officials (49). Other crises, such as 
electoral crises, constitutional crises, and other non-coup emergencies, are considered “second-
order” crises and he argues the OAS will consider these on a “case-by-case” basis (50). Third, 
the middle-range of crises that are not clearly coups or autogolpes, but do contain “significant 
violence, resignation (and eventual exile) of a sitting president, and allegations of a coup” are 
termed “near-coup crises” and the response of the OAS to these crises is “likely to be 
contentious” (49).  
I also code severity based on the nature of the democratic crisis, using Marsteintredet’s 
(2014) coding of the level of threat to democracy during presidential interruptions. 
Marsteintredet’s coding of presidential interruptions is useful because he codes both the actions 
of the opposition as well as the action of the executive to demonstrate that threats to democracy 
can come from either group. His scale ranges from “0” to “5”, with “0” representing democratic 
behavior and “5” representing the most severe undemocratic behavior. The crisis is then coded 
based on the most undemocratic behavior of either actor, i.e. if the executive scores a “5” for his 
behavior, and the opposition a “0”, the crisis is coded as a “5.” Further details regarding his 
coding and my additions to his coding are discussed in the empirical chapter.  
 In addition to the arguments that the clarity and severity of a crisis explain the variation 
in intergovernmental responses to presidential crises, I also add to the literature by empirically 
demonstrating support for the argument that when there is a threat to the incumbent president’s 
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continuation in office, we are more likely to see responses where the Permanent Council passes a 
resolution, and the resolutions are more likely to invoke the IADC and/or Resolution 1080. 
Alternatively, when the crisis is one in which the executive is abusing power or is taking 
ambiguously democratic actions, there is less likely to be an intergovernmental response, 
especially one that invokes the primary democratic instruments. The argument that the OAS and 
other regional organizations are only representative of the executives in office needs to be 
considered, as it has implications for the opposition and other democratic institutions in a crisis 
country. If the OAS and other regional organizations are simply “Clubs of Presidents” and only 
represent the will of the executive branch, then the defense of democracy will be limited when it 
is a case of the executive abusing the powers of the office. As a result, opposition leaders will be 
limited in gaining assistance from the regional organizations and undemocratic behavior by the 
executive will occur with less pressure from the regional community. 
The only exception to this “Club of President’s” hypothesis is that when the incumbent 
abuse is an autogolpe, there will be a more forceful response, including condemnation and 
invocation of 1080 or the IADC. However, when it is a case of presidential abuse of power that 
falls short of an autogolpe, the response from regional organizations will be limited or non-
existent.  My third hypothesis can therefore be stated as: 
Hypothesis 3: If the crisis is one that threatens the president of the crisis country, the crisis is 
more likely to receive a response that invokes Resolution 1080 or the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter.  
 
The dependent variable is broadly defined as the responses from regional 
intergovernmental organizations, with a focus on the OAS since it is the only organization whose 
membership includes all of the cases in my study. The other sub-regional IGOs, such as the 
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Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR), will be addressed in the case studies.  
In order to clarify the variety of potential responses available to the main regional IGO of 
focus, the OAS, I divide the types of responses into six main ways the Organization can respond. 
The responses available to the OAS start with actions that require the least amount of political 
will and agreement and end with formal actions that require significantly more political will and 
agreement.  
Firstly, the OAS can choose to not respond to a crisis at all. In other words, the Secretary 
General of the OAS may make some comments or a statement on an issue, but neither the 
member-states nor the Secretary General call for the convocation of a permanent council 
meeting. The issue can also never be addressed at all by any entity of the OAS, neither by the 
Secretary General nor by the representatives of the member-states at the OAS. As a result, even 
if a crisis is occurring, the OAS can stay silent on the issue, leading to no response. 
The first action the OAS can take is whether the Permanent Council holds a meeting to 
discuss the crisis. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets on a regularly scheduled basis, but 
can also be called to convene in order to address a specific issue or crisis. If a crisis is discussed 
in a regularly scheduled meeting, I count that as a meeting of the Permanent Council regarding 
the crisis, regardless of whether the meeting was specifically called for that individual event. In 
this way, I can review how the OAS member-states are discussing crises and determining action, 
even when it is brought up as part of the agenda during a regularly scheduled meeting.  
The second action the OAS can take is the passage of a Resolution by the Permanent 
Council regarding the crisis. Resolutions from the OAS represent that a meeting of the PC has 
occurred, that the member-states have reviewed the crisis, and that they have all agreed on a 
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statement regarding the crisis. While the passage of a Permanent Council Resolution represents 
an agreement among the member-states of the OAS, it does not represent the most extensive 
action the OAS can take, either with regards to resolutions or to other actions. As a result, it is 
important to differentiate between resolutions that refer vaguely to the defense-of-democracy 
norms of the organization as opposed to those that specifically invoke the primary democratic 
instruments (Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter in the OAS). In order 
to invoke these primary documents, there must be higher levels of political will, agreement on 
the nature of the crisis, and agreement on what types of outcomes follow from the invocation of 
the resolution. In other words, the OAS can either pass only a resolution expressing support for 
the embattled government or condemning the events of the crisis in a member state or they can 
pass a resolution that specifically invokes the primary democratic instruments as part of the 
response. These are considered two separate responses, as the need for consensus on whether to 
invoke the primary democratic instruments is greater, since the invocation sets into motion a 
series of mechanisms to respond to the crisis. I will discuss those mechanisms in further detail 
shortly. 
 The OAS can also send missions to the crisis country. These missions include fact-
finding missions, where a designated member or group from the OAS goes to the country to 
meet with government and opposition officials to better understand the situation on-the-ground 
as well as good offices, where the Secretary General of the OAS or another respected individual 
or group visit the country, using the weight and prestige of their office, to comment on and 
discuss the situation in the crisis country. Political missions can also include mediation attempts, 
whether short-term or long-term. Due to the variation of the extent of each mission in terms of 
authority, commitment, and time, they are considered to be three distinct responses from regional 
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organizations, held broadly under the term “political missions.” As a result, they will be studied 
as three different responses available to the OAS. It is important to note that the OAS can send 
missions to member states without explicit permission from the Permanent Council, but due to 
the influence of sovereignty as a key norm in the region, the undertaking of a mission still 
requires the consent of the crisis state. 
 Finally, the OAS can suspend a member from the organization. This response has only 
been used twice in the history of the OAS: the first was the suspension of Cuba in 1962 
following the deterioration in relations between the United States and Cuba in the post-
revolutionary period. The second was the suspension of Honduras in 2009 following the coup 
d’etat against President Manuel Zelaya. Mercosur has also suspended a member-state in response 
to a democratic crisis, suspending Paraguay after the impeachment and removal of President 
Fernando Lugo in 2012. Since suspension is used so rarely, but constitutes the most severe 
punishment regional organizations can level against a member-state, I include threats of 
suspension as a response the OAS can take- since the threat of suspension can sufficiently warn a 
member-state of the consequences of continuing with an undemocratic action.  
 With regards to invocation of the primary democratic instruments and the suspension of a 
country from the OAS, it is important to note the specific clauses of the Organization of 
American States that authorize those actions. Resolution 1080, adopted at the OAS General 
Assembly Meeting in 1991, instructs the Secretary General of the OAS to call for the immediate 
convocation of the Permanent Council to address “any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or 
irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise 
of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization’s member states” 
so that the Permanent Council can analyze the situation and determine whether to convene an ad 
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hoc meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or a special session of the General Assembly. 
The meeting of the Permanent Council and the meetings of either the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs or General Assembly must occur within a ten-day period. If a special session of the 
General Assembly or meeting of Ministers is called, the purpose of the meeting is “to look into 
the events collectively and adopt any decisions deemed appropriate, in accordance with the 
Charter and international law” (AG/Res. 1080 (XXI-O/91).  
 Section Four, Articles 17-22 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter fall under the 
heading, “Strengthening and Preservation of Democratic Institutions,” and form the basis of the 
defense of democracy clauses for the Organization since 2001.5 These Articles can be divided 
into two main groups: The first group includes Articles 17 and 18 and “provide the basis for 
constructive, preventive, and proactive collective action” (Cooper 2004, 106). The government 
of a member state can invoke Article 17 if it considers that “its democratic political institutional 
process or its legitimate exercise of power is at risk.” If a member state requests the invocation of 
Article 17, the government can seek additional assistance from the Secretary General or the 
Permanent Council for the strengthening and preservation of its democratic system.  
As noted by Cooper (2004), Article 18 establishes the notion of “community watch” or 
“collective vigilance” in that the Secretary General or a member state of the Permanent Council 
can request the application of Article 18 when a situation “arises in a member state that may 
affect the development of its democratic political institutional process or the legitimate exercise 
of power.” However, in order for the Secretary General or Permanent Council to arrange for 
visits or other actions to analyze the situation, the member state in question must give prior 
consent. As noted by Cooper (2004: 106), Articles 17 and 18 take into account and try to balance 
                                                 
5
 The full text of these articles is located in the appendix. 
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the norms of sovereignty and “community watch” by allowing for the invocation of the articles 
in a proactive way, but still function as a “by invitation only” or “prior consent principle” as a 
requirement for collective action from the OAS. Specifically, Article 18 means any member state 
can request the application of Article 18 if there is concern about the development of democracy 
in another state, but the member state of concern can refuse to allow the visits or other actions 
authorized by Article 18. 
 The second group, Articles 19-22, authorize the Organization to take action if there is an 
unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or if there is an unconstitutional alteration 
of the constitutional regime. Articles 19, 20, 21, and 22 refer to the actions the main institutions 
of the Organization, the Permanent Council and General Assembly, are authorized to take if 
there is an “unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration 
of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state” 
(IADC Article 19). In the cases that meet the definition of unconstitutional interruption, any 
member state or the Secretary General is authorized to convene the Permanent Council to assess 
the situation and to “take such decisions as it deems appropriate” (Article 20). If diplomatic 
initiatives fail, the Permanent Council can convene a special session of the General Assembly, 
during which the General Assembly, with an affirmative vote of two thirds of the member states, 
can suspend a member state. If a country is suspended, the Organization will continue to attempt 
to restore democracy in the state through diplomatic initiatives (Article 21). The state can be 
readmitted after the “situation that led to the suspension is resolved” and an affirmative vote of 
two thirds of the member states in the General Assembly can lift the suspension of the state 
(Article 22). One of the key issues in the Organization, and one I’ll discuss in greater detail in the 
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theory section, is how “unconstitutional alteration or interruption” is understood and how that 
affects the responses to presidential crises in Latin America 
1.5 Universe of Cases 
 My universe of cases is “presidential crises” in Latin America and encompasses multiple 
threats against the elected president (coup d’etats (both successful coups and attempted, but 
unsuccessful coups), dubious impeachment proceedings and other dubious congressional 
maneuvers, and social protests demanding the resignation or removal of the president, as well as 
democratic crises perpetrated by the president in office, such as autogolpes and cases of 
presidential abuse of power. I primarily choose from the crises identified in the works by Dexter 
Boniface (2007), Jennifer McCoy (2006), and Leiv Marsteintredet (2014), with some additions 
to account for the post 2007 period and crises outside of Marsteintredet’s universe of cases.6 For 
the current project, I limit the cases to the region of Latin America, excluding the Caribbean, for 
a variety of reasons. The first is to control for government type: all cases in my selection are 
presidential systems. This excludes countries such as Haiti and many Caribbean countries that 
are semi-presidential or parliamentary systems. I focus on the region of Latin America due to the 
development and strength of the defense-of-democracy regime compared to other regions in the 
world. Although the African Union and ASEAN include provisions for democracy in their 
charters, they do not have the same extent of shared history nor do they have a defense-of-
democracy regime as extensive as the one in Latin America. As Van Klaveren notes, the 
development of the norms regarding democracy promotion in the region means “Latin America 
has become the only effective testing ground for international democratic activism in the 
developing world” (Van Klaveren 2001: 121).  
                                                 
6
 Marsteintredet’s universe of cases is focused on presidential interruptions, meaning the “premature, extraordinary, 
and forced exit of an elected president that does not lead to a democratic breakdown” (2013: 2). He does not include 
abuses of power by the executive, nor does he include cases in which the executive survived the removal attempt.  
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The list of cases and the nature of the case is on the next page in Figure 1.3. 
Figure 3: List of Crises 
Threats to the Executive (n=16) Nature of Crisis Presidential 
Overreach of Power 
(n=15) 
Nature of Crisis 
Venezuela 1992 Coup d’etat attempt Peru 1992 Autogolpe 
Paraguay 1996 Coup d’etat attempt Guatemala 1993 Autogolpe 
Ecuador 1997 Questionable 
impeachment 
Peru 2000 Electoral Fraud 
Paraguay 1999 Coup d’etat attempt Ecuador 2004 Inter-branch conflict 
Paraguay 2000 Coup d’etat attempt Bolivia 2006 Constituent Assembly 
Conflicts 
Ecuador 2000 Coup d’etat  Bolivia 2007 Constituent Assembly 
Conflicts, mass protests 
Argentina 2001 Mass protests and 
presidential resignation 
Venezuela 2007 Government refuses to 
renew broadcasting 
license for opposition 
media 
Venezuela 2002 Coup d’etat attempt Ecuador 2007 Constituent Assembly 
Conflicts 
Bolivia 2003 Mass protests and 
presidential resignation 
Nicaragua 2008 Electoral Fraud 
Peru 2004 Mass protests against the 
president, no resignation 
Nicaragua 2009 Lack of separation of 
powers 
Bolivia 2005 Mass protests and 
presidential resignation 
Panama 2009-2010 Executive allegedly 
spied on opposition 
figures 
Ecuador 2005 Mass protests and 
questionable removal of 
president 
Venezuela 2009 Lack of separation of 
powers, curtailed 
opposition powers 
Nicaragua 2005 Questionable 
impeachment threat 
Venezuela 2010 Lack of separation of 
powers 
Honduras 2009 Coup d’etat Nicaragua 2010 Lack of separation of 
powers 
Ecuador 2010 Police protest with some 
violence 
Nicaragua 2011 Lack of separation of 
powers, electoral fraud 
Paraguay 2012 Questionable 
impeachment 
 
1.6 Methodology 
 I employ a multi-method approach to test my argument. Due to the medium-N nature of 
my universe of cases (31), I use correlation and chi-squared tests represented in cross-tabulations 
tables to first investigate the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable, disaggregated into six response types available to the Organization of American States 
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Permanent Council and General Assembly (OAS).7 I then investigate two sets of paired case 
study comparisons, choosing two cases from the coup crises group and two from the near-coup 
crises group to determine how well my theory transfers to cases that are not explicitly clear and 
severe. The cases to be studied are: Group One (Coup Crises): Ecuador 2000 and Honduras 2009 
and Group Two (Near-Coup Crises): Bolivia 2003 and Ecuador 2004-2005. After the paired case 
studies, I demonstrate that regional intergovernmental organizations in the Americas can 
generally be characterized as clubs of presidents that are more likely to ignore violations of the 
democratic order by an executive but respond when a president is being challenged. I look at 
numerous cases across time to demonstrate that this argument holds not only for the OAS, but 
also for Mercosur and UNASUR. 
 The use of paired case-study approaches as a method to study political phenomena can be 
justified by reviewing the arguments of George and Bennett (2005) and King, Keohane, and 
Verba (1994). They argue that well-designed and executed case study designs can lead to “valid 
causal inferences” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 45) and that case studies can often capture 
details that large-N statistical models cannot. In the case studies, I use process-tracing to 
determine the causal effects of my independent variables on the variation of intergovernmental 
responses. Process-tracing as a method has received strong support from scholars in the 
discipline based on the ability of process tracing in case studies offering “thick descriptions” to 
demonstrate the causal mechanisms underlying a relationship (Crasnow 2012: 657; George and 
Bennett 2005). Additionally, case studies using process tracing allow researchers to observe the 
process and mechanisms driving a relationship that quantitative research is less able to capture 
(Crasnow 2012; Laitin and Milner 2002).  
                                                 
7
 The six types of responses available are: (1) No response, (2) Meeting of the Permanent Council, (3) Resolution 
passed by Permanent Council, (4) Invocation of 1080 or IADC in resolution, (5) Authorization of a mission (fact-
finding mission, mediation, good offices, etc) and (6) threat of or implementation of sanctions. 
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1.7 Significance of Question 
The variation in international responses to democratic crises in Latin America deserves 
further attention for a variety of reasons. While much literature is written about the role of 
international actors and crises, there are few systematic studies that address the question of why 
international organizations intervene in some cases and not others, and why they choose the type 
of response they choose.  The literature review demonstrated that there have been attempts at 
understanding the variation in responses to democratic crises, but that the literature tends to 
focus on an overall summary of the types of threats with minimal attention paid to the 
mechanisms underlying the variation in responses. Additionally, the literature fails to address 
variation in the cases that aren’t clear instances of a crisis or aren’t severe threats to democracy. 
As a result, the field is lacking explanations for variations in responses from IGOs to crises that 
erode democracy over time. Without an understanding of the reasons behind the variations in 
these responses, we will be limited in our ability as scholars to inform practitioners of ways to 
support and strengthen democracy in the region. 
In addition, this project seeks to add to the literature by focusing on the role of 
international organizations in domestic democratic crises, particularly crises that present a threat 
to presidential power. Since much of the literature on international intervention and mediation 
focuses on either interstate conflicts or intrastate conflicts during wartime, this project changes 
the focus and adds to the literature on international intervention by looking at the role of 
international actors and their responses during democratic crises that do not reach the same levels 
of violence as civil wars or other conflicts. It also adds to the literature by building on prior work 
regarding international intervention in domestic crises by seeking to understand the conditions 
under which international actors intervene in these crises and which response they choose. It is 
also important to look beyond the responses of the Organization of American States at other 
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regional organizations, such as UNASUR and Mercosur, especially since these organizations 
also include defense-of-democracy clauses as essential parts of their institutional charters.  
Finally, the focus on presidential crises as a subset of democratic crises adds to the 
literature by narrowing in on a key set of crises to democracy that encompass not only opposition 
or inter-branch politics, but also the abuse of power by an executive. Since presidential systems 
are the dominant institutional model in Latin America and the stability of presidential systems 
for the consolidation of democracy has been questioned, presidential crises represent a vital area 
of study (Linz 1990; Stepan and Skach 1993; Lamounier 1994). If the stability and consolidation 
of democracy are more difficult in presidential systems, and if the norm of international response 
is growing in the region, we should expect to see a more consistent application of the defense of 
democracy to cases that pose the clearest threat to democratic stability: threats to the president.  
1.8 Outline of the Remaining Chapters 
 In the next chapter I will discuss in more detail how the clarity and severity of a crisis 
determines the international response, and how one theoretically deals with cases in which the 
levels of clarity or severity vary. When a crisis isn’t clearly a violation of the charter or 
Resolution 1080 and severity varies, what determines the extent of response from regional 
organizations? I argue that the components of bounded rationality matter, in that time, 
ideological polarization in the organization, imperfect information, and uncertainty regarding the 
consequences of responding to unclear crises determine the variation of responses. Chapter 3 
provides empirical tests and analyses of the data and hypotheses, demonstrating correlation 
between the main explanatory variables and responses from the OAS.  
 Drawing from the empirical demonstrations of the argument, I turn to an in-depth 
discussion in Chapters Four and Five of paired case-study comparisons to demonstrate how 
variations in severity and clarity in similar types of crises led to a divergence in responses for 
39 
 
those crises. I also demonstrate in the case study chapters the role of the intervening variables of 
time, polarization, information, and uncertainty. Chapter Six tests the “Club of Presidents” 
argument, demonstrating that regional IGOs in Latin America are biased towards protecting 
presidents, especially if and when a president explicitly requests assistance (regardless of the 
severity of the crisis). In addition to protecting presidents when they are being threatened, 
regional organizations are less likely to punish a president for undemocratic behavior. I 
demonstrate this argument through a broad comparison of numerous cases incorporating cases of 
threat to the executive as well as instances of presidential overreach. In the conclusion, I discuss 
the implications of my findings for the defense of democracy in Latin America and the role of 
regional IGOs in promoting democracy in Latin America.   
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2  Chapter Two: A Theory of Clarity and Severity in Domestic Democratic Crises 
As demonstrated in Chapter One, it is apparent that there has been variation in responses 
to the variety of democratic crises seen in the Western Hemisphere since the end of the Cold 
War. What explains this variation in responses from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to 
democratic crises in Latin America? Prior arguments fail to account for why this variation exists 
or fail to delve deeper into why states are less willing to address issues of democratic deepening 
than they are to address issues of democratic survival. The argument for this project is that as 
states calculate their own self-interests and their own ability to respond to a democratic crisis, the 
clarity and severity of the crisis in question determines the variation of responses. Ultimately, as 
I will show in this chapter, when clarity and severity are high, member states in international 
organizations are more likely to agree on a response and act based on that agreement. However, 
when clarity and severity are low, other factors, such as ideological polarization, time, imperfect 
information, and the uncertainty of the consequences of action become more important in 
determining whether there will be a response. By incorporating these other factors into the 
process of decision-making in regional IGOs, I develop a theory that explains the variation in 
responses to crises that are neither clear nor severe and, by doing so, demonstrate the limitations 
of regional IGOs in responding to democratic crises in Latin America.  
2.1 Why Clarity and Severity Matter 
There are two main arguments regarding the roles of clarity and severity for this project. 
The first is that high levels of clarity (defined as how clearly the crisis is a violation of the 
primary democracy clauses of the OAS) and severity (defined as the extent to which the crisis 
threatens the fundamental foundation of democracy in the crisis state) lead to stronger responses 
 from IGOs. When a crisis is clear and severe, the member
likely to not only convene a meeting and pass a resolution, but the resolution
invoke the primary democratic instruments and the member
likely to agree to send a mission to address the crisis. 
Clarity and severity matter primarily because during crises of high clarity and sev
member-states are more able to agree on the type of crisis and how to respond to it. They can 
more easily identify that the crisis is a violation of the democracy clauses and commitments of 
the regional organizations and can then use those as a guid
other words, when a crisis is clearly a violation of the democratic order and the crisis is a threat 
to the fundamental foundation of democracy in a crisis state, the acto
on the type of crisis and how best to respond to it to restore the democratic order. They can then 
act based on a collectively perceived “clear” and “severe” violation, using a greater range of 
responses available to the regional IGOs. This relationship between clarity, sev
responses to democratic crises by regional 
Figure 4: Relationship Between Clarity, Severity, and Responses
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regarding the appropriateness and consequences of acting, are likely to influence the response 
from regional intergovernmental organizations. High levels of clarity and severity play a 
mitigating role on the impact of these other factors in regional IGOs.  As a result, when clarity 
and severity are low, we need to consider the impact of these other factors, as their role is 
important in explaining the variation of responses from regional IGOs to democratic crises in 
Latin America. Drawing from Simon’s (1947, 1979) and March’s (1994) works on decision-
making behavior, the role of imperfect information, uncertainty, ideological polarization, and 
time can help to explain how and why regional intergovernmental organizations in Latin 
America do not respond consistently to democratic crises that lack clarity and severity. A theory 
that builds on their prior work will help us understand more clearly the reasons for the variation 
in responses to crises of low severity and clarity.  
2.2 When Clarity and Severity are Low: The Role of Information, Time, Uncertainty, and 
Polarization 
 
The importance of information in politics grounds itself primarily in rational choice 
theory. According to rational choice theory, individuals are utility maximizers who seek to gain 
the outcome that most closely aligns with their preferences.  Models of rational choice theory 
tend to assume that actors have perfect or near-perfect information, that actors make decisions 
based on the logic of consequences, that there are few, if any, competing preferences, and that 
actors have the ability to weigh all choices and consequences (March 1994: 4). In pure rational 
choice theory, if an actor’s choices appear to be suboptimal to an outside observer, it is because 
“the observer’s perspective is incomplete” and that actors are usually involved in multiple games 
that may change the optimal outcome for the whole network of games (Tsebelis 1990, 7). 
However, the assumption that actors have perfect information is not reflective of reality in 
international politics. As Simon (1979) argues, actors do not have access to perfect information 
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and as a result, they are bound to the information they have, their ability to process that 
information, and the timeframe within which they are able to act (see also March 1994). We can 
explain the apparent suboptimal outcomes in decision-making behavior as a result of the 
limitations of knowledge on human beings and note that while individuals intend to be rational, 
they are only rational to the extent of the information they have.   
 The role of information in decision-making is the main crux of not only limited 
rationality, but also a significant part of my theory of decision-making during democratic crises. 
Pure rational choice theory assumes perfect information and that the preferences of actors are 
known and ordered. In reality, information is not perfect nor are the preferences of actors clearly 
and neatly ordered over time, leading to variations in ideological polarization in regional 
organizations. If applied to cases of democratic crises, this reality of bounded rationality and 
changes in ideological polarization means that IGO behavior will be greatly affected by how 
clear a crisis is- that is, given limited information, ideological polarization, uncertainty over the 
consequences of responding, and time constraints, cases of clear crisis are ones that are easier for 
IGOs to respond to. When a crisis is not clear, these other factors affect whether or not the 
regional IGOs will respond to a crisis.   
With regards to information, the highly interconnected world in which these crises are 
occurring means we are often dealing with multiple types of actors such as government officials 
(i.e. ambassadors), opposition actors, governments of states, nongovernmental organizations, and 
representatives of intergovernmental organizations, offering information in any given crisis. The 
preferences and biases of these various groups are likely to conflict with one another, and the 
information each actor considers and acts from will vary. This is where the clarity of a crisis 
matters most: if the crisis is clearly a violation of the democratic order and consensus exists on 
44 
 
what is occurring, then biases are less influential, polarization can more easily be overcome in 
the organization, it takes less time to determine a response, and appropriate reactions can be 
more clearly linked to the fundamental democracy clauses and charters of the intergovernmental 
organizations to offer credence and legitimacy to the actions of the international community, 
making those actions more likely to be based on a consensual decision within the organization.  
When there is a lack of clarity as to whether a situation constitutes an interruption or 
alteration of the democratic order, consensus is more difficult to achieve and responses from the 
international community are less likely to include the invocation of the primary democratic 
instruments and are more likely to consist of either no response at all, or be limited to statements 
of concern from individual states, statements from the OAS Secretary General, or a meeting of 
the member-states but with no further actions (i.e. no resolutions, no missions, etc). At this point, 
actors are more likely to be biased by preexisting beliefs and will tend to overlook facts that 
contradict their prior beliefs, leading to greater influence of ideological polarization in the IGOs. 
As March (1994) states: “They (decision makers) are more likely to seek to confirm their 
existing information than to acquire or notice disconfirming information” and “tend to rely from 
one cue and exclude others from consideration” when inconsistent information comes to light 
(38). It is easier for actors to work from their preexisting biases and use those to direct their 
actions when the clarity of a crisis is questioned. This theory is supported by the work of 
Daniella Donno (2010), who argues that the variation in responses from international 
organizations to electoral misconduct can be explained by two main factors: competing 
geopolitical interests and the degree of uncertainty regarding the extent and intentionality of the 
misconduct. Where there are higher levels of uncertainty regarding the electoral misconduct, it is 
less likely that the international community will respond.  
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To add to the difficulty of incomplete or irrelevant information for decision-makers, the 
regional documents that address democratic defense are not clear on what constitutes a violation 
of the commitments to democracy in the various agreements, leading to a lack of information on 
the basis of what would constitute a response.  For example, the definition of a “sudden or 
irregular” alteration is not spelled out in the resolutions of international organizations, and as a 
result it is much more understandable why international responses to crises vary. Agreement on 
what constitutes a representative democracy has also been contentious, with the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter (IADC) of 2001 being the first to start to clearly attribute characteristics to 
representative democracy. “Essential elements” of representative democracy, according to the 
IADC, are items such as: “the holding of periodic free and fair elections” and “respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms” (IADC Section 1, Article 3)8. Various interpretations of 
human rights and the responsibilities of the state in providing and securing those human rights 
are present in governmental discourse amongst the international community. However, despite 
the growth of a consensus on what constitutes representative democracy, the IADC is still vague 
as to what constitutes an interruption or alteration of the democratic order (McCoy 2001, Cooper 
2004: 107).  Without clarification of what constitutes a violation of the democratic order or the 
constitutional regime and without the explicit understanding of the extent to which the OAS and 
other IOs have responsibility for democratic consolidation, the role of competing information, 
ideological polarization, and a lack of clarity on what constitutes a violation of the democratic 
order will continue to limit the ability of the international community to address crises as they 
                                                 
8The full text of Article Three of the IADC is: 
“Essential elements of representative democracy include, inter alia, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free, and 
fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people, the 
pluralistic system of political parties and organizations, and the separation of powers and independence of the 
branches of government.” Article Four also includes transparency, respect for social rights, freedom of expression 
and the press, civilian-led government, and respect for rule of law as essential elements of democracy. 
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unfold. As March argues, without a common understanding of what a crisis entails “decision 
makers may have difficulty acting, and social systems may have difficulty enduring” (1994: 39). 
In order to understand the role of information for my specific case studies, I sought to ask 
a combination of specific and general questions that addressed the role of information, such as 
how the international and national actors themselves defined the crisis or an interruption and/or 
alteration of the democratic order and how they addressed and evaluated events that were not 
clearly unconstitutional, but did clearly violate the spirit of representative democracy in the 
region. Beyond these interviews, I also analyzed the documents from the IOs to determine how 
the actors labeled the crisis. Did they have consensus about the type of crisis occurring, or were 
there different, competing labels? When there was a disagreement over what was occurring in a 
particular country or whether the actions of the government or opposition were violating the 
democratic order, the clarity of that crisis was lower and action from the OAS or other regional 
organizations was less likely. 
With regards to time, one of the main critiques of international organizations, and the 
Organization of American States in particular, is that the rules of the Organization lend 
themselves to delayed action as opposed to the ability to act quickly and decisively in the face of 
a democratic interruption (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Hardt 2009). This critique is not only 
applicable to the OAS, but also to the other regional IGOs. In the OAS, most actions by the 
organization require a two-thirds vote, although consensus decision-making is typically preferred 
for most actions taken by the Permanent Council. Similar to the rules of the OAS, a unanimous 
vote is necessary to suspend a member-state from Mercosur, per Article Six of the Ushuaia 
Protocol. The same is true according to the Charter of the recently formed Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The need to have consensus among the member-
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states of the organizations leads to a situation where decisions may take longer to make and, 
more importantly, consensus may not be achieved, leading to limited action. In some cases, 
timing is even more important in that the organizations may not even have time to meet before 
the immediate crisis is over, such as Venezuela 2002.  
Even though some of the organizational rules seem to allow for quick action, member-
state reactions can hamper any further progress. For example, in the OAS any member can 
request convocation of the Permanent Council, but further action can be stymied by divisions 
amongst the actors or by stalling tactics of the crisis state, as we saw between Venezuela, 
Panama, and the OAS during the crisis in Venezuela in March 2014. Where events are more 
clearly democratic crises due to the undemocratic behavior of actors, consensus is more easily 
achieved, thus making the response from the international community more likely to be quicker 
and stronger. When an event in a member state is less clearly a violation of the primary 
democratic instruments, actors must spend more time discerning whether the event necessitates a 
response from the international organization as well as what type of response is appropriate for 
the balancing of democratic defense and sovereignty of the member states. A less clear crisis also 
requires time of the decision-makers for them to discern from which sectors the threat is coming 
from and which responses will best fit the crisis. That being said, the Secretary-General of the 
OAS and the individual ambassadors of the member-states are still able to express their concern 
over a crisis, support for or condemnation of different actors within a member-state during a 
crisis, and to call for meetings with the Permanent Council over a crisis in a member-state. So 
while timing and information may mean that more in-depth responses, such as sanctions from 
IOs or states, military action, or mediations, are less likely to occur, we may still see statements 
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(diplomatic responses) from the Secretary-General of the OAS and public officials of the 
member-states in the region, although the weight of such actions is much less. 
2.3 The Role of Uncertainty and Polarization 
The historical experience of many of the Latin American states is one of unbridled 
intervention in their domestic affairs by either the government of the United States or by 
multinational corporations supported by the United States. As a result, the norm of sovereignty, 
especially with regards to democratic deepening, is guarded by the states of the region. There is 
still the belief by many Latin Americans that the United States will overstep the bounds of 
sovereignty when it benefits the U.S., despite the consequences for Latin Americans. Uncertainty 
of the consequences of violating the principle of sovereignty in order to defend democracy in a 
neighboring state creates hesitation among the states of the region. As Arceneaux and Pion-
Berlin point out, the difference in the willingness of international actors to respond to crises that 
are less clear may be because they fall into the realm of democratic deepening, rather than 
democratic defense, and other states will “tend to not push too far for democratic deepening” due 
to concerns not only regarding the notion of sovereignty, but also because states do not want 
their own “internal system to be looked at too deeply” (2005: 20). The uncertainty regarding the 
evolution of a norm that deepens the ability of external actors to comment and respond to 
domestic issues threatens the leaders of many Latin American states who recall a time when the 
United States and other actors were often deeply involved in the domestic affairs of the states 
within the region. Additionally, the fear that international organizations may not support them if 
they are ever in a crisis situation may also mean that they attempt to stonewall any action from 
the international organization while trying to find alternate ways to manage the crisis 
domestically, using the principle of sovereignty to prevent action from regional organizations.  
Combine these concerns with the fundamental dissonance between the principles of non-
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intervention and democratic defense and timely action from regional organizations has multiple 
obstacles to overcome.  
 The role of competing norms and ideological polarization within the organization is also 
a vital point to address. The most obvious competing norms that have led to polarization are the 
norms of democratic defense (especially as described in Resolution 1080 and the IADC from the 
OAS and the Ushuaia Protocol from Mercosur) and the principle of sovereignty. The competition 
of these norms is not unique to the Americas, especially as the norm of democracy continues to 
find additional strength in the global community. However, the legacy of European and U.S. 
intervention in the affairs of Latin American states has also led to a system where sovereignty is 
fiercely guarded within the region, especially when the governments in power are from the left of 
the political spectrum. Consensus on the balance between sovereignty and democratic defense 
has not yet been achieved and an agreement on democratic deepening and the role of the 
international community seems even more distant. While Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin (2005) 
argue that democratic defense has been steadily moving towards the realm of high politics, and 
therefore sovereignty is less of a barrier, the lack of clarity on when and to what extent a crisis 
counts as democratic defense remains a barrier to collective action. 
 Ideological polarization among the key actors both in and out of the regional IGOs also 
contributes to the variation in the responses of the international community in the face of 
democratic crises. These competing differences can exist not only between the representatives of 
different member-states within an organization, but also between the representative to an 
organization and his or her home government. As decision-makers are analyzing their own 
position, preferences, and potential actions, they are also considering the likely position of other 
decision-makers with whom they are interacting. March (1994) argues “each decision maker acts 
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on the basis of probable actions of the others, knowing that they are doing the same” (38). 
Especially in cases where information is tightly guarded regarding domestic events in a crisis 
country as well as concerns of potential crises in a decision-maker’s home country, each actor is 
analyzing the situation without the full knowledge assumed by pure rational choice theory. 
 Preferences of the various actors in the region as to which international organization 
should lead the international response have also been changing drastically in the past decade and, 
as a result, polarization in the OAS and in the region has increased. The rise of the Bolivarian 
Revolution and the election of leftists in governments throughout the region led to the 
development of intergovernmental organizations specifically designed to exclude the United 
States. In the recent 2014 Venezuela crisis, the Venezuelan government stonewalled action from 
the OAS, but accepted a visit from a delegation from UNASUR, most likely due to the belief by 
Venezuelan leaders that UNASUR would be less biased against the Venezuelan government than 
the OAS. In April of 2014, the Venezuelan government and the opposition in Venezuela agreed 
to a dialogue between them, with UNASUR and the Catholic Church mediating. The rise in the 
number of regional organizations means that different preferences will become even more 
apparent as alternatives to the OAS emerge. 
 The variation in the combination of these four factors- information, time, uncertainty and 
polarization- leads to the variation in the responses by international actors to different democratic 
crises. Figure 2.2 below demonstrates this argument.  
 Figure 5: The Impact of Intervening Factors when Clarity or Severity is Low
Chart 2.2 demonstrates how the four factors described above impact the likelihood of a 
response from regional intergovernmental organizations during crises where clarity and se
are low. When clarity or severity are low, the likelihood of consensus regarding
as well as the threat it poses to the fundamental foundation of democracy is lower, meaning the 
effects of time, imperfect information, 
are larger. As a result, consensus is le
IGO and action in response to the democratic crisis is likely to be limited, or, in some cases, to 
not exist at all. The expected responses from the OAS during variations in clarity or severity are 
demonstrated in Figure 2.3 below.
Clarity and severity of crisis 
low
• Consensus on type of 
violation does not exist 
or  it is unclear as to 
whether a violation has 
occurred
• Threat to fundamental 
foundation of democracy 
due to the crisis is low
Effects of Bounded 
Rationality become more 
important
• Information regarding 
the crisis and its nature 
is limited or conflicting
• Time needed to consider 
the crisis increases
• Polarization matters to a 
greater extent
• Uncertainty of the 
consequences of a 
response is higher
 
ideological polarization, and the uncertainty of a response 
ss likely to be achieved among the member
 
Likelihood of consensus for 
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• Due to effects of 
bounded rationality, 
consensus on whether to 
respond  and how to 
respond is less likely to 
be achieved 
Crisis is less likely to receive 
a response  or will receive a 
iimited response from IGOs
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member-states unable to 
agree on response for 
IGO to take
• Responses from IOs 
limited to those that do 
not require votes from 
members or that are 
minimally intrusive to 
crisis state
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 Figure 6: Variations in Severity and Clarity and OAS Responses
 
 Figure 6 demonstrates the expected relationship between clarity, severity and responses 
from the OAS as the levels of clarity and severity vary. In cases of high severity and high clarity, 
I expect to see the greatest range of responses, with the Permanent Council
meeting, issuing a resolution, and invoking the primary democratic instruments, such as 
Resolution 1080 or the IADC. In these cases, the impact of the intervening variables of 
uncertainty, information, polarization
the coup d’état in Honduras (2009), the autogolpe by President Alberto Fujimori 
and the coup d’état in Ecuador (2000). 
 In cases where the severity of the crisis is high, but where the clarity of w
is a violation of the primary democratic instruments is low, I expect to see the
Council meet and fact-finding missions
invocation of the primary democratic instruments 
to see divisions amongst the member states on whether the invocation of those documents is 
appropriate, especially since it is not clear if the crisis falls under the jurisdiction of the primary 
High Severity
High Clarity
Outcome: Greatest range of responses, including 
invocation of 1080 or IADC
Archetypal Examples: Honduras 2009, Peru 1992, 
Ecuador 2000
Low Severity
High Clarity
Outcome: Meetings, Resolutions, No invocation  
Archetypal Examples: Bolivia 2003, Ecuador 2010
 
 of the OAS holding a 
, and time is lowest. Examples of this type 
 
 OAS Permanent 
 to be sent. Resolutions from the Permanent Council and 
for those crises are likely to be mixed. I expect 
High Severity
Low Clarity
Outcome: Meetings, Authorization of missions, 
Invocation mixed
Archetypal Examples: Ecuador 2005, Paraguay 2012
Low Severity
Low Clarity
Outcome: Little or no response, Highest impact of 
intervening variables
Archetypal Examples: Ecuador 2007, Bolivia 2007
Variations in Severity and 
Clarity and the Expected 
Outcomes
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of crisis include 
in Peru (1992), 
hether the crisis 
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democratic instruments. I also expect to see hesitancy regarding the issuance of resolutions 
because the lack of clarity on whether the crisis is a violation of the primary democratic 
instruments will also lead to a division on the underlying reasons for the crisis and the 
appropriate response to the crisis. As a result, the OAS Permanent Council will be less likely to 
be able to come to agreement regarding a course of action, leading to more limited responses. 
Examples of this type of crisis include Ecuador 2005 (the removal of President Lucio Gutiérrez 
by Congress for “abandoning his post”) and Paraguay 2012 (the questionable impeachment 
proceedings against President Fernando Lugo).  
 When a crisis is one of low severity but high clarity, meaning it is clear that the primary 
democratic instruments could be invoked if the crisis continues, but the situation has not yet 
evolved into a crisis of high severity, invocation is less likely. I expect the Permanent Council to 
hold meetings and issue resolutions regarding the crisis, but the invocation of the primary 
democratic instruments will occur only when the government in crisis explicitly requests the 
invocation. Examples of this include the mass protests against and eventual resignation of 
Bolivia President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (2003) and the request by the Bolaños 
government of Nicaragua (2005) to invoke the IADC in response to impeachment threats and the 
reduction of presidential powers by the legislature. 
 Finally, when crises are not clear and not severe, the responses from the OAS will be 
limited or non-existent. The OAS Permanent Council is not likely to hold an extraordinary 
meeting to discuss the crisis, and without a meeting, the Permanent Council will not issue a 
resolution nor authorize any additional missions. In the rare instance that a crisis of low clarity or 
severity is addressed in an ordinary or extraordinary meeting of the Permanent Council, the 
intervening variables of uncertainty, polarization, time, and information are likely to have a 
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greater impact. If there is a response to the crisis in a situation of low severity and clarity, the 
crisis state is likely to have made the request and will guide the response of the OAS to the crisis. 
Examples include the constituent assembly process in Bolivia (2007), the constituent assembly 
process in Ecuador (2007), and instances of presidential overreach in Nicaragua (2008, 2009, 
2010) and Venezuela (2007, 2009, 2010). A table with the cases in each category is located in 
the appendix. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I argued that clarity and severity act to mitigate the influence of 
polarization, time, uncertainty, and imperfect information and therefore help determine the 
variation in responses for crises when clarity or severity are low. When a crisis is clearly a 
violation of the primary democracy clauses of the regional intergovernmental organizations and 
the crisis presents a threat to the fundamental foundation of democracy in the crisis state, the 
member-states of the regional intergovernmental organizations are more likely to find consensus 
regarding the appropriate response to the crisis. In cases of the highest levels of severity and 
clarity, this means the member-states in the IGOs are also more likely to respond to the crisis by 
invoking the primary democratic instruments of the IGO. However, when either clarity or 
severity is low, we must look at the roles of imperfect information, time, uncertainty about 
consequences of responding, and ideological polarization to explain why regional IGOs have 
varied in their responses.  
 In the next chapter I demonstrate the correlation between high levels of clarity, severity, 
and responses from regional intergovernmental organizations. In the following chapters, I will 
demonstrate through process-tracing in paired case studies how imperfect information, 
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uncertainty, time, and polarization have influenced the variation in responses to crises when 
clarity and severity vary. 
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3 Chapter Three: Presidential Crises and Intergovernmental Responses: Empirical 
Results 
What factors best explain when regional intergovernmental organizations such as the 
Organization of American States (OAS) respond to a presidential crisis in a member-state? 
While previous studies have offered explanations, I have argued that they have only offered 
partial explanations for the variation in responses in Latin America. The explanations of prior 
studies have pointed to the type of crisis as a reason for the variation in responses (Arceneaux 
and Pion-Berlin 2005, 2007; Boniface 2007), the role of the regional hegemons in guiding the 
response of the IGO (Burges and Daudelin 2006; Shaw 2003), the role of domestic politics in 
response to the crisis (Levitt 2006), and the influence of norms as a motivation for responses 
(Boniface 2002). To build on this prior literature, I argue that a more accurate explanation for the 
variation in responses to presidential crises in Latin America is a rational choice one that 
demonstrates the importance of the clarity and severity of the crisis in explaining the variation in 
responses. I argue that when clarity and severity are high, member-states are likely to agree on 
the type and extent of the crisis, making consensus on action more likely to be achieved, and, as 
a result, more likely that the regional intergovernmental organizations will respond. When a 
crisis reaches the highest level of severity and is clearly a violation of the primary democracy 
clauses of the regional IGOs, the response from the IGOs is likely to include the invocation of 
the primary democratic instruments. On the other hand, when either clarity or severity is low, the 
intervening variables of imperfect information, uncertainty regarding the consequences of a 
response, time limitations, and ideological polarization matter to a greater extent. These factors 
influence whether the member-states of the organization are able to agree on the type and extent 
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of the crisis, whether the crisis merits a response from the regional IGO, and finally, what type of 
response should be employed.  
I also argue that the regional intergovernmental organizations of the region are “Clubs of 
Presidents,” meaning when a crisis is one that threatens the executive in office, such as mass 
protests calling for his removal or a coup d’etat, the regional IGOs are more likely to respond to 
support the president in danger. Conversely, when the president is the one abusing power and 
potentially violating the democracy clauses of the regional IGOs, the regional intergovernmental 
organizations are likely to either not respond at all or choose less invasive responses. The only 
caveat to this expectation is that the OAS is likely to respond to autogolpes, which are 
considered the most egregious cases of presidential abuse of power. 
 This chapter tests my theory and expectations regarding the relationships between high 
levels of clarity and severity and the responses of the OAS. I also test the theory that the OAS is 
more likely to condemn threats to the president than they are to respond to cases of presidential 
abuse of power. In this chapter, I demonstrate that high levels of clarity and severity are strongly 
correlated with responses from the OAS. I also demonstrate that the Club of President’s 
hypothesis also strongly correlates with responses from the OAS and that the OAS is more likely 
to respond to threats to the president than cases of presidential abuse of power. Due to the small 
number of cases in my study (31 cases), I focus primarily on correlation tables and chi-squared 
tests for statistical significance to demonstrate the correlation between my explanatory variables 
and responses. 
For the correlation tests in this chapter, I focus solely on the responses of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) to presidential crises in the region. The OAS is the only 
organization that is inclusive of all of the states within my case selection. Since Mercosur and its 
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mechanisms would only apply to Paraguay after 1998 and Venezuela after 2012, it was not 
included in the analysis.9 UNASUR’s Additional Protocol on Democracy was not signed until 
2010, after the police protests and violence against President Rafael Correa on the 30th of 
September in Ecuador, and was therefore not included. The case studies chosen for the in-depth 
section will address the role and responses of these other organizations, but considering their 
lack of applicability to all of the countries within the study, as well as the nascent defense-of-
democracy clause for UNASUR, the cross-tabulations used in this chapter are not the appropriate 
method to compare the responses of the other regional organizations.  
 This chapter proceeds as follows: in the next section, I discuss the dependent variable and 
how the dependent variable has been coded to demonstrate the range of responses the OAS can 
take to respond to a presidential crisis in a member-state. I then discuss the coding of the key 
independent variables as well as the alternate variables of linkage and leverage. All of the 
variables for the correlation tests are coded dichotomously. Specific information for the 
thresholds chosen is included in the coding description for each variable.  After each independent 
variable, I outline the specific hypothesized relationship between the independent variable and 
the responses from the OAS. I then turn to the presentation of the correlation tests to demonstrate 
the strength of the relationship between my explanatory variables and responses from regional 
IGOs.  
3.1 Dependent Variable: Responses from the Organization of American States 
The dependent variable can be defined broadly as the response from the Organization of 
American States (OAS). There is a wide range of responses that the OAS can take in the event of 
a democratic crisis. In order to clarify the variety of potential responses available to the 
                                                 
9
 The full members of Mercosur are: Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela. Venezuela gained full 
membership in Mercosur in 2012, during the suspension of Paraguay. 
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organizations, I divide the types of responses into six main ways the regional organizations can 
respond. The responses available to the OAS start with actions that require the least amount of 
political will and agreement and end with formal actions that require significantly more political 
will and agreement. The responses are  
Firstly, the OAS can choose to not respond to a crisis at all. In other words, the Secretary 
General of the OAS may make a comment or issue a statement on an issue, but neither the 
member states nor the Secretary General call for the convocation of a Permanent Council 
meeting. The issue can also never be addressed at all by any entity of the OAS, neither by the 
Secretary General nor by the representatives of the member states at the OAS. As a result, even 
if a crisis is occurring and individual states or the Secretary-General make a comment, there can 
be a lack of official responses from the OAS to the crisis. For the cross-tabulations, I code “no 
response” as a general dichotomous variable: if there is a response of any type from the 
Permanent Council or General Assembly, I code that as a response to the crisis. If there is a 
complete lack of response from the PC or GA, I code that as a non-response.  
The first action the OAS can take is the convocation of a meeting of the Permanent 
Council to discuss the crisis. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets on a regularly scheduled 
basis, but can also be called to convene in an extraordinary meeting in order to address a specific 
issue or crisis. If a crisis is discussed in a regularly scheduled meeting, I also count that as a 
meeting of the Permanent Council regarding the crisis, regardless of whether the meeting was 
specifically called for that individual event. In this way, I can review how the OAS member-
states are discussing crises and determining action, even when it is brought up as part of the 
agenda during a regularly scheduled meeting.  
60 
 
The second action the OAS can take is the passage of a Resolution by the Permanent 
Council regarding the crisis. Resolutions from the OAS represent that a meeting of the PC has 
occurred, that the member states have discussed the crisis, and that they have all agreed on a 
statement regarding the crisis. While the passage of a Permanent Council Resolution represents 
an agreement among the member states of the OAS, it does not represent the most extensive 
action the OAS can take, either with regards to resolutions or to other actions. As a result, it is 
important to differentiate between resolutions that refer vaguely to the defense-of-democracy 
norms of the organization as opposed to those that specifically invoke the primary democratic 
instruments (Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter in the OAS). In order 
to invoke these primary documents, there must be higher levels of political will, agreement on 
the nature of the crisis, and agreement on what types of outcomes follow from the invocation of 
the resolution. The passage of a resolution without the invocation of the primary democracy 
clauses and the passage of a resolution that includes the invocation of the primary democracy 
clauses are counted as two separate, distinct responses. 
 If the Permanent Council passes a resolution, that resolution can also include the 
authorization of the Permanent Council to send missions. These missions include fact-finding 
missions, where a designated member or group from the OAS goes to the country to meet with 
government and opposition officials to better understand the situation on-the-ground as well as 
good offices, where the Secretary General of the OAS or another high-level official visits the 
country, using the weight and prestige of their office, to comment on and discuss the situation in 
the crisis country. Political missions can also include mediation missions, either short-term or 
long-term. Although there is variation in the extent of each mission in terms of authority, 
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commitment, and time, they will be held broadly under the variable “missions” to demonstrate 
whether the Permanent Council or Secretary General undertook a mission to a crisis country.  
 Finally, the OAS can threaten sanctions through the form of threats of suspension or 
actually suspension of a member from the organization. Suspension has only been used twice in 
the history of the OAS: the first was the suspension of Cuba in 1962 following the deterioration 
in relations between the United States and Cuba in the post-revolutionary period. The second 
was the suspension of Honduras in 2009 following the coup d’etat against President Manuel 
Zelaya. Mercosur has also suspended a member-state in response to a democratic crisis, 
suspending Paraguay after the impeachment and removal of President Fernando Lugo in 2012. 
Since suspension is used so rarely, but constitutes the most severe punishment regional 
organizations can level against a member-state, I include threats of suspension as a response the 
OAS can take- since the threat of suspension can sufficiently warn a member-state of the 
consequences of continuing with an undemocratic action.  
 The responses from the OAS are dichotomous variables: “1” if an action was present, “0” 
if it was not. In other words, if the Permanent Council held a meeting, that action is coded as a 
“1”, if no meeting was held; it is coded as a “0”. 
3.2 Explanatory Independent Variables 
Clarity: I define clarity based on how clear the crisis is a violation of the primary democracy 
clauses of the OAS as listed in Resolutions 1080 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. 
Clarity is coded based on how the Organization of American States (OAS) views and discusses 
the crisis in either Permanent Council Meetings or through statements from the Secretary 
General through the official OAS record of Press Releases. I first look through the minutes of the 
meetings corresponding to each crisis when a meeting of the Permanent Council takes place. If 
there is agreement among the member-states and they refer to the crisis using the language of the 
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IADC or Resolution 1080, such as using the phrases “sudden or irregular interruption,” 
“unconstitutional interruption or alteration,” “autogolpe,” or “golpe de estado,” I code that as a 
clear crisis. However, if there is a debate on whether the crisis falls under that language among 
member-states in the OAS, it is coded as not clear, as the presence of a debate on the extent of 
the crisis implies a lack of consensus on whether the crisis is a violation of the primary 
democratic clauses and documents. If there was no meeting regarding the crisis, I look through 
the press releases from the OAS to determine if any member-states [as members of the OAS] or 
the Secretary General spoke out regarding the crisis and how they labeled it. Again, the same 
language is the key for coding the crisis as a clear crisis. If there is no discussion or press 
releases regarding the crisis, it is coded as not clear. If the language above is not used in the 
minutes of the meetings or in the press releases, it is coded as not clear.  
 The expected relationship between clarity and OAS responses can be stated as: 
H1: As the clarity of a violation increases, the likelihood of a response that invokes 
Resolution 1080 or the Inter-American Democratic Charter increases.  
 
Severity: I define severity as the extent to which the crisis threatens the fundamental foundation 
of democracy in the crisis state. I code the severity of a crisis in two ways in order to get a well-
rounded understanding of severity and to determine how the coding of severity may affect the 
results. The first is derived from Boniface’s (2007) chapter regarding the OAS and its record of 
responses to democratic crises. He argues, based on the wording of the various charters and 
agreements of the OAS, that there are essentially three types of crises. Those that represent a 
direct threat to democracy, such as coup d’etats and autogolpes, are most likely to clearly fit the 
definition of an interruption of the democratic order and thus the OAS is more likely to invoke 
its “primary instruments for the defense of democracy” such as Resolution 1080 or the Inter-
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American Democratic Charter (49). These crises include the use of force to unseat elected 
officials (49). Other crises, such as electoral crises, constitutional crises, and other non-coup 
emergencies, are considered “second-order” crises and he argues the OAS will consider these on 
a “case-by-case” basis (50). Third, there are the middle-range crises that are not clearly coups or 
autogolpes, but do contain “significant violence, resignation (and eventual exile) of a sitting 
president, and allegations of a coup” are termed “near-coup crises” and the response of the OAS 
to these crises is “likely to be contentious” (49). Using his trichotomous descriptions of the types 
of crises, I consider the crises he labels as direct threats to be the most severe threats to 
democracy: Peru 1992, Guatemala 1993, Ecuador 2000, Venezuela 2002, and Paraguay 1996. I 
add Honduras 2009 to that list since it fits the same criteria as the other cases. For the empirical 
portion of this project, I code the crises using a dichotomous measure (1 for the direct threats 
(coups and autogolpes), 0 for not severe (all others)).  
I also code severity using the coding scheme developed by Leiv Marsteintredet (2014) in 
his article regarding presidential interruptions. He codes the threat to democracy based on a scale 
from 0 (democratic behavior) to 5 (maximum undemocratic behavior) and then codes for both 
the opposition as well as the president’s behavior. His coding rules, with my additions in 
italics,10 are as follows: “0: Opposition- Demonstrations, Impeachment attempt; President - No 
retaliation, peaceful resignation. 1: Opposition- Continued street demonstrations, dubious 
congressional maneuver; President- non-violent sabotaging of protests, for example, jailing 
opposition, dubious presidential maneuver; 2: Opposition- Illegal behavior /violent 
protests/threats of violence against President; President- Illegal behavior/violent handling of 
                                                 
10 Marsteintredet’s project covers only presidential interruptions, and as a result his universe of cases does not 
perfectly overlap with mine. However, his coding of democratic threats transfers well to this project, and where 
presidential abuse or opposition behavior is not accounted for in his coding, I approximated the best fit and included 
it as an italicized addition to his coding scheme.  
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protests/threats of use of violence against opposition leaders. 3: Opposition- Violence against 
government; President: Violent, targeted attacks, or unconstitutional attack on opposition, key 
actors, institutions, electoral fraud at sub-national level elections; 4: Opposition- Boycotts 
democratic game, for example elections, aims to delegitimize president sufficiently to have him 
ousted; President- electoral fraud for national level elections. 5: Opposition- civil-military coup; 
President- self-coup” (22). This coding of the threat level allows me to analyze multiple actors in 
the democratic crises and clearly label and compare the type and extent of violation of the 
constitutional democratic process. For the cross-tabulations, I use a dichotomous coding of 
severity. I code any crisis that earns a “4” or “5” as a “1” and all others as a “0.” The expected 
relationship between severity and responses from the OAS can be stated as: 
Hypothesis 2: As the severity of a crisis increases, the likelihood of a response that 
invokes Resolution 1080 or the Inter-American Democratic Charter increases. 
 
Threat to the President: My third hypothesis, that the OAS is a “club of presidents” and will be 
more likely to respond to threats to the president than to presidential overreach, is also tested in 
the cross-tabulations. A crisis is coded as a threat to the president if the crisis is one that includes 
one or more of the following: questionable impeachment proceedings, mass protests demanding 
the resignation or removal of the executive, or a coup d’etat (including both attempted coups that 
fail as well as successful coups). If a crisis falls into one of those categories, it is coded as a 
threat to the president and receives a “1.” All other crises are considered cases of presidential 
overreach and are coded as “0.” The relationship between whether the crisis is a threat to the 
president and OAS responses can be stated as. 
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Hypothesis 3: If the crisis is one that threatens the president of the crisis country, the crisis is 
more likely to receive a response that invokes Resolution 1080 or the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter.  
 
 
3.3 Alternative Independent Variables 
 There are two main alternative variables (linkage and leverage) that have been offered for 
an explanation for the variation in responses to democratic crises in Latin America and that can 
be tested using cross-tabulations. Levitsky and Way (2010; 2006) argue that when linkage and 
leverage are high, international factors are more decisive in contributing to democratization, even 
in cases where domestic conditions are less favorable for democratization. Theoretically, their 
argument could also potentially explain the variation in responses to democratic crises in newly 
democratic or democratizing countries. Where linkage and leverage are high, we would expect to 
see a wider range of responses, due to the increase in the salience of that country’s domestic 
issues as well as the increase in leverage to encourage democratic action. Although their 
argument is persuasive and deserves to also be tested in the cross-tabulations, the coding of their 
variables does not accurately reflect the potential for variation in Latin America.11 For example, 
in their coding of leverage, they code whether the country in question has nuclear weapons. The 
Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) declares the region of Latin America and the Caribbean as a nuclear-
weapons free zone. As a result, that indicator of leverage is not appropriate for the region.  
In order to test this argument as an alternative explanation for the variation in responses 
but accounting for factors relevant for Latin America, I created a variable that captures the idea 
                                                 
11 Examples of indicators that are not regionally relevant or deserve greater nuance from Levitsky and Way (2011: 
372-373) include: Total GDP as an indicator of a low leverage country (Total GDP more than $100 billion), 
possession of/capacity to use nuclear weapons, competing security issues (country where there exists a major 
security-related foreign-policy issue for the United States and/or the EU), and countries that receive significant 
bilateral aid (at least 1 percent of GDP), the overwhelming dominant share of which comes from a major power 
other than the US or the EU.  
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of leverage, but with a slight change to the concept. Levitsky and Way are describing the idea 
that some countries are more “insulated” in that they have the ability to resist pressure from the 
international community. As a result, the variable “Insulation” represents the ability a country 
has to resist pressure from the international community during democratic crises. Insulation is an 
aggregate variable and consists of:  
1) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (in current U.S. dollars) taken from the World 
Development Indicators [WDI] index. GDP is coded per country per crisis year. High 
levels of GDP indicate high levels of insulation, following the same logic of Levitsky and 
Way. When a country has high levels of GDP, there is less leverage for the international 
community to use on that country. High levels of GDP thus equal high levels of 
insulation and are coded as “1”, where low levels of insulation coded as “0.” I divide the 
countries into high and low based on the median score within the set of cases. Levitsky 
and Way’s leverage threshold is not applicable as there are only two cases (Argentina and 
Venezuela) that would count as high insulation/low leverage cases (GDP more than $100 
billion). As a result, I create a threshold that reflects the range of variation in the region. 
2) Fuel exports and Metal exports. These form two variables in the aggregate variable. The 
raw data is derived from the WDI. They are measured the same way, so I included them 
in this brief summary together. They are calculated by the WDI as a percentage of total 
merchandise exports. The higher the level of exports of fuel and metal goods, the higher 
the level of insulation. High levels of exports are coded as “1”, low levels are coded as 
“0.” 
3) Aid from the United States and European Union- These consist of two variables (Aid 
from U.S. and Aid from EU) but are measured the same way and are coded from WDI 
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yearly reports, with bilateral aid directly measured between the United States and the 
crisis country and the European Union and the crisis country. Higher levels of aid lead to 
lower levels of insulation, since during a crisis aid-donor countries can choose to suspend 
aid to the crisis country, influencing domestic events. On the other hand, low levels of aid 
indicate higher levels of insulation, as the threat of suspension of aid is less likely to 
affect a country with low levels of aid. Low levels of aid are coded as “1” (high 
insulation) and high levels as “0” (low insulation). 
In order to calculate an insulation score from these individual variables, I sum the dichotomous 
outcomes from each variable. Scores above “3” are considered high levels of insulation (for 
example, a country may have high GDP (1), high fuel exports (1), low metal exports (0), and low 
levels of aid (1). The score for that country would be a “3” and would be considered an 
“Insulated” country). Scores of “2” and below are considered countries with low insulation. 
Based on Levitsky and Way’s understanding of leverage, the expected relationship between 
insulation and OAS responses can be stated as: 
Alternative Hypothesis 1: Crises in countries with higher levels of insulation will receive 
fewer responses from the Organization of American States than in crises in countries 
with lower levels of insulation. 
 
Linkage: I code linkage using the KOF index of globalization scores dataset from 1970-2010. 
Levitsky and Way’s coding of linkage includes economic, social, communication and 
intergovernmental ties; all of which are coded in the KOF index of globalization. I used the KOF 
index of globalization instead of Levitsky and Way’s coding scheme because the KOF index is 
significantly more in-depth and contains multiple variables that all address the concept of 
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Levitsky and Way’s linkage variable but add depth and variation to linkage. For example, while 
social ties for Levitsky and Way are measured by “the average annual number of a country’s 
citizens traveling to or living in the U.S. and EU (1990-2000) as a share of the total country 
population, excluding years when a country is democratic,” the KOF index takes additional 
items, such as telephone contact, foreign population, internet users, trade in newspapers, and 
cultural proximity (as measured by number of McDonald’s Restaurants and Ikea’s as well as 
trade in books) to get a well-rounded representation of social ties. Overall, the KOF index of 
globalization provides a more accurate and deeper picture of ties between countries. I use the 
median score of linkage as the cutoff point. Any countries with a KOF index above the median 
are considered to have high levels of linkage to the West and are coded as “1”, those below the 
median are considered to have low levels of linkage and are coded as “0.” Based on Levitsky and 
Way’s arguments, the expected relationship between linkage and OAS responses can be stated 
as: 
Alternative Hypothesis 2: Crises in countries with higher levels of linkage between the 
crisis country and the West will lead to more responses from the OAS than in crises in 
countries with lower levels of linkage. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
 Table 3.1 contains the results of the cross-tabulations between the independent variables 
and dependent variables and is located on the following page. 
The first cross-tabulations chart demonstrates high levels of correlation and statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level for the explanatory variables “clarity” and “severity” (regardless of 
coding). In every instance where the crisis was clearly a violation of the primary democracy 
clauses, the OAS responded. In every case in which the crisis was clear, the member states of the 
PC gathered for a meeting and passed a resolution. This relationship is also found for severity- in 
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every crisis of high severity, the OAS PC met and passed a resolution, with significance at the 
0.05 level for each relationship. The high level of correlation between these variables 
demonstrates a strong relationship between the clarity that a crisis is a violation of the primary 
democracy clauses of the OAS, the severity of the crisis, and the convocation of a meeting of the 
PC and the passage of a resolution. The correlation and the corresponding p-values give us 
confidence that the strength of this relationship is high. The hypotheses regarding clarity, 
severity, and OAS PC meeting and resolutions are confirmed and in the direction expected. 
The results of the cross-tabulations between clarity, severity, and missions also 
demonstrate significance for those relationships at the 0.05 level. The results demonstrate that 
when a crisis was clear, the OAS was likely to send a mission, doing so eight out of eleven times 
a crisis was occurring.  Similarly, when a crisis was severe, the OAS was likely to authorize a 
mission, doing so 100 percent of the time using the coding by Boniface (2007) and 78 percent of 
the time (seven out of nine times) using the coding based on the work by Marsteintredet (2014).
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Table 1: Empirical Results: Explanatory Variables and OAS Responses 
 CLARITY SEVERITY 
(BONIFACE) 
SEVERITY 
(MARSTEINTREDET) 
THREAT TO 
EXECUTIVE 
PRESIDENTIAL 
OVERREACH 
 High Low High Low High Low Yes No Yes No 
Meeting 11  8 6 13 9 10 14 5 3 16 
No Meeting 0 12 0 12 0 12 2 10 10 2 
p-value 0.001* 0.030* 0.005* 0.002* 0.000* 
Resolution  11 6 6 11 9 8 13 4 2 15 
No Res 0 14 0 14 0 14 3 11 11 3 
p-value 0.000* 0.013* 0.001* 0.002* 0.000* 
Mission Sent 8 5 6 7 7 6 9 4 2 11 
No Missions 3 15 0 18 2 16 7 11 11 7 
p-value 0.010* 0.001* 0.010* 0.095 0.023* 
Invocation 6 2 5 3 6 2 6 2 0 8 
No Invoke 5 18 1 22 3 20 10 13 13 10 
p-value 0.007* 0.000* 0.001* 0.124 0.005* 
Sanctions 4 0 4 0 4 0 2 2 0 4 
No Sanctions 7 20 2 25 5 22 14 13 13 14 
p-value 0.004* 0.000* 0.002* 0.945 0.069 
No Response 0 12 0 12 0 12 2 10 10 2 
Response 11 8 6 13 9 10 14 5 3 16 
p-value 0.002* 0.030* 0.005* 0.005* 0.000* 
N=31    *=p ≤ 0.05 
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 The correlation tests for clarity and severity of a crisis and whether the OAS PC invoked 
the primary democratic instruments (Resolution 1080 or the IADC) demonstrate that the OAS 
was likely to invoke the primary democratic instruments during crises of high clarity and high 
severity. In six out of the eleven crises counted as clear, the OAS PC invoked the primary 
democratic instruments. Additionally, it is important to note that the OAS was not likely to 
invoke the primary democratic instruments during crises of low clarity, doing so only two times 
in response to a crisis (Ecuador 2005 and Venezuela 2002). This relationship also holds for 
severity. The OAS was more likely to invoke the primary democratic instruments during crises 
of high severity. In five cases of high severity (Boniface), the OAS PC invoked the primary 
democratic instruments. Using coding based on Marsteintredet’s (2014) article, the PC invoked 
the primary democratic instruments in six out of nine crises considered severe. Again, the 
relationship between clarity, severity, and invocation of the primary democratic instruments is 
significant at the 0.05 level. The hypotheses regarding clarity, severity, and the invocation of the 
primary democratic instruments are also confirmed and statistically significant. 
 Finally, the relationships between clarity, severity, and sanctions are also statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level, although the evidence demonstrates that overall the OAS is not 
likely to invoke sanctions, doing so in only four cases in the time period under consideration. 
The relationship between clarity and sanctions is not in the expected direction, with only four 
(out of 11) cases of high clarity receiving sanctions. Severity has a stronger impact on the 
imposition of sanctions in response to a crisis. The strongest relationship is between severity 
(Boniface) and sanctions, with the OAS imposing sanctions four out of six times during a severe 
crisis. However, it is important to note that the OAS has never imposed sanctions against a crisis 
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country during an unclear or non-severe crisis, meaning low levels of clarity and severity lead to 
an absence of sanctions during crises. 
3.5 Summary of the Results of the Cross-tabulations for Clarity, Severity, and OAS responses 
 The results of the cross-tabulations demonstrate support for my hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between clarity, severity, and responses of the OAS. During every episode of a crisis 
that was a clear or severe violation of the primary democracy clauses of the OAS, the Permanent 
Council of the Organization of American States not only met but also passed a resolution 
regarding the crisis. The statistical significance of the relationship between clarity, severity, and 
OAS responses remains strong even as responses become more in-depth, even though the overall 
number of cases in which the OAS invokes the primary democratic instruments or imposes 
sanctions decreases. Despite that decrease, the relationships between clarity, severity, and the 
invocation of the primary democratic instruments or the threat of (or actual) suspension of a 
member state from the OAS demonstrate support for my hypotheses. In the majority of cases, 
regardless of the coding, a crisis of high severity was met by the invocation of the primary 
democratic instruments of the OAS. In four cases of high severity, the OAS threatened to 
suspend (or, as in the case of Honduras, actually suspended) the crisis state from the OAS. The 
p-values for the relationships between these variables also demonstrate statistical significance, 
giving us confidence in the strength of the relationship between high levels of severity and the 
threat of suspension from the OAS. 
3.6 Empirical Results for the “Club of Presidents” Hypotheses 
 The results of the cross-tabulations and chi-squared tests also demonstrate support for my 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between the presidents of the member states and the OAS.  
The first is that threats to the president do, in fact, receive more responses overall from the OAS 
as compared to cases of presidential abuse of power. In 14 cases (out of 16) where the president 
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was threatened, the OAS held a PC meeting. In 13 of those cases, the PC passed a resolution 
regarding the crisis. Contrasted with the numbers for cases of presidential overreach, we see a 
clear trend towards responding to threats to the executive but not to overreach: the OAS PC met 
to discuss the crisis in only three (out of 13) cases of presidential overreach and passed a 
resolution in only four of those cases. The results from the cross-tabulations and the p-values for 
these variables also demonstrate support for my first two hypotheses and are significant at the 
0.05 level.  
 The relationship between whether the crisis was a threat to the executive and whether 
missions were sent is not statistically significant, however, the relationship is in the expected 
direction with more cases of missions during threats to the executive than not. In nine out of 16 
cases, a mission was sent to the crisis country. To some extent, this relationship makes sense, in 
that if the embattled president survives the threat to his office, he may choose to take 
undemocratic actions (and thus would not want additional scrutiny paid to domestic politics) in 
the aftermath of the crisis. The executive may also choose to limit the response of the OAS if a 
crisis is over relatively quickly, so as not to set a precedent in the region for the involvement of 
the Organization in domestic politics after a crisis. At this point, the reasons for why there would 
be a limited relationship between threats to the executive and political missions are speculation. 
A comparison between cases that are threats to the executive and cases of presidential overreach 
and missions lends support to my argument: a mission was sent to the crisis country in only two 
of 13 cases of presidential overreach. In other words, although missions are mixed in terms of if 
they were authorized for cases of threats to the executive, they are almost non-existent in cases 
of presidential overreach. The relationship between presidential overreach and missions is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
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 The results for the final two dependent variables, the invocation of the primary 
democratic instruments and suspension, are somewhat split. The OAS was more likely to invoke 
either Resolution 1080 or the Inter-American Democratic Charter when the crisis represented a 
threat to the president compared to when a crisis was one where the president was abusing 
power. The OAS PC invoked the primary democratic instruments six times out of 16 during 
cases of threats to the executive, but the p-value does not give us much confidence in the strength 
of the relationship. However, we again see a dynamic difference between the likelihood of 
invocation of the primary democratic instruments for presidential overreach compared to threats 
to the executive. When not counting autogolpes (when we would expect to see a forceful 
response from the OAS), there has never been the invocation of Resolution 1080 or the Inter-
American Democratic Charter against an executive.12 The relationship between presidential 
overreach and whether there was an invocation of Resolution 1080 or the IADC is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level, lending strength to the argument.  
 Neither the relationship between the dependent variable “sanctions” and threat to 
executive nor presidential overreach is statistically significant. The OAS implemented sanctions 
in only two cases of threat to the executive, compared to 14 in which it did not. In cases of 
presidential overreach, the OAS never implemented sanctions against the crisis country. The low 
incidence of sanctions is likely affecting the outcome of this relationship, as only four of 31 
cases in the study were met with sanctions. Additionally, if a coup d’etat is unsuccessful or if 
there is some kind of constitutional succession to replace the executive, the regional 
                                                 
12 It is important to note that this does not mean there have not been requests by an individual member state 
for the invocation of Resolution 1080 or the IADC against a president for undemocratic behavior. In the case 
studies that follow, I will discuss the case of Venezuela 2007, in which there was a request by the United 
States to invoke the IADC against the government of Hugo Chávez, but the request was denied. The case study 
will discuss the “why” of the denial in further detail. 
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organizations (and member states within them) are likely to view that as an acceptable, although 
not ideal, outcome and work with the new government to stabilize the country post-crisis.  
 Although the levels of statistical significance for threat/overreach and missions, 
invocation of 1080/IADC, and sanctions are lower, a comparison of the outcomes in the two 
categories demonstrates the propensity of the OAS to respond to crises where the president is 
threatened as compared to cases of presidential overreach. As a result, there is empirical support 
for the argument that the OAS is a “club of presidents” and that the OAS is more likely to 
respond to a threat to a president, but remain quiet or limit actions when the crisis is one where 
the president is abusing power.  
3.7 Empirical Results for Alternative Variables and OAS Responses 
 Finally, the relationship between the responses of the OAS and the variables linkage and 
insulation are demonstrated below in Table 3.2. The first, most important note regarding linkage 
and insulation is that when compared to the main explanatory variables, the strength of linkage 
and insulation as explanations for the variation in responses from the OAS is very low. Only one 
relationship, insulation and response, achieves statistical significance at the 0.05 level. It was 
more likely that the OAS would respond to a crisis in a country with low levels of insulation, 
however, in countries with high levels of insulation the record is mixed. In six crises in high 
insulation countries, the OAS did not respond at all whereas in four crises in high insulation 
countries, the OAS did respond- a difference of two. Beyond the relationship of insulation and 
whether there was any response, the record for both linkage and insulation is mixed. For 
example, in 16 total crises in countries with high levels of linkage with the West, eight of those 
crises were discussed in a PC meeting and eight were not. This is a similar story to the passage of 
resolutions and the authorization of missions: out of 16 total crises with high levels of linkage, in 
a resolution was passed and a mission was sent in seven crises (in nine crises, there was no 
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resolution and no mission). The results from the cross-tabulations for linkage and insulation do 
not provide support for the argument that linkage and insulation explain the variation in 
responses from the OAS to democratic crises in Latin America. 
Table 2: Relationship between Alternative Variables and OAS Responses 
 LINKAGE INSULATION 
 High Low Yes No 
Meeting 8 11 4 15 
No Meeting 8 4 6 6 
p-value 0.183 0.093 
Resolution 7 10 3 14 
No Res 9 5 7 7 
p-value 0.200 0.055 
Mission Sent 7 6 3 10 
No Missions 9 9 7 11 
p-value 0.833 0.353 
Invocation 3 5 2 6 
No Invoke 13 10 8 15 
p-value 0.354 0.610 
Sanctions 1 3 0 4 
No Sanctions 15 12 10 17 
p-value 0.254 0.139 
No Response 7 4 6 5 
Response 9 11 4 16 
p-value 0.320 0.049* 
N=31                                                        *=p ≤ 0.05 
 
3.8 Summary of Empirical Results 
 Overall, the results of the cross-tabulations and chi-square tests demonstrate support for 
the hypotheses put forth as part of the explanations for the variation in responses from the 
Organization of American States to presidential crises in Latin America. The results of the cross-
tabulations and chi-squared tests for clarity and OAS responses are summarized in Table 3.4 
below. 
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Table 3: Clarity and OAS Responses 
When the clarity of a crisis is high, I expect to see: Confirmation of Hypothesis 
The Convocation of a Meeting of the OAS Permanent 
Council 
 
The Passage of a Resolution regarding the response 
 
 
A Mission to the Crisis Country  
The Invocation of Either Res1080 or the IADC  
The Threat of or Actual Suspension of the Crisis State 
(Sanctions) 
 
 The relationship regarding the relationship between high levels of clarity and the 
responses of the OAS was confirmed, with the exception of the relationship between clarity and 
suspension or threat of suspension. When a crisis is clearly a violation of the primary democratic 
instruments, we can expect to see a wider range of responses, including a meeting of the 
Permanent Council of the OAS, the passage a resolution, the authorization of a mission to the 
crisis country, and the invocation of either Resolution 1080 or the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter. Although the relationship between clarity and sanctions is statistically significant, it is 
not in the expected direction. Sanctions were a rare phenomenon, occurring in only four of 
twelve cases of high clarity. Even though the relationship between high levels of clarity and 
sanctions, the relationship between low levels of clarity and sanctions is consistent, with zero 
cases of sanctions during crises of low clarity.  
 Overall, the results from the cross-tabulations and chi-squared tests using either coding of 
severity demonstrate support for the hypothesis regarding the relationship between severity and 
OAS responses. During crises of high severity, the OAS Permanent Council was likely to meet, 
pass a resolution, authorize a mission to the crisis country, invoke Resolution 1080 or the IADC, 
and was likely to impose sanctions on the crisis country. Using the severity coding from 
Boniface, the OAS imposed sanctions four out of six times during crises of high severity. The 
relationship changes slightly using the coding from Marsteintredet, with sanctions being imposed 
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in four out of nine cases, but demonstrates a relationship between high levels of severity and 
sanctions against a crisis country. The relationship between severity and OAS responses to 
democratic crises is confirmed by the cross-tabulations. The results for the cross-tabulations of 
severity and responses from the OAS are presented in Table 3.4 below. 
Table 4: Severity and OAS Responses 
When the severity of a crisis is high, I expect to see: Confirmation 
of Hypothesis 
using coding 
based on 
Boniface 
(2007) 
Confirmation of 
hypothesis 
using 
Marsteintredet’s 
coding 
The Convocation of a Meeting of the OAS Permanent 
Council 
  
The Passage of a Resolution Regarding the Response   
A Mission to the Crisis Country   
The Invocation of Either Res1080 or the IADC   
The Threat of or Actual Suspension of the Crisis State   
  
 Finally, the results from the cross-tabulations and chi-squared tests for the relationship 
between whether the crisis was a threat to the president and responses from the OAS demonstrate 
strength for the argument that the OAS is more likely to respond to crises that are threats to the 
president. We were more likely to see the OAS respond to a crisis that threatened the president in 
office than when it was a crisis where the president was abusing power. Although the 
relationships between invocation, sanctions, and missions with crises that are threats to the 
executive are not statistically significant, and therefore received a “no” in terms of confirmation 
of the hypothesis, the results are in the expected direction and demonstrate an overall trend of 
protection of the executive during democratic crises. When comparing the responses of 
invocation, sanctions, and missions between the two types of crises (threat/overreach), the 
responses were more likely in cases of threats to the executive than in cases of presidential 
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overreach. The results of the cross-tabulations for threat to the executive, presidential overreach, 
and OAS responses provide support for my hypothesis. 
 
Table 5: Club of President's Hypotheses and OAS Responses 
When the crisis represents a threat to the president, I 
expect to see: 
Confirmation 
of Hypothesis  
Was response 
more likely in 
cases of threat 
to executive 
than in 
presidential 
overreach? 
The Convocation of a Meeting of the OAS Permanent 
Council 
  
The Passage of a Resolution regarding the response   
A Mission to the Crisis Country   
The invocation of either Res1080 or the IADC   
The threat of or actual suspension of the crisis state   
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 The cross-tabulations and chi-squared tests demonstrate support for the majority of my 
hypotheses. While the cross-tabulations and chi-square tests demonstrate support for the majority 
of my hypotheses, the concern about omitted variables is important to address. Since the 
correlation and chi-squared tests only demonstrate the relationship between my explanatory 
variables and the responses of the OAS, it is possible other variables contribute to the decision of 
the OAS to respond to presidential crises. Despite the potential of omitted variable bias, the 
results of the empirical tests provide support for my argument regarding the relationship between 
high levels of clarity and severity and OAS responses, as well as support for my argument 
regarding the propensity of the OAS to respond more often to threats to the president.  
 The correlation tests were also not able to capture the reasons for the variation in crises of 
low clarity and severity. Due to this fact, I use two sets of paired case-study comparisons to 
demonstrate the when clarity and/or severity are low, the impact of the components of bounded 
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rationality- imperfect information, uncertainty regarding the consequences of a response, 
polarization, and time- affect when the OAS will respond. In the following chapters, I look at 
paired case studies to demonstrate the impact of severity and clarity on the likelihood of 
responses from regional intergovernmental organizations. I also demonstrate the impact of the 
components of bounded rationality-time, imperfect information, polarization, and uncertainty- 
when the severity and clarity of crises are low. 
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4 Chapter Four: Explaining the Variation in the Responses to Coups d’etat in Ecuador 
2000 and Honduras 2009 
 
What explains the variation in responses from regional intergovernmental organizations 
to presidential crises in Latin America? In the empirical chapter, I demonstrated support for the 
argument that the clarity and severity of a crisis determines the variation in responses from the 
Organization of American States (OAS) to democratic crises. When a crisis was clear and severe, 
the OAS was not only likely to respond, but was also likely to do so by invoking the primary 
democratic instruments of the Organization, such as Resolution 1080 or the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter (IADC). However, despite the strength of the relationship demonstrated in 
the empirical chapter, there are cases that deserve further attention due to variations in the 
response despite similar crises. Case studies also illuminate the decision-making processes and 
differences in the cases that led to the variation in outcomes and allow me to address the 
responses of the other regional IGOs when they apply. 
 In this chapter, I analyze and explain the difference in responses between two similar 
cases: Ecuador 2000 and Honduras 2009. Despite similar crises- there was agreement within the 
OAS that the events could be considered coups d’etat- the OAS responded in different ways to 
the two crises. The response to the presidential crisis in Ecuador did not include the invocation of 
the primary democratic instruments and the OAS Permanent Council eventually accepted the 
transition from President Jamil Mahuad to his constitutionally designated successor, Vice 
President Gustavo Noboa. In comparison, the OAS responded to the crisis in Honduras not only 
with the invocation of the IADC but also eventually with the suspension of Honduras. Although 
some members of the OAS eventually accepted that President Manuel Zelaya would not be 
returned to office and accepted the election of Porfirio Lobo to the executive office in 2009, the 
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suspension was not lifted until 201113. In order to test my argument that high levels of clarity and 
severity will lead to responses that invoke the primary democratic instruments of the regional 
organizations, we must ask why there was a variation in responses to these two similar crises. 
 I posit that although the clarity of the crises in Ecuador and Honduras were similar- both 
were clearly coups d’etat- and both cases were severe in that they both had the potential to 
threaten the fundamental foundation of democracy in the state, the variation in responses is due 
to slight, but important, differences in the levels of severity between the two cases. Due to the 
behavior of the domestic actors in Ecuador, the crisis eventually represented less of a threat to 
the fundamental foundation of democracy in the country (lower levels of severity), while the way 
the key domestic actors handled the crisis in Honduras meant higher levels of severity to 
democracy. In other words, the higher levels of severity meant the threat to democracy was 
higher and there was a deeper, more extensive international response to the events occurring in 
Honduras than in Ecuador.  
 The format for this chapter is as follows. The following section summarizes the crises in 
Ecuador and Honduras, providing an overview of the events and the responses of the regional 
intergovernmental organizations, focusing primarily on the Organization of American States, but 
also including Mercosur, UNASUR, and other regional organizations when appropriate.14 I then 
turn to an explanation of the specific actions taken by the domestic actors in the crisis states that 
                                                 
13
 Whether the OAS and the international community should accept the election of Porfirio Lobo as president of 
Honduras in November 2009 was a divisive issue. Mercosur and UNASUR, as well as many of the member-states of 
those organizations, stated they would not accept the outcome of any elections held under the Micheletti regime. 
However, closer to the scheduled elections, the United States, Panama, Costa Rica, and Peru accepted the elections, 
while Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil and other leftist-led governments did not. Officially, the Secretary-General of 
the OAS continued to condemn the coup d’etat and demand the reinstatement of Zelaya.  
14
 For this chapter, I primarily focus on the Organization of American States. Ecuador did not join Mercosur as an 
associate member until 2004. UNASUR was not founded until 2008. As a result, those IOs will not be included. 
However, multiple regional organizations, including Mercosur, CARICOM, UNASUR and ALBA (once in 
existence) issued statements regarding the crises and/or took actions against the coup governments and those 
statements will be noted. 
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made the Honduran crisis one of greater severity than the crisis in Ecuador. Finally, I discuss 
how polarization, time, uncertainty, and information affected the response to the crisis in 
Ecuador as compared to Honduras. 
4.1 Ecuador 2000 
 The underlying issues that led to the removal of President Jamil Mahuad in a coup d’état 
on January 21, 2000 were based in long-running economic and political crises. In 1997, the year 
before Mahuad’s victory in the presidential elections, the National Congress of Ecuador had 
removed then-President Abdalá Bucaram from office in questionable impeachment proceedings, 
declaring him “mentally unfit” to rule. Bucaram had been in office for only six months before 
facing opposition to his neoliberal economic policies and his refusal to address high levels of 
corruption and nepotism in the government. Opposition to President Bucaram was expressed 
through civilian mobilizations throughout the country and culminated in approximately three 
million people protesting on February 5, 6, and 7 (Rivera Vélez and Ramírez Gallegos 2005, 
129). Despite Bucaram’s penchant for odd behavior, which earned him the nickname “el loco,” 
the way the impeachment proceedings were held and the lack of official diagnosis of an actual 
mental condition cast a shadow over the legitimacy of the impeachment proceedings. The period 
immediately following his removal led to a dispute between Vice President Rosalea Arteaga and 
Fabián Alarcón, the president of Congress. Congress had elected Alarcón as President to replace 
Bucaram, but Rosalea Arteaga claimed that the constitution meant she should succeed Bucaram 
as President. The short-term dispute was eventually solved when Rosalea Arteaga, lacking 
support from either Congress or the Army, acknowledged she did not have the support to remain 
in office, resigned from the Vice Presidency, and Alarcón was sworn in as President. President 
Alarcón held a referendum in May 1997, which demonstrated support by Ecuadorians for the 
removal of Bucaram and, combined with the lack of support for Arteaga, solidified the support 
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for the succession of Alarcón to the presidency (Breuer 2007). The removal of Bucaram set the 
expectations and precedent for political behavior by civil society, Congress, and the military for 
the next few years. As Ivonne Baki, former ambassador to the United States during Jamil 
Mahuad’s presidency, argued in a personal interview, the removal of Bucaram established a 
“precedence” that encouraged civil society to move into the street and call for the removal of the 
executive when the president’s popularity decreased, even if he had been recently elected with a 
majority of the vote (Ivonne Baki, December 9, 2014, Atlanta, Georgia (Skype).  
 In addition to the political conflict surrounding the impeachment of President Bucaram 
and the questions surrounding constitutional succession, Ecuador had been in the midst of a 
severe economic crisis since the late 1990s. Lucero (2001, 60), drawing on economic data from a 
variety of sources, illustrates the severity of the economic crises: 
“Between 1998 and 2000, Ecuador suffered its worst economic reversals in a 
century. In the course of these two years, GNP shrank 7.3 percent, foreign 
investment fell by 34.7 percent, imports declined by 38.4%, and the value of the 
dollar against the sucre rose by 362 percent. Ecuador bled not only capital but 
also people, as almost 10 percent of the country’s 12 million inhabitants 
emigrated. Contributing to all these woes was a severe banking crisis. In 1998, 
there were 42 banks in Ecuador; by 2000 there were only 26. Efforts to bail out 
the banking sector had absorbed roughly 23 percent of GNP, placing a fiscal 
strain on the state and diverting resources from social spending.” 
  
 The economic crisis in Ecuador underlined the political crises and provided a precarious 
foundation for Jamil Mahuad, who won the second round of the 1998 elections with only 51% of 
the vote. In an effort to make Ecuador more credit-worthy, Mahuad implemented a series of tax 
increases and reductions of subsidies for key basic goods and services, which led to increases in 
“electricity costs by 410 percent, gasoline by 174 percent, and public transportation by 40 
percent” (Lauderbaugh 2012, 152). In response to his economic decisions, Mahuad faced 
multiple protests, including a series of strikes led by unions, road blockades by indigenous 
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organizations, and protests in Guayaquil, Ecuador’s largest city and its economic base. In 
attempts to manage the protests and maintain order, Mahuad declared a state of emergency three 
times between March 1999 and his removal in January of 2000. The economic and political 
turmoil affected President Mahuad’s ratings greatly, leaving him with an approval rating of only 
6% by January 2000 (Barracca 2007, 146; Walsh 2001, 185). 
 The mounting economic problems eventually led President Mahuad to announce a plan of 
dollarization, hoping that the dollarization of the economy would not only restore confidence in 
the country’s economy, but also stop the rapid devaluation of the sucre and stabilize the 
economy.15 President Mahuad announced the dollarization of the economy on January 9, 2000, 
despite the staunch opposition and eventual resignation of the Central Bank’s three highest 
officials over the plan (The New York Times 2000). In response to the handling of the economic 
crisis and catalyzed by the decision to dollarize the economy, the Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) announced an uprising and encouraged indigenous people 
all over Ecuador to meet in the capital city of Quito to press for the resignation of President 
Mahuad and push for a greater focus on indigenous issues. In response to the calls from 
CONAIE for indigenous groups to unite in protest in Quito, the government deployed a “thirty-
five-thousand member police force” whose job was to ensure the roads remained open and that 
the indigenous groups did not reach Quito to add to the numbers of protestors (Walsh 2001, 173). 
In spite of this order from the central government, indigenous protestors managed to make their 
way to central Quito, with numbers reaching five thousand indigenous people by January 18, and 
that number doubling by the next day (Walsh 2001, 174).  
                                                 
15
 Walsh (2001: 175) notes the devaluation at “348 percent between August 1998 and January 2000, and an 
additional 33 percent in the first weeks of 2000.” 
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 To add to the difficulties for President Mahuad, on January 17, workers from 
Petroecuador, Ecuador’s state-owned oil company, went on strike and joined the protestors in 
Quito calling for Mahuad’s resignation. The oil workers were eventually joined by labor unions 
and student organizations, which when combined with the indigenous protestors, reached a 
critical mass (Lauderbaugh 2012, 155). Despite the inclusion of the other social organizations, 
the major group leading the protests calling for the resignation of Mahuad was the indigenous 
organization CONAIE, whose goals went beyond the resignation of President Mahuad from the 
presidency (Walsh 2001: 175). In addition to the call for protests in Quito, CONAIE also held an 
alternative parliamentary session in Quito, titled the “People’s Popular Parliament for National 
Salvation,” whose intention was to provide a “new political authority” outside of the established 
political institutions so that politics would be more participatory and inclusive (Walsh 2001: 
174). In consideration of this broader goal, CONAIE and the People’s Popular Parliament also 
called for the overthrow of the “National Congress, the Supreme Court, and the government”  
(Walsh 2001: 176).  
 By January 20, a large group of Indians had surrounded the Congress, Supreme Court, 
and comptroller’s office buildings, leading to clashes between the military posted around the 
buildings and the protestors. The next day, the military joint command chose to not enforce the 
state of emergency against the protestors surrounding the government buildings. As a result, on 
January 21st, the protestors invaded and occupied the government buildings. Shortly after, 
Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, CONAIE president Antonio Vargas, and Carlos Solórzano, a former 
president of the Supreme Court, declared the formation of the Junta of National Salvation and 
issued a series of declarations promising the people a government of “no lying, no stealing, and 
no idleness” and a promise to “change the structures of the state, and to strengthen democratic 
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institutions”16 (Walsh 2001, 178). In the midst of the takeovers of the Congress and the 
pronouncements by the triumvirate junta, President Jamil Mahuad fled the presidential palace in 
central Quito, “hidden in an ambulance headed to the air base” (Walsh 2001, 179). Although 
President Mahuad had been forced to flee the presidential palace due to a lack of protection from 
the armed forces, he refused to resign (McConnell 2001, 76). His Vice President, Gustavo 
Noboa, flew in from Guayaquil in an armed forces plane, keeping in nearly constant contact with 
the military high command and later, once in Quito, meeting with various leaders of the political 
parties along with the high command (Walsh 2001, 179-180).  
 By 10:30 p.m. on January 21, essentially all support for President Mahuad had 
evaporated, he had been forced to abandon the presidential palace, the Vice President had been 
involved in negotiations with the military high command and other political leaders in attempts 
to find a resolution to the crisis, and the Junta of National Salvation had spoken publicly and 
with great public support, about the events that, according to them, justified the manner in which 
President Mahuad had been removed from office17. The military high command issued a 
document that stated the armed forces were required to intervene to manage the “political, 
economic, and moral splitting of the groups the people had democratically put in charge of 
managing the nation” and requested “international understanding” for their actions (Walsh 2001, 
180). Despite the calls for international understanding, the Clinton Administration condemned 
the overthrow and putting direct pressure on the high command of the military in Ecuador, 
threatened sanctions against the military-led government (Rohter 2000). 
                                                 
16
 The quotes are from Antonio Vargas and Lucio Gutiérrez, respectively. Translation by Catherine Walsh (2001). 
17
 CEDATOS published a poll during the crisis that demonstrated high levels of public support for the indigenous 
peoples’ movement (71%), the occupation of Congress  (74%), and moderate-to-low levels of support for the three 
junta leaders (Vargas-34%; Gutiérrez 26%; Solórzano- 21%). However, 79% of the population also supported the 
maintenance of the constitutional order (Walsh 2001, 181). 
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 Despite the image of a united junta presented to the public, there was conflict over who 
should be leading the military faction of the junta. In backroom discussions, the high command 
of the military, the indigenous leaders, and a group of colonels including Lucio Gutiérrez 
debated how best to move forward. The high command of the military, concerned with the 
precedence of breaking rank established by Lucio Gutiérrez and the other colonels, argued that 
General Carlos Mendoza, chief of the joint high command and the acting Minister of Defense, 
should replace Gutiérrez. Mendoza and the high command argued that by replacing Gutiérrez 
with Mendoza, the military could keep its hierarchical structure and that the military would be 
willing to respect the goals of the indigenous leadership as well as the trust placed in Gutiérrez 
by the indigenous groups. The indigenous leaders eventually accepted and agreed to announce 
the triumvirate of General Carlos Mendoza, Antonio Vargas, and Carlos Solórzano. The three 
“took an oath, sang the national anthem, and together said a prayer” (Walsh 2001, 182). 
However, as the new presidents convened their planning session, General Mendoza disappeared, 
along with the military officers that up until that time had “filled the halls and terraces” (Walsh 
2001, 182).  
  General Carlos Mendoza, under direct pressure from the United States, announced his 
resignation at 2:50 a.m. on January 22, declaring that his primary intention was to ensure the 
unity of the armed forces and arguing for a constitutional transition out of the crisis. The same 
day, Vice President Gustavo Noboa was sworn in as President at the Ministry of Defense, and 
suddenly lacking the support of the military, the junta was dissolved. According to Antonio 
Vargas, the indigenous leader of the junta, General Mendoza had deceived the junta and had 
effectively ended the coup d’etat. After the dissolution of the junta, Vargas argued in a speech 
before representatives of the indigenous peoples and nationalities still in the Congress building 
89 
 
and the main park in Quito that “Mendoza’s betrayal was a deception of the masses” (Walsh 
2001, 182). Vargas acknowledged the defeat of the junta, but also claimed success for the 
overthrow of Mahuad and the rise in awareness of the indigenous issues in the country. Gutiérrez 
and a number of other junior officers who took part in the coup were jailed for their roles in the 
uprising. Jamil Mahuad, despite rejecting the avenues through which he was overthrown and 
refusing to officially resign, said he would accept the transition to his Vice President and asked 
the country to “give Gustavo Noboa the support you did not give to me” (BBC News 2000). By 
January 22, the coup was over, President Jamil Mahuad had been successfully overthrown, and 
Gustavo Noboa was sworn in as President of Ecuador.  
4.2 The OAS Response to the Coup in Ecuador 
 Despite the reality that the mass protests in Ecuador, the economic crisis, and the 
instability of the Ecuadorian government were well-publicized and well-known, it was not until 
Ecuador and the democratically-elected government of Jamil Mahuad were in full-blown crisis 
that the Organization of American States and other regional intergovernmental organizations 
responded to the crisis. Before the day of the coup, there were no statements from the OAS 
Secretary-General regarding the protests, concerns of the potential for a crisis, or statements of 
support for the Ecuadorian government as it navigated multiple economic and political crises. 
The first official meeting of the OAS Permanent Council was held on the day of the coup, 
January 21 at 7:20 p.m. The meeting was requested by the government of Ecuador in order to 
update the member-states regarding the crisis in Ecuador and to ask the OAS to “give grand 
support to democracy in the hemisphere and to Ecuadorian democracy” (“OAS Meeting Minutes 
CP/ACTA 1220/00,” 2000). 
 As noted by Levitt (2007), there were divisions amongst the various member-states as to 
whether the invocation of Resolution 1080 would be appropriate for this case. Resolution 1080 
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instructs the Secretary-General to convene a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council “in the 
event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic 
political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected 
government in any of the Organization’s member states” (AG/Res. 1080 XXI-0/91). If 
Resolution 1080 is invoked, the foreign ministers of the various member-states are convened 
within ten days to examine the situation and undertake decisions they deem necessary to respond 
to the crisis and restore democracy.  
 Chile, Costa Rica, Argentina, Paraguay and the United States all echoed similar 
sentiments regarding the crisis and the potential to invoke Resolution 1080 as a response to the 
crisis. The Chilean ambassador argued that Resolution 1080 gave the OAS the necessary 
mechanisms to respond to the “terrible facts” of the situation and should be employed to respond 
to the unfolding crisis in Ecuador. The ambassador from the United States questioned whether 
there could be a response from the Secretary-General faster than the ten days allotted by 
Resolution 1080, referring to the need for a “time urgency factor” in the resolution (CP/ACTA 
1220/00, 23).  
 On the other hand, the Venezuelan delegation argued that the sovereign Ecuadorian 
people, who had elected Mahuad to the office, could also decide his “political destiny” 
(CP/ACTA 1220/00, 16; Levitt 2007). Mexico and Brazil were also hesitant to invoke 
Resolution 1080, with the Mexican ambassador arguing that the meeting that evening was not 
convened to discuss whether or not to invoke Resolution 1080, but rather to get updates on the 
events as they were unfolding. The Mexican ambassador accepted the mention of Resolution 
1080, but also made it clear that the member states were “not acting under any other mechanism 
or other provision” (CP/ACTA 1220/00, 24).  
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 The Ecuadorian ambassador, Patricio Vivanco, expressed gratitude to the member states 
for the meeting and stated that the response from the OAS would demonstrate support for the 
constitutional democratic government of President Mahuad. It is also clear, based on the minutes, 
that the Ecuadorian ambassador was not opposed to the invocation of Resolution 1080, as he 
stated that it was certainly possible to invoke Resolution 1080 and hold a meeting of the foreign 
ministers, but wanted to wait a few hours before determining a date for the convocation of the 
foreign ministers (and thus wait to invoke Resolution 1080) to see how the crisis unfolded 
(CP/ACTA 1220/00, 19; Levitt 2007, 108). As a result, the invocation of Resolution 1080 was 
left on the table for future meetings, but was not invoked in the first meeting of the Permanent 
Council. 
 At the end of this first meeting, the member states agreed to a resolution mentioning, but 
not putting into place, the mechanisms of Resolution 1080 and the OAS Charter. The resolution 
expressed support for the constitutional government of Ecuador, specifically mentioning 
President Mahuad, condemned the attacks against the democratic order, and informed that the 
OAS, through the Secretary General, would monitor the situation closely.  
 The OAS Permanent Council did eventually hold a second meeting to discuss the events 
in Ecuador, although that meeting was not held until January 26, four days after Gustavo Noboa 
succeeded Jamil Mahuad as President of the Republic of Ecuador. In the meeting, Patricio 
Vivanco (the Ecuadorian ambassador) informed the Permanent Council that the military had 
overthrown President Mahuad in a coup d’etat and that he had not resigned from the presidency. 
However, despite the occurrence of a coup d’etat that resulted in the removal of President 
Mahuad, the recognition of Noboa as President by Mahuad had meant the situation had calmed 
and, since the succession of Vice President Noboa to the presidency as stipulated by the 
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constitution, the democratic system had been restored. He also stated that “87 out of 96 
congressmen present in Congress had voted for Gustavo Noboa to assume office,” and normal 
activities had “resumed” (“OAS Meeting Minutes CP/ACTA 1221/00” 2000, 2–3, 5). The 
member states that had either recommended the invocation of Resolution 1080 or a more 
strongly-worded resolution in the January 20 meeting argued in the January 26 meeting that the 
OAS and its member states should consider how to move forward from the events in Ecuador 
and how the OAS could more clearly and efficiently respond to crises in its member-states in the 
future.  
 Secretary General César Gaviria and the ambassadors from the United States, Canada, 
Ecuador, and Chile also pointed to the quick action from the OAS in the form of Resolution 763 
and argued that the quick action from the OAS was a “decisive factor” in reversing the 
"break/weakening” in democracy (CP/ACTA 1221/00, 6). After a brief recess in the session to 
work on the wording of a final resolution regarding the events that occurred just a few days 
before, the OAS Permanent Council passed Resolution 764 supporting the constitutional 
succession to Gustavo Noboa, but also condemning the events that put the “democratic and 
constitutional order of Ecuador” in danger (CP/ACTA 1221/00, 31-32).  
 With the passage of Resolution 764, the response of the Organization of American States 
to the crisis in Ecuador in 2000 was complete. The OAS Permanent Council refrained from 
invoking the primary defense-of-democracy instruments, including Resolution 1080. This is in 
marked contrast to the response to the crisis in Honduras in 2009, to which we now turn. 
4.3 Honduras 2009 
 Despite the increasing divisions present in Honduras in the months before the coup d’etat, 
the nature of the removal of President Manuel Zelaya on the morning of June 28, 2009 took 
many in the Western Hemisphere by surprise. It was the first military coup d’etat in Central 
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America since the Cold War and the first in Latin America since the brief, but ultimately 
unsuccessful, removal of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in 2002. However, in comparison 
to the response of the international community to the crisis in Ecuador, the international 
community reacted much more swiftly in condemnation of the events and took more significant 
steps to express the disapproval of the international community towards the events in Honduras 
as they unfolded.  
 Manual Zelaya was elected as President of Honduras in 2005 as a conservative 
landowning leader from the traditional, center-right Liberal Party of Honduras (Partido Liberal 
de Honduras). Despite running as a member of the Liberal party, once in office Zelaya’s policies 
reflected a more populist and leftist trend. The rise of leftists in the region also coincided with a 
regional trend to change the strict presidential term limits many countries had in place. For 
example, the constitution of Honduras, written in 1982 at the end of a ten-year military 
dictatorship, limited the executive office to a single, four-year term with no chance for 
reelection. Conflict over presidential term limits and whether there was a constitutional ability to 
change any or all aspects of the constitution underlined the crisis in Honduras leading up to the 
2009 coup. The events that led to the removal of Manuel Zelaya from the presidential palace 
ended “27 years of uninterrupted democratic, constitutional governance” and represented a 
unique challenge and opportunity for the regional intergovernmental organizations to 
demonstrate their commitments to the democratic order (Meyer 2010).  
 The events leading up to Zelaya’s ouster polarized the country and made Zelaya popular 
with certain sectors, while alienating others. Before his ouster in June, Zelaya’s popularity 
ratings hovered around 30 percent, certainly higher than those of Jamil Mahuad’s in Ecuador in 
2000, but still a demonstration of disapproval in his policies and administration. In March of 
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2009, Zelaya proposed a referendum to determine whether there was support within the 
Honduran population for a constituent assembly to convene to rewrite the Constitution. As part 
of this proposal, Zelaya issued an executive decree calling on the National Statistics Institute 
(NIE) to hold a referendum on June 28, 2009. The referendum was to ask the population if a 
fourth ballot box should be included during the general elections in November in order to 
determine the level of support among the population for a new constitution (Meyer 2010, 2). In 
May, Zelaya repealed the executive decree issued in March and issued a new decree that made 
the June referendum non-binding. The May decree also changed the wording of the question that 
would be posed to voters during the general election to one that removed the references to a new 
constitution and instead asked whether the voter approved the inclusion of a fourth ballot box to 
approve the convocation of a National Constituent Assembly (Meyer 2010, 2). 
 The opposition, led mainly by the President of Congress, Roberto Micheletti, accused 
President Zelaya of trying to change the constitution to permit reelection, and thus, to allow 
Zelaya to run for office for another term. In addition to the allegations that Zelaya was trying to 
coordinate an institutional change to allow him to remain in power, the opposition also argued 
that any change in the Honduran constitution with regards to term limits was a violation of the 
Constitution, as Article 239 “provides that any official who proposes to reform the Constitution, 
in order to allow a president to run for a second term, “immediately” ceases in the exercise of his 
office” (Cassel 2009, 2). As a result, the opposition argued that Zelaya was not only trying to 
unconstitutionally continue in office as the president by changing term limits, but that in doing 
so, he had effectively removed himself from office by pursuing that path. The Attorney 
General’s Office and the Honduran judiciary declared Zelaya’s proposed referendum 
unconstitutional, but neither of those decisions was sufficient to convince President Zelaya to 
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cancel the referendum. In addition to the Attorney General’s office and the judiciary, the 
hierarchy of the Catholic Church, the Human Rights Ombudsman, the legislature, four of the five 
political parties (including Zelaya’s own party), business associations, and evangelical groups all 
opposed the referendum. However, the referendum did have support from other civil society 
groups, such as “unions, peasants, women’s groups, groups of ethnic minorities, and the small 
leftist Democratic Unification Party (DU)” (Meyer 2010, 3-4). 
 On June 23, the opposition-dominated legislature tried to prevent the referendum from 
taking place by passing a law preventing referenda from occurring within 180 days before or 
after the general election (Meyer 2010, 4). In this divided context, the military chose to follow 
the decisions from other institutions instead of the President, who is also the commander-in-
chief. Since the other institutions had declared the referendum unconstitutional, the military high 
command notified President Zelaya that they would not provide logistical support for the 
referendum. In response, Zelaya ordered the resignations of the Defense Minister and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This action prompted the resignation of “36 other 
Honduran military commanders, including the head of the Army, Navy, and Air Force” (Meyer 
2010, 4). The Supreme Court declared the removal of the military commanders invalid and 
ordered President Zelaya to reinstate them, but Zelaya refused. The impasse between the 
branches of government culminated in the removal of Zelaya on June 28, 2009, the date of the 
referendum, from the presidential palace.  
 In the early morning hours of June 28, 2009, the military, acting on a secret warrant from 
the Supreme Court, entered the Presidential palace, removed President Zelaya (still in his 
pajamas) from the building, put him on an air force jet, and flew him into exile in Costa Rica. 
The military also confiscated the ballot boxes with the referendum materials. The National 
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Congress met that afternoon and read a resignation letter they attributed to President Zelaya 
(which was later found to be falsified) and then voted to depose the president on other grounds, 
including for “crimes against the form of government, treason, abuse of authority, and usurpation 
of functions for calling a referendum without the approval of the National Congress” (Meyer 
2010, 4). The National Congress then issued a decree to replace Zelaya with the President of 
Congress (and constitutionally the next-in-line to the executive office), Roberto Micheletti, who 
claimed that a constitutional succession had taken place and the removal of Manuel Zelaya was 
legitimate due to the arrest warrant issued by the judiciary and Zelaya’s own violations of the 
constitution. 
 Although public support existed in some sectors for the coup government in Honduras, 
exemplified by demonstrations in support of the Micheletti government on June 30, overall the 
public was suspicious of the Micheletti government and still supported Manuel Zelaya. A poll 
completed in August 2009 by the polling firm Coimer & OP found that 52.7% of the population 
polled was against the coup d’état removing Zelaya, with only 17.4% in favor of and 30% not 
responding (Coimer & OP 2009). 60.1% of Hondurans polled believed Micheletti should leave 
power, with only 22.2% believing Micheletti should stay in power. Meyer (2010) discusses a 
poll taken in October of 2009 that demonstrated “just 36% of Hondurans approved of 
Micheletti’s job in office and 59% believed he rarely or never did what was in the interest of the 
Honduran people. The same poll found that 42% of Hondurans recognized Zelaya as president, 
while 36% recognized Micheletti” (6). These polls demonstrated that the Honduras population 
was divided on the ouster of Zelaya and the performance of Micheletti, although the polls were 
not enough to sway the Micheletti government to step down from power. 
97 
 
 Following the removal of Zelaya, Micheletti argued that the transition had occurred 
constitutionally and that elections would still be held as planned in November 2009. Despite his 
pronouncements of the constitutionality of the removal of Zelaya, the actions following the coup 
caused deep concern. The days following the coup, security forces patrolled the streets, 
supporters and allies of Zelaya in government were forced into hiding, the government arrested 
the Foreign Minister, Patricia Rodas, as well as the Ambassadors of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and 
Cuba, and a variety of local and international television and news stations were shut down 
(Meyer 2010, 6; “OAS Meeting Minutes CP/ACTA 1700/09” 2009). The Micheletti government 
also instituted a curfew, while pro-Zelaya protestors filled the streets and put up barricades in 
parts of the capital city, Tegucigalpa, and restricted the roadways to the presidential palace (El 
País 2009). Over time, the coup government also restricted civil liberties, repeatedly using 
decrees calling for states of emergency.18 
4.4 The International Response to the Coup in Honduras and the Continuation of the Crisis 
 The international response to the coup in Honduras was quick in its timing and universal 
in its condemnation. In contrast to the Ecuadorian crisis where the international organizations 
reacted retroactively, the Honduran government itself worked to inform the Permanent Council 
of the OAS regarding the developing conflict on the ground and, as a result, the OAS was well 
prepared to respond to the crisis. The Honduran delegation requested a Permanent Council 
meeting, held on the 26th of June (two days before the coup) under the jurisdiction of Article 17 
of the IADC, which allows the government of a member state to request assistance from the 
                                                 
18 For example, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights notes that “On September 26, the de facto government 
published Executive Decree PCM-M-016-2009 announcing that certain guarantees would be suspended for a period 
of 45 days (the maximum allowed under the Constitution).  Those guarantees were the right to personal liberty 
(Article 69), freedom of expression without prior censorship (Article 72), freedom of association and assembly 
(Article 78), freedom of movement (Article 81), and the right to be brought before a competent authority within 24 
hours if arrested or detained (Article 84).  The Decree also prohibited public meetings or assemblies unless 
authorized by the police or military authorities” 
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Secretary General or the Permanent Council if the government considers that its democratic 
political institutional process is at risk.19  In this first meeting, the Honduran government sought 
to inform the member-states of the OAS regarding the conflict over the constituent assembly and 
argued that the decree for the referendum was legal under the recently passed “Ley de 
Participación Ciudadana”(Law of Citizen Participation”) (“OAS Meeting Minutes CP/ACTA 
1699/09” 2009, 3). The Honduran delegation also requested support for the Honduran 
government under the jurisdiction of Article 18, which allows for the Secretary General or the 
Permanent Council arrange for visits or other actions to analyze the situation and report on the 
situation to the Permanent Council. Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Paraguay not only 
condemned what they called the “threats” of a coup d’état, but also expressed support for the 
invocation of the IADC (CP/ACTA 1699/09, 8-10). Member-states representing the sub-regional 
organizations of Mercosur (Paraguay), ALBA (Venezuela) and CARICOM (Belize) also issued 
statements condemning the threats of a coup d’etat and expressing support for President Zelaya. 
Speaking on behalf of ALBA, the Venezuelan delegation expressed not only support for 
President Zelaya, but also expressed that the “sovereign will of the people” should be respected 
(CP/ACTA 1699/09, 9).   
 Although the other delegations condemned the potential for a coup d’etat and expressed 
the need for the constitutional order, the delegations from the United States, Canada, Chile, and 
Belize expressed concerns regarding the role of the OAS in Honduras and wanted to ensure that 
the purpose and mission of the OAS in Honduras was clear (CP/ACTA 1699/09, 15). Eventually, 
these delegations expressed their support for the mission Honduras requested. The OAS member 
                                                 
19 Section IV, Article 17 states that: When the government of a member state considers that its democratic political 
institutional process or its legitimate exercise of power is at risk, it may request assistance from the Secretary 
General or the Permanent Council for the strengthening and preservation of its democratic system. 
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states agreed to a special commission, headed by Secretary General Insulza, to gather additional 
information regarding the situation, to encourage a dialogue between the parties, and to report 
back to the Permanent Council. At the end of this first meeting, the OAS had been informed 
about the potential of a coup d’état in Honduras, the delegation of Honduras requested and 
successfully achieved the application of Articles 17 and 18 of the IADC, a special commission 
had been approved, and the member-states of the OAS were hoping that a clear mission and the 
notification that the international community was watching Honduras would be enough to 
prevent a coup d’état. 
 Despite the intentions of the OAS and international community, this initial meeting was 
not enough to sway the opposition actors in Honduras from their course. In response to the 
removal of Zelaya, the regional intergovernmental organizations Mercosur, UNASUR, 
CARICOM, the Rio Group, and ALBA20 all issued statements vehemently condemning the 
actions and demanded Zelaya’s return. The President of the United Nations General Assembly 
(GA) organized a GA meeting to allow President Zelaya to speak in front of the organization and 
stated that President Zelaya remained “the only legitimate and constitutional head of the 
Honduran government”  (GA/10840, 29 June 2009). In addition, the OAS called an emergency 
meeting the day of the coup to discuss the situation as it unfolded and to issue a statement that, 
according to the delegate from Argentina, needed to convey “repudiation, support, and 
solidarity” (CP/ACTA 1700/09, 10).  
 Within the OAS meeting, all of the member-states expressed their support for President 
Zelaya and universally condemned the actions in Honduras. The ambassador from the United 
                                                 
20 CARICOM, the Rio Group, and ALBA are sub-regional organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
CARICOM is the Caribbean Community and Common Market and is composed of countries in the Caribbean. The 
Rio Group is a regional intergovernmental organization composed of Latin American and Caribbean countries, but 
excluding the United States and Canada. ALBA (formally the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) 
is composed of Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and a number of Caribbean countries.  
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States, although not calling the situation a coup d’etat directly, argued the “most recent events, 
which have put in jeopardy the democratic institutional process, the legitimate exercise of power, 
and the rule of law, are very, very worrisome” (CP/ACTA 1700/09, 15). Additionally the U.S. 
ambassador read letters from President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
which noted that the events violated the Inter-American Democratic Charter and “should be 
condemned by all” (CP/ACTA 1700/09, 15). The Secretary General spoke directly to the 
Permanent Council, arguing that the events in Honduras were exactly what Article 20 of the 
IADC refers to, i.e. “the alteration of the institutional order that gravely affects the democratic 
order of the Republic of Honduras” (CP/ACTA 1700/09, 3). Secretary General Insulza also 
called on the Permanent Council to invoke Articles 20 and 21, which would authorize the 
Permanent Council to undertake diplomatic initiatives and, if those failed, would lead to the 
convocation of a special session of the General Assembly, during which the member states could 
authorize additional diplomatic initiatives or vote to suspend the country from the organization. 
Although some member-states, such as Venezuela and Nicaragua, took the opportunity to discuss 
the history of U.S. intervention in the region and that the OAS “had remained silent or had 
validated” invasions of member-states in the past, the ambassadors also made the point that now 
was a moment for the OAS to “vindicate” itself (CP/ACTA 1700/09, 7-8). Even with obvious 
polarization in the OAS between the United States and Venezuela (and its allies), the member-
states were united in calling the events in Honduras a violation of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter.  
 Resolution 953, passed by the Permanent Council in its emergency session, invoked 
Article 20 of the IADC, condemned the “unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order,” 
demanded the return of President Zelaya to his constitutional functions, noted the President by 
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his name21, authorized an emergency meeting of the General Assembly, and condemned the 
detention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the other ministers and individuals that had been 
detained. In conjunction with the responses from individual states, the message to the coup 
government was intended to be clear: a coup d’etat was not an acceptable way to manage 
institutional conflicts and a coup government would face consequences if it did not reverse 
course. 
 Although the regional intergovernmental organizations vehemently condemned the 
events in Honduras, the Micheletti government refused to back down, resting its argument in the 
constitutionality of the succession and the illegality of Zelaya’s actions in proposing to reform 
the constitution to extend presidential term limits. On June 30, 2009 the OAS General Assembly 
held a special session to discuss the events in Honduras and to hear a statement from President 
Zelaya. During this General Assembly meeting, the member states agreed that there needed to be 
greater pressure on the coup government and issued a resolution which not only reaffirmed the 
condemnation of the coup and the demand for the reinstatement of President Zelaya, but also 
instructed the Secretary General to undertake diplomatic initiatives to restore democracy and the 
rule of law to Honduras. The resolution called for a Special General Assembly to suspend 
Honduras’ membership from the OAS if the diplomatic initiatives by the Secretary General and 
other actors proved unsuccessful within 72 hours. In those 72 hours, Secretary General Insulza 
met with members of the judicial and legislative powers in Honduras, and, determining that the 
de facto regime was “extremely firm” and “inflexible” in its attitudes about the situation, 
recommended to the General Assembly that Honduras be suspended from the OAS 
(Organization of American States E219/09 2009). Based on the recommendation from the 
                                                 
21
 One of the concerns of Nicaragua and Venezuela was that Resolution 952 did not refer to President Zelaya by 
name, which to those states, indicated the OAS did not offer full support to President Zelaya and made it appear that 
a transition that appeared constitutional would potentially be accepted. 
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Secretary General, Honduras was suspended from the Organization of American States by a 
unanimous vote in the General Assembly (“OAS AG/RES.2 (XXXVII-E/09)” 2009).  
 In addition to the suspension of Honduras from the organization, the OAS also designated 
Costa Rican President Oscar Arias as a mediator to discuss a solution to the crisis. Between the 
suspension of Honduras in July and the final agreement to a solution mediated by President 
Arias, a number of key events occurred that increased the severity of the crisis. One of those 
events was the return of Manuel Zelaya to Honduras on September 21st and the ensuing violence 
and protests regarding his return. In an effort to avoid detention by the de facto government, 
Zelaya returned to Honduras and took refuge in the Brazilian embassy. His presence in Honduras 
led to tension and violence between pro-Zelaya factions and the government. Upon learning that 
Zelaya was back in Honduras and in the Brazilian embassy, Secretary-General Insulza issued a 
press release calling for “calm in all stakeholders in the process” and stressing that the de facto 
government “should be responsible for the safety of President Zelaya and the Embassy of Brazil” 
(Organization of American States E-300/09 2009). The Permanent Council also met on the 21st 
and issued a declaration calling for the “de facto authorities” to “ensure the life and physical 
integrity of President Zelaya and a treatment consistent with his high office, as well as his return 
to the Presidency of the Republic in accordance with General Assembly Resolution AG/Res. 1 
(XXXVII-E09)” (Organization of American States CP/DEC. 42 (1716/09) 2009). They also 
called for the de facto regime to agree to sign the Tegulcigapa-San Jose Accord (hereafter 
referred to as the San Jose Accord) that had been negotiated over the previous months by 
President Arias. In response to Zelaya’s return, protests in support of Zelaya were organized. The 
Micheletti government responded with “excessive use of public force” and imposed a curfew 
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(IACHR 65/09 2009). Again, the Permanent Council, Secretary General, and other officials of 
the OAS continued to condemn the actions taken by the de facto regime in Honduras.  
After months of back-and-forth diplomatic missions to Honduras and negotiations led by 
President Arias, the San Jose Accord was signed in October 2009.22 The Accord included a 
variety of expectations to be met in order to “achieve reconciliation and strengthen democracy.”  
These expectations included the creation of a government of national unity- composed of 
representatives of different political parties and social organizations, the authorization of 
international electoral observers at the general election, and the expectation that there would be a 
renunciation of the calls for a National Constituent Assembly and for the amendment of the 
“unamenable” articles of the Honduran Constitution. An additional component of the Accord 
was the establishment of a Verification Commission to monitor whether the various actors in the 
crisis were following the Accord. Despite the agreement and the isolation of the Honduran 
government by the international community, the efforts by the international community were not 
successful in a number of key provisions, including the restoration of Zelaya as president and the 
inclusion of a unity government including allies of Zelaya23. However, the Accord demonstrated 
action taken on behalf of the OAS and regional states to seek a solution to the crisis, regardless 
of its success.   
 Honduras held presidential elections in November 2009, in which Porfirio Lobo, the 
candidate of the conservative party, won the executive office. The United States recognized the 
                                                 
22 A mission of foreign ministers scheduled for mid-August was cancelled, then rescheduled after further 
discussions between Secretary General Insulza and a delegation from Honduras. As part of the missions the 
delegation from the OAS worked to mediate with multiple groups from Honduran society and encourage the signing 
of the San Jose Accord. The cancellation or restriction of diplomatic missions by the de facto government occurred 
multiple times over the course of the crisis, but after diplomatic negotiations with the de facto government of 
Honduras each time, the missions were eventually allowed in to continue to press for a resolution to the crisis.  
23
 Zelaya refused to give a list of candidates for the Government of National Unity, arguing that there should also be 
a vote in Congress on whether to restore him to office. Micheletti, on the other hand, stated the deadline for Zelaya 
to give the list of candidate had passed and that he would be forming a government of National Unity without 
Zelaya’s representatives (BBC News 2009). 
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results of the election, but noted that the election was only a first step and that the Honduran 
Congress still needed to vote on the restoration of Zelaya and needed to form a government of 
national unity. The move to recognize the election of Lobo as President was followed by 
Panama, Peru, and Costa Rica; however, Lobo was still not recognized by a number of other 
countries in the region, including Brazil (Charles 2009). The divisions with regards to the status 
of Honduras continued, and the OAS did not lift the suspension of Honduras until 2011, after 
another round of mediations, diplomatic missions, and eventually, in May 2011, the agreement 
by both the Lobo government and President Zelaya to the Cartagena Accord. In the Cartagena 
Accord, the Lobo government allowed Zelaya to return back to the country and pledged that 
Zelaya’s allies would be allowed to participate in politics. Although the OAS and its pressure on 
the Honduran coup regime failed to achieve many of the goals set out, such as reinstating 
Manuel Zelaya as the President of Honduras, the response of the OAS to the crisis in Honduras 
represented the most clear, immediate, and forceful response to a crisis in the region since the 
end of the Cold War. 
4.5 Comparing the Responses to the Crises in Ecuador and Honduras 
It was clear to most observers that the events in both Ecuador and Honduras were crises that 
amounted to interruptions of the democratic order and yet, as noted in the summaries, the 
responses from the OAS and other regional organizations varied significantly. If the explanatory 
variable were simply that the OAS is more likely to respond to coups d’etat, then we would 
expect a similar response to each crisis. Prior explanations have largely failed to capture the key 
differences between the crises in Ecuador and Honduras and how those affected the responses of 
the regional intergovernmental organizations. 
I argue that the variation in responses is better understood when we consider the severity of the 
crisis, defined as the extent to which the crisis threatens the fundamental foundation of 
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democracy in the state, and how the severity of the crisis mitigates the effects of time, 
uncertainty, polarization, and incomplete information. So why was Ecuador, despite the outcome 
being the removal of President Jamil Mahuad from office in a coup, less severe than the removal 
of President Zelaya? 
 When we look at the cases in their total context, outside of the label of “coup d’etat”, we 
notice key differences in the severity of the cases, and as a result we can see how uncertainty, 
time, information, and polarization had a greater impact on the outcome for Ecuador compared to 
Honduras.  
4.6 The Variation in the levels of Severity and the Role of Uncertainty, Polarization, Time and 
Information 
I argue that the threat to the underlying foundation of democracy varied in the two cases due to 
the following factors: 
1) Popularity Ratings of the Embattled Presidents- In the crisis in Ecuador, the low approval 
rating (6%) for Mahuad, the massive involvement from civil society, and the relatively strong 
approval ratings for the junta leaders led to the belief for many major decision-makers that the 
Mahuad government simply could not stay in power. Francisco Carrión, then Ambassador to 
Spain and a well-respected government minister in various other administrations, noted in a 
personal interview that, in general, it was clear that the Mahuad administration was 
“unsustainable” (Carrión, June 18, 2014). In this sense, the coup d’etat was not a “traditional 
coup d’etat, in that there was popular participation,” and as a result it was more difficult for 
international organizations to respond to the crisis by putting pressure on the coup leaders to 
return President Mahuad to office (Carrión 2014). The reality that much of the population was 
supportive of the removal of Mahuad meant the international actors accepted the transition to the 
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Vice President and didn’t choose to sanction Ecuador further for the failure to restore President 
Mahuad to office. 
 In Honduras, divisions amongst the institutions as opposed to street protests and civil 
society involvement largely drove the crisis. Although Zelaya’s popularity rating had indeed 
been falling, leveling around 30% at the time of the coup, that is in marked difference to the 
near-bottom popularity rating of Mahuad. In addition, the opinion polls in the Honduran case 
demonstrated higher levels of support for Zelaya than for Micheletti, as well as a lack of faith in 
the Micheletti government. Numerous pro-Zelaya rallies were held, demanding the return of 
Manuel Zelaya and denouncing the Micheletti government, and demonstrated to the international 
community that a strong plurality of the population was not in favor of the events in the country. 
The lack of popular support for the events in Honduras as compared to those in Ecuador meant a 
greater threat to democracy in the crisis state. With moderately high levels of support for the 
removal of Mahuad in Ecuador, some international actors were concerned that the “popular will” 
of the people would be ignored and the pressure of restoring Mahuad as president would only 
serve to undermine the notion that popular will is a key component for democratic stability. The 
uncertainty regarding the consequences of insisting Mahuad remain in power presented a strong 
deterrent to more formal insistence on the continuation of Mahuad in power. As a result, the 
lower levels of severity meant that uncertainty regarding the consequences of action had a 
greater impact in Ecuador than in Honduras. 
 The polarization in opinions regarding the right of the people to protest and remove a 
president from power was also expressed in the Organization’s Permanent Council meeting 
during the discussion over whether the PC had been convened to discuss the invocation of 
Resolution 1080. Without the installation of a lasting junta-led government, the levels of 
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polarization regarding the best course of action and the role of the OAS in responding to the 
crisis were not overcome. 
2) Duration of the Coup in Ecuador and Acceptance of the Transition to Noboa: The coup in 
Ecuador was over within 24 hours. With Mahuad’s explicit recognition of the succession to Vice 
President Gustavo Noboa, the congressional vote that reinforced the succession, and the 
subsequent return to constitutional order, the OAS likely did not have much incentive to invoke 
any further democracy clauses or invoke more sanctions24. In fact, the PC did not meet again 
until the events of January 21 were over, settled, and a “sense of normalcy” had been restored 
(CP/ACTA 1221/00). In contrast, the refusal of the coup government in Honduras to accept the 
return of Zelaya (both in terms of allowing his return to the executive office as well as a 
guarantee of safe passage to Honduras for Zelaya) meant a longer time for regional organizations 
to try multiple different tactics. As a result, the OAS was able to attempt a wider range of 
solutions to the crisis in Honduras. 
3) The Behavior of the Actors in each country: With regards to severity, the most important 
variation in the severity of each crisis is based on how the coup leaders and ousted government 
officials behaved during and after the crisis. In a personal interview on June 18, 2014, when I 
asked why there was a variation in the responses to the two crises, Teodoro Bustamante, a well-
known academic based at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales Sede Ecuador 
(FLACSO), referred to the characteristics of the crises in Ecuador as “no ha sido tan duro, tan 
terrible” (they have not been so hard, so terrible) (Bustamante 2014). He argued that there is an 
“umbral” or a “threshold” that initiates a response, and that the crises in Ecuador, since they had 
not been so bad or so terrible, did not reach that same level and, as a result, did not receive quite 
                                                 
24
 It is important to note again that although Mahuad accepted the transition to Noboa, he did not officially resign 
and insisted that his actions were about helping to stabilize Ecuador, not about an acceptance of the mechanisms 
through which he was removed. 
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as extensive as a response. When that threshold is met and the “message” is sent that this crisis 
needs a response, a response equal to the threat occurs. However, since the crises in Ecuador did 
not reach that threshold, the responses were limited. This “threshold” understanding supports the 
idea of the severity of the crisis. When we look at the variation in the severity of the crisis, we 
can see how the Honduran crisis likely tipped the balance over the threshold, whereas the 
Ecuadorian crisis did not. 
 In Honduras, the reading of a false resignation letter, the suspension of civil liberties, the 
arrest and arbitrary detention of the Foreign Minister and the ambassadors of other Latin 
American countries, and the expulsion of President Zelaya to another country were issues that 
threatened the notion of a constitutional and democratic order and raised concern amongst the 
member-states in the region regarding the effects of those particular decisions on the status of 
democracy in Honduras. At the same time, Zelaya was effectively using the networks he had 
established in the region and also used the regional and supranational IGOs (such as the UN) to 
inform and catalyze a reaction to the crisis in Honduras. In the personal interview, Teodoro 
Bustamante also noted that part of the reason for the variation in responses was not necessarily 
because Zelaya was more sympathetic or liked than Mahuad, but rather because Zelaya had the 
network of alliances built to notify them that he was “hurt” and to request a forceful response 
from the IGOs to the Micheletti government.  
 On the other the other hand, the behavior of key actors in Ecuador, with special focus on 
General Mendoza, reduced the levels of severity. By taking over the military seat of the junta and 
then removing military support for the coup government, General Mendoza effectively ended the 
process of the coup d’etat. International pressure and the threat of sanctions on Ecuador proved 
sufficient to change the behavior of Mendoza to reestablish the democratic and constitutional 
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order. In addition to Mendoza’s actions, Mahuad was unable (or did not have the foresight and 
networks to keep the OAS informed like Zelaya) to activate the network of the regional IGOs 
and keep them informed and actively involved in the events before and during the crisis. As a 
result, the behavior of the perpetrators of the coup affected the level of severity of each crisis, 
and the variation in the ability to provide information by each embattled president affected the 
information with which the regional organizations had to work. 
 In light of the variation in severity between the two crises, we can more clearly see how 
time, uncertainty, polarization, and information played a role in reducing the overall response of 
the OAS to the crisis in Ecuador as compared to Honduras. Had the crisis in Ecuador lasted 
longer or the behavior of the junta been more of a threat to the status of democracy in the 
country, it is likely that the mitigating factors that reduced the response in Ecuador would have 
been less important and the international community would have responded in ways more similar 
to the response to the Honduran crisis, a counterfactual supported by Boniface (2007).  
4.7 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I argued that the variation in the responses of the Organization of 
American States to the crises in Honduras and Ecuador is due to the variation in the levels of 
severity of the two crises. Due to the lower levels of severity of the crisis in Ecuador, the 
intervening factors of time, uncertainty regarding a response, the role of information, and 
polarization within the OAS lessened the ability of the Organization to respond forcefully and 
with the invocation of the primary democratic instruments available to the Organization. On the 
other hand, the high levels of severity due to the behavior of the actors in the crisis in Honduras 
meant the OAS was not only able to respond forcefully and with the invocation of the primary 
democratic instruments, but also that the Organization was able to overcome the potential 
influence of time, uncertainty, polarization, and information.  
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5 Chapter Five: “Near-Coup Crises”: Bolivia 2003 and Ecuador 2004-2005 
What explains the variation in responses from regional intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) to presidential crises in Latin America? In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the 
variation in responses to the coups d’etat in Ecuador in 2000 and Honduras in 2009 was driven 
by the decrease in the severity of the crisis in Ecuador due to the dissolution of the junta by 
General Mendoza and the succession of Vice President Noboa to the executive office, and, as a 
result of the reduction in severity, the increase in the importance of the intervening variables of 
time, uncertainty, information, and polarization for that crisis. Part of what is interesting in the 
region of Latin America is that traditional coups d’etat, where the military takes an active role in 
the removal of a president, either independently or in alliance with other actors, have reduced in 
frequency since the end of the Cold War. Coups are now considered rare instances of democratic 
crisis in the region. However, other forms of democratic crisis, known under a variety of names 
such as “civil society coups” (Encarnación 2002), “presidential interruptions” (Marsteintredet 
2014), “failed presidencies” (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009) and “impeachment coups” 
(Boniface 2007) have been on the rise and present a unique and new challenge to the 
consolidation of democracy in Latin America.  
 As a result of the rise of these new types of crises in Latin America, we must ask whether 
the variation in responses to cases that are not coups d’etat is also due to the variation in the 
levels of the clarity and severity of the crisis. Additionally, if clarity and/or severity are low, is 
the variation in responses due to the influence of the intervening variables of uncertainty, time, 
information, and polarization? In this chapter I demonstrate that the expected relationship 
between severity, clarity, and responses from regional intergovernmental organizations holds for 
“near coup crises” as well. I also demonstrate that during times when clarity or severity were 
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low, the influence of time, polarization, uncertainty, and information played a significant role in 
explaining the variation in responses to “near coup crises.” I use the archetypal cases of Bolivia 
in 2003 (the protests against and eventual resignation of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada) 
and Ecuador 2005 (the protests against and the removal of President Lucio Gutiérrez for 
“abandoning his post”) to demonstrate the strength of my argument. These cases provide similar 
circumstances- mass protests against the executive, eventual resignation and/or exile of the 
president, and a constitutional transition to a successor. However, the circumstances surrounding 
the crisis in Ecuador were potentially more severe, in that there were concerns that the removal 
of President Gutiérrez amounted to a congressional coup, leading to pressure from the Permanent 
Council on the Ecuadorian government to invoke Article 18 of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter (IADC) to gather more information on the situation. Article 18 authorizes the Permanent 
Council or Secretary General of the OAS, with the prior consent of the government concerned, to 
arrange for visits or other actions to analyze the situation and then to submit a report to the 
Permanent Council for a collective assessment of the situation and a determination of further 
decisions. In Bolivia, despite the crisis bordering on severity, the President of Bolivia chose to 
refrain from invoking the IADC, and instead resigned in the face of protests. In this chapter, I 
will demonstrate how the behavior of the main domestic actors affected the levels of clarity and 
severity of the crisis, and as a result, increased the importance of the intervening variables of 
time, information, polarization, and uncertainty, which led to the variation in responses.   
 This chapter proceeds as follows: I will first summarize the events of the crises in Bolivia 
and Ecuador and the responses from the regional intergovernmental organizations to the crises. 
The focus will be on the Organization of American States (OAS), but will mention the responses 
of other regional organizations, such as the Andean Community (CAN), Mercosur, and the Rio 
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Group. However, this chapter is primarily limited to an in-depth review of the variation of 
responses of the OAS because UNASUR had not been fully created, neither Bolivia nor Ecuador 
were members of Mercosur at the time, and other regional groups, such as CAN and the Rio 
Group, did not have defense-of-democracy mechanisms developed to the same extent as the 
OAS.25 It is, however, important to note their responses to the crises as they unfolded since many 
of them issued declarations regarding the events unfolding in the countries. Finally, after 
summarizing the crises and responses of the regional IGOs, I will demonstrate that the crisis in 
Bolivia was less severe than the crisis in Ecuador and that levels of clarity varied over time for 
each case. Due to the variation of clarity and severity over time in each case, the intervening 
factors of time, information, uncertainty, and polarization led to the variation in responses. 
Ultimately, higher levels of severity and clarity in the Ecuadorian crisis resulted in a more in-
depth and comprehensive response.  
5.1 The Bolivian Crises of February and October 2003 
 When Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (known as “Goni”) was elected President of Bolivia 
and took office in August of 2002, his support was already tenuous. Due to the nature of the 
electoral system in Bolivia, Goni secured the executive office with only 22.5% of the popular 
vote in the second round of elections, defeating a last minute surge of support for the 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) candidate, Evo Morales.26  Like many presidents in the 
Americas during the early 2000s, Goni inherited a weak economy, high levels of inequality, and 
a populace that was highly active in expressing frustrations with the entrenched political system.  
                                                 
25
 Ecuador, as an associate member of Mercosur, is not considered a full member of the economic union. Bolivia is 
currently (as of 2015) in the process of incorporating as an associate member. The Cuzco Declaration, which 
signaled the intention of the South American States to create a political andeconomic union that would eventually 
align with Mercosur was signed in 2004, although the incorporation of UNASUR as a deliberative body was not 
completed until 2008. 
26
 Since no candidate won more than 50% of the vote, the National Congress chose the executive. Gonzalo Sánchez 
de Lozada was chosen by the National Congress to serve as President of Bolivia, winning 84 of the 127 
Congressional votes (Singer and Morrison 2004, 181). 
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Protests had been occurring with relative frequency, including the 2000 Cochabamba 
Water Protests (also known as the Cochabamba Water Wars), and had created difficulties for the 
prior Banzer-Quiroga administration.27 Although protests from indigenous groups were common, 
much of the discontent within civil society was economic, with issues such as higher pensions, 
coca eradication policies, higher salaries, and the right to earn a living from coca forming the key 
concerns underlying civil society protests (Barr 2005, 71). Due to the multitude of issue-areas 
citizens had concerns about, protests tended to have a snowball effect, involving wide swaths of 
civil society and leading to a proliferation of demands and people on the streets when one group 
began a protest (Barr 2005, 72).  The situation in Bolivia was uneasy before Congress chose 
Goni as president and due to the lack of majority support for Goni from the citizens, the 
numerous issues that failed to receive satisfactory responses from the government, and the 
pressure external actors put on the Bolivian government, the divide was deepened between 
citizens and their institutions.  
Although Bolivia’s economy had seen a slight turnaround in terms of GDP growth, the 
promises of neoliberalism had not been translated into social progress. As noted by Barr (2005, 
76-77): 
“The country’s healthy GDP growth rate of 5 percent in both 1997 and 
1998 fell to 0 percent the following year, sparking the first round of 
protests during the Banzer administration. Although GDP growth has 
since improved- it rose 2 percent in 2000, followed by 1 percent, 2.8 
percent, and 2.5 percent in subsequent years- the impact has been largely 
nullified by the 1.9 percent annual population growth rate. Life 
expectancy is just over 64 years, and the under 5 infant mortality rate is 
66 per 1,000 births; both figures are the worst in the hemisphere except 
for Haiti.”  
                                                 
27
 Hugo Banzer led a coup d’etat and presided over a dictatorial regime from 1971-1978. He was reelected in 1996 
and served a second term from 1997-2001 before resigning due to ill health. His Vice President, Jorge Quiroga, 
completed the term but was barred from seeking reelection as President due to constitutional limits on consecutive 
reelection.  
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Despite the weak economy and the high levels of poverty in the country, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) continued to pressure Bolivia to implement the neoliberal policies and 
structural adjustment programs (known as The Washington Consensus) promoted by the IMF 
and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs). According to the World Bank and IMF, the 
structural adjustment programs would improve growth and address inflation, “reduce 
governments’ economic role and open economies to international capital,” all of which would 
lead to “superior economic performance” (Kohl and Farthing 2009, 62; Williamson 1993, 1330). 
Despite the promises, the policies and programs endorsed by the IFIs created more instability 
and pitted Goni and his administration in a constant battle with the majority of the population. 
In February 2003, in an attempt to institute the neoliberal policies of the IMF and 
demonstrate that Bolivia could be trusted for additional loans and support, Goni announced a flat 
12.5 percent tax for salaried workers, coupled with other economic changes, such as “a 10 
percent cut in government expenses, sharp limits on pay increases, and no new money for the 
universities” and only a “2.2 percent increase” in income for the police (Greenberg 2009, 388).  
The reaction to the austerity plan presented by Goni was very negative. Two days of protests and 
conflicts left 30 people dead, government buildings burned, and stores looted (Barr 2005, 70).  
5.2 The OAS Response to the February 2003 Crisis in Bolivia 
Although protests had been occurring with relative frequency in Bolivia, as noted above, 
the marches and protests in February (and later in October) were the deadliest in the country 
since the 1952 Revolution (Barr 2005, 70). In response to the deadly protests, Bolivia’s 
Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States asked for an extraordinary Permanent 
Council meeting, which was held on February 14. At this first meeting of the Permanent Council 
to address the February crisis, the goal of the Bolivian ambassador was to pass a resolution 
written by the Bolivian delegation which expressed support from the Organization of American 
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States for the government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, condemned the acts of violence, and 
encouraged a peaceful and successful resolution of the crisis. 
In this first meeting, Bolivia’s foreign minister, Carlos Saavedra Bruno, described the 
events that were occurring in the country, couching his discussion in the impact of the economy 
and concerns for the stability of democracy in Bolivia if the protests and violence were to 
continue. In one portion of his discussion, Saavedra Bruno stated: “it is possible to represent…a 
situation which puts at risk the democracy, democratic stability and institutional framework of 
our country” (“OAS Meeting Minutes CP/ACTA 1355/03” 2003, 5). The response to the 
Bolivian ambassador and his summary of the crisis was unanimous in its support for the country 
and the country’s democracy, although there were disputes about the roots of the crisis. 
Venezuela and Mexico made specific mention of Articles 12 and 13 of the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter, which refer to the need to address poverty, economic development, and 
economic and social rights. In particular, Venezuela repeatedly made the point that the crisis in 
Bolivia was a social one, not a political one, and as such, any action from the OAS should 
include references to those Articles.  
Other member states, such as Panama and the United States, focused on the political 
aspects of the crisis. Panama suggested the invocation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter 
(IADC) because Panama argued that the OAS and the IADC were there “to protect democracy” 
(CP/ACTA 1355/03, 9).  The Bolivian ambassador recognized the influence of social and 
economic factors and agreed that the influence of those factors was important. He also 
recognized that there were a number of member states that suggested the invocation of the 
IADC, but stated his goal was to secure a resolution showing support for the Bolivian 
government that was supported by the IADC.  He also noted that if the resolution referred to 
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almost every article of the entire IADC, in the end the resolution would not be read by anyone 
(CP/ACTA 1355/03, 20).  
Earlier in the discussion, the ambassador also clarified that the language of the resolution 
was meant to refer to the IADC, but not to invoke the mechanisms of the IADC, such as Articles 
17 or 18, at that point. Invocation of Article 17 would have required a request for invocation 
directly from the Bolivian government. Although Article 18 can be invoked by any member 
state, the prior consent of the government concerned is required before visits or other actions to 
analyze the situation are allowed. Although the Bolivian government noted the dangers to 
democracy and the government, the ambassador said they wanted to “keep the window open” to 
be able to invoke these articles of the IADC if the situation later merited, but chose to not 
directly invoke either of those articles nor ask for specific assistance in the form of diplomatic 
missions at that point (CP/ACTA 1355/03, 11).  
The member-states of the OAS Permanent Council agreed to pass the resolution put forth 
by Bolivia that did not invoke the IADC but did express support for “the constitutional 
government of the Republic of Bolivia, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, and for the democratic 
institutions” and reaffirmed “the firm resolve of the member-states to apply the mechanisms of 
the Inter-American Democratic Charter for preserving democracy” (CP/Res. 838). Although the 
member-states were in agreement that a democratic crisis was brewing in Bolivia and the recent 
events posed a potential threat to democratic stability in the country, there had not yet been an 
alteration in the democratic order. Without an unconstitutional alteration and with the request by 
the Bolivian delegation to put the invocation of the IADC on hold, the OAS Permanent Council 
limited its resolution to one of firm support for Goni’s government and a warning to the 
opposition that a violation of the IADC would not be tolerated. In other words, at the February 
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meeting it was clear that a crisis was occurring, but there was uncertainty as to further steps the 
OAS should take. The Bolivian delegation wanted to keep the window open for invoking the 
IADC, and at that point did not ask for further support in the form of good offices, mediation, or 
a fact-finding mission.  
 The response from the OAS to the crisis in Bolivia is consistent with the theory that clear 
and severe crises will be met with greater responses from the Organization of American States. 
The member states of the Permanent Council agreed to a firmly worded Resolution, expressing 
support for the democratically elected government and conveying that the Organization was fully 
willing to employ its primary democratic instruments if the situation merited that response in the 
future. Although the PC did not invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter at that time, that 
action was due more to the request from the Bolivian government to wait to invoke the Charter 
than due to other concerns. In spite of the disagreement on the root causes of the crisis, the 
member states seemed willing to invoke the IADC in some form had Bolivia requested or given 
prior consent to the diplomatic actions authorized by Article 18. 
5.3 The October 2003 Crisis and the OAS Response  
Between the crises in February and October, protests continued in Bolivia against the 
Goni government and against many of his policies. Between these two major crises, the Bolivian 
government regularly updated the Permanent Council regarding the situation in the country. In 
late February, Bolivia requested additional support from the OAS to form a commission to 
investigate the deaths of the protestors from the February crisis to help discover who was 
responsible for the deaths and the instances of vandalism (“OAS Meeting Minutes CP/ACTA 
1357/03” 2003). In September 2003, Vice President Carlos Mesa met the member states in a 
Permanent Council meeting to update them on the situation in the country and received 
statements of support from the member states in the Permanent Council. Although the OAS 
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remained informed regarding the events and was involved in the investigation of the deaths, 
discontent in Bolivia towards the Goni government grew.  
The catalyst for the protests in October 2003 was the announcement of a proposal to 
export natural gas from Bolivia’s reserves through Chile and then to the United States and 
Mexico. The proposal ignited long-standing tensions and negative sentiment towards Chile over 
the loss of Bolivian territory (and its access to the sea) from the War of the Pacific (1879-1884). 
Protests against the plans to export the natural gas included road blockades around the capital, 
which led to food and fuel shortages, strikes led by the Bolivian Labor Federation, and mass 
marches led by indigenous groups, based largely in El Alto, one of the largest suburbs of La Paz 
where a high concentration of indigenous people live (Alessandro and Tobar 2003). In response 
to the marches against the natural gas export plans and against Goni’s government, on October 
11 the President issued Supreme Decree #27209, which dispatched the military to El Alto to 
ensure the delivery of fuel and food shipments to La Paz. The military used weapons to clear the 
roads blocked by the unarmed protestors and repressed the protests in El Alto through force. As a 
result of the use of force by the military to break up the blockades and suppress the protests, 
confrontations ensued between the protestors and the government forces. More than 50 people 
were killed and 400 injured as a result of the confrontations (Tuckermann and Salazar de la Torre 
2005, 106).  
By October 13th, the protests had grown to over one million people (out of 9 million in 
the country) and people from broad swaths of society were demanding Goni’s resignation (Kohl 
and Farthing 2009, 70). Goni instructed his ambassador at the OAS to request the convening of 
an extraordinary Permanent Council meeting to discuss the situation in his country and to once 
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again ask for support for the democratic process and his government from the member-states in 
Latin America. 
The Permanent Council of the OAS held an extraordinary meeting at the request of 
Bolivia on October 13th. The Ambassador of Bolivia to the OAS, María Tamayo Arnal, 
presented the group with an update of the events in Bolivia, expressing concern for the 
democratic framework and asking for support for Bolivian democracy. At one point in her 
discussion, Ambassador Tamayo stated that she was concerned because “Bolivia is in danger of 
a seditious project, supported by the outside, to destroy democracy” (“OAS Meeting Minutes 
CP/ACTA 1384/03” 2003, 3). According to Ambassador Tamayo and the Secretary General of 
the OAS, the major concern was that the political opposition had been behaving 
undemocratically. Although there had been deaths due to the protests and the deployment of the 
military, the president had been democratically elected and enjoyed the support of a majority of 
the members of the Bolivian Congress. As part of the Bolivian delegation’s presentation, a draft 
version of a proposed resolution written by the Bolivian delegation was passed around. The draft 
version of the resolution reiterated support for the government of Sánchez de Lozada, 
condemned the acts of violence that had taken place in Bolivia which “endangered its 
constitutional order,” urged the financial institutions to cooperate with the Bolivian government 
to contribute to stability and development in the country, promoted dialogue and negotiation, and 
finally “recalled the firm resolve of member states to enforce the commitments set forth in the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter for preserving democracy” (OAS Permanent Council 
CP/Res.849 (1384/03)). 
The Secretary General (SG) of the OAS, César Gaviria, spoke after the Bolivian 
ambassador. During his presentation, the SG informed the delegations that the information 
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presented by Ambassador Tamayo was accurate and he had been in contact with numerous actors 
in the country. He notified the Permanent Council that it was his intention to remain connected 
and informed regarding the events as they unfolded in Bolivia. He also stated hope that the 
“expressions of disagreement from the opposition can be channeled into democratic and peaceful 
ways, so that they can return to a path of dialogue and understanding” (CP/ACTA 1384/03, 4).  
The presentations of the Bolivian ambassador and the Secretary General painted a picture 
of a crisis where democratic stability was being threatened and where the Bolivian government 
needed the support of the Organization of American States to help respond to the crisis in hopes 
that support would discourage the opposition and push them back towards a path of dialogue. At 
this point, the crisis was both clear and bordered on severe- it was clear that a crisis was 
occurring where Article 17 or 18 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter could be applied and 
severe in that the opposition’s behavior threatened to undermine the democratic order. However, 
Bolivia chose to not invoke Article 17 and requested that the Organization put the invocation of 
other portions of the IADC on hold. Although the OAS could offer mediation, good offices, or 
other forms of diplomatic missions without the invocation of the primary democratic 
instruments, the OAS would still need the prior consent of the government concerned for those to 
take place and the Bolivian delegation had only requested a commission to look into the deaths 
of protestors from the February protests. In the meetings of the Permanent Council, the focus 
was on the passage of resolutions supporting the Sánchez de Lozada government and the 
Bolivian delegation did not request additional missions. As a result, the actual invocation of the 
primary democratic instruments did not occur. 
Secondly, the question of the timing of getting the Resolution approved and published 
came up- demonstrating a need for urgency in the face of a clear crisis. The member-states were 
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united in their expressions of solidarity and support for the Bolivian government, but were 
divided in how those expressions should be made. Some of the delegations were strong 
proponents of applying the IADC and pressing for diplomatic initiatives, although the 
delegations were not clear on the specific diplomatic initiatives they were proposing. Other 
member states were hesitant to invoke the IADC without the request of Bolivia, and others, 
particularly Venezuela, argued that while they supported a resolution, the resolution would need 
to address the underlying causes of the crisis, mainly the economic and social issues prevalent in 
Bolivia. 
Of all the delegations that spoke at the Permanent Council meeting, the most vocal 
proponents of applying the IADC were Panama, the United States, Peru, and Paraguay. Panama, 
speaking after the SG, argued that the OAS was at a “momento historico” (a historic moment) in 
which the OAS should apply the norms and principles of the IADC in response to the crisis 
(CP/ACTA 1384/03, 5). The United States echoed that sentiment, arguing that the Bolivian 
situation is “yet another example of how to apply the Charter” (CP/ACTA 1384/03, 10). 
Statements from Peru and Paraguay also noted that the time was ripe to “reopen the mechanisms 
of the IADC” (CP/ACTA 1384/03, 12). These delegations suggested that the crisis in Bolivia 
was one in which the IADC could apply and should be invoked to demonstrate the intent of the 
Organization of American States to defend democracy.  
The delegations from Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Belize, and El Salvador (speaking 
for many of the Central American countries) demonstrated their support for the resolution put on 
the table by the Bolivian delegation, and with the exception of some minor translation and 
wording concerns, did not suggest any changes to the draft resolution put forth by Bolivia. 
Venezuela discussed the situation as “the product of the social crises that we have presently” 
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(CP/ACTA 1384/03, 12). The Venezuelan delegation noted its satisfaction with the draft 
resolution put forth by the Bolivian delegation and, noting that the democratic system is a 
“perfectible” system, expressed its support for the Bolivian “pueblo” (CP/ACTA 1384/03, 12). 
 Colombia and Mexico both noted that a continuing discussion had the potential of 
delaying a response to the crisis in Bolivia and, if the discussion continued, the Resolution could 
become an innocuous instrument (“instrumento inocuo”).  The meeting had been called late in 
the evening and by the point the Mexican and Colombian delegations had the chance to speak, 
the clock had passed 10 p.m. As a result, the Colombian and Mexican delegations urged the 
member states to pass the resolution as put forth by the Bolivian government. Chile agreed and 
said that if Bolivia wanted any changes to be made based on the suggestions put forth, Bolivia 
could request those, but at that point they should move on. After all, the Mexican delegation 
stated, the resolution was “the support the Bolivian government has asked us for” (CP/ACTA 
1384/03, 16). 
 At the end of the discussion, the Bolivian ambassador thanked the member-states for their 
support, for the discussion, and then said that since there appeared to be support among various 
delegations, that they could adopt the text, in its “original version” (CP/ACTA 1384/03, 18). 
Resolution 849 was approved by the Permanent Council and published as a response to the 
ongoing events in the country. The Resolution once again reaffirmed the support of the OAS for 
the “constitutional Government of the President of the Republic of Bolivia, Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada” and “recalled the firm resolve of the member states to enforce the commitments set 
forth in the Inter-American Democratic Charter for preserving democracy” (Organization of 
American States 2003). In addition, the Resolution called for dialogue and negotiation among all 
political and social sectors of Bolivia, deplored the loss of life, urged the financial institutions to 
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cooperate with the government of Bolivia, and condemned the violence that had taken place. 
Again, the response from the Organization of American States involved meetings of the 
Permanent Council and resolutions, however it fell short of the invocation of the primary 
democratic instruments and additional offers for dialogue or other diplomatic efforts were 
lacking.  
 In response to the protests against his presidency and shortages of fuel and food due to 
the blockades around La Paz, Goni authorized the use of force by the military and imposed 
martial law in El Alto. Violent clashes between the security forces and the protestors led to the 
deaths of sixteen people, which also left the Goni government in an “untenable position” 
(Dawson. The continuing protests and the use of force led to a withdrawal of support for Goni by 
key members of his administration, including Vice President Carlos Mesa. On October 17th, 
President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada announced his resignation to Congress, which accepted 
his decision to resign. Vice President Carlos Mesa constitutionally succeeded Goni to the office 
of President, announced that a referendum would be held over the issues of natural gas in 
Bolivia. For a short period of time, it appeared that life had quieted in Bolivia.  
 At a regular session of the Permanent Council on October 22nd, Ambassador Tamayo 
addressed the Permanent Council and stated that “a democratic process” had been achieved in 
Bolivia (“OAS Meeting Minutes CP/ACTA 1387/03” 2003, 5). She also stated that although 
“Bolivian institutions were tested” it was demonstrated that “Bolivia has a profound democratic 
conscience that allows the advance of democracy toward a horizon of hope” (CP/ACTA 
1387/03, 4). The resolution authored by the Bolivian delegation, titled “Response to the 
Constitutional Process of the Republic of Bolivia” was passed unanimously, although not until 
after a variety of delegations spoke. As part of the discussion, the delegation of Chile stated that 
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the continent was “able to solve its most grave crises with fidelity to the text and spirit of the 
IADC” (CP/ACTA 1387/03, 9). The delegation of Peru supported the process in Bolivia and 
acknowledged the succession of Carlos Mesa as President. They also read a statement by the Rio 
Group, stating that the swearing in of Mesa “reaffirms the democratic legitimacy” in Bolivia 
(CP/ACTA 1387/03, 7). Venezuela’s delegation offered its support of the Bolivian people and 
announced that President Hugo Chávez was willing to mediate between the conflicting parties in 
Bolivia (CP/ACTA 1387/03, 11). Other countries, such as Canada, Uruguay, Belize, and 
Nicaragua all expressed their support for Bolivia and pleasure at the prospects for stability and 
democracy in the future. With the acceptance of the transition to Mesa, the OAS accepted that 
the crisis had been adequately handled for the moment and continued the meeting to pursue other 
business.  
 By the end of the crises that Bolivia faced in 2003, the Permanent Council of the 
Organization of American States had issued three resolutions, two of which demonstrated the 
willingness of the Organization and the Permanent Council to apply Articles 20 and 21 to the 
crisis and a mission to investigate the deaths of a number of protestors from the February protests 
had been authorized. However, Goni’s resignation and the constitutional succession of Vice 
President Mesa to the presidency meant that Articles 20 and 21, which could be invoked in the 
instance of an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional 
alteration of the constitutional regime, were not invoked. As a result, the OAS Permanent 
Council took the necessary and most effective steps it could take while also considering the role 
of sovereignty for Bolivia.  
 The crisis in Bolivia provides an interesting contrast to the crisis in Ecuador between 
2004 and 2005. Why did the OAS Permanent Council invoke the Inter-American Democratic 
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Charter for the crisis in Ecuador but not for the crisis in Bolivia? Why did the international 
community respond with greater force to the crisis in Ecuador than to the crisis in Bolivia? In 
order to answer these questions, it is important to understand the background of the Ecuadorian 
crises as well as the viewpoints of the various member-states with regards to the crises in 
Ecuador. 
5.4 Ecuador 2004-2005: A Coup D’etat in Institutional Clothing or The Justified Response to 
an Autogolpe?  
 After serving a short prison sentence due to his participation in the coup of 2000, Lucio 
Gutiérrez created the political party “21 January Patriotic Society Party” (PSP) and ran for the 
office of President in 2002.28 In an alliance with the indigenous party, Pachakutik (MUPP-NP), 
Gutiérrez managed to place first in the first round of voting with 20.3 percent of the vote.29 
However, since he failed to win a majority, a second round of voting was held in which he beat 
banana magnate Alvaro Noboa, winning 54.5 percent of the vote and securing the executive 
office. Despite his campaign alliance with Pachakutik and the leftist nature of his campaign 
platform, once in office Gutiérrez implemented a series of neoliberal policies promoted by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United States. At one point Gutiérrez even told 
George W. Bush in a meeting that Ecuador would be the “best friend” the United States would 
have in the region (The Economist 2003).  
 In response to the decisions made by Gutiérrez, Pachakutik publicly broke its alliance 
with the PSP and aligned with the main opposition party, the Social Christian Party (PSC), to 
attempt to impeach Gutiérrez for a variety of charges, including “embezzling state funds to 
                                                 
28 The coup in 2000 occurred in the 21st of January. The political party was named to honor the events of that 
day.  
29 Pachakutik’s full Spanish name is “Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik- Nuevo País” 
(Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement).  
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campaign for local elections in October 2004, as well as risking national security by 
requisitioning state-owned transport for the campaign” (BBC News 2004).  
  The move to impeach Gutiérrez failed in Congress after many of the members of the 
PSC broke with the party, allegedly due to intense lobbying and bribes from the Gutiérrez 
administration, and refused to vote to impeach Gutiérrez (BBC News 2004). However, the 
impact of the loss of the alliance with Pachakutik and the pressure put on him from the PSC 
meant that Gutiérrez had to form new alliances with other parties in Congress in order to push 
through his legislative agenda. The alliance he put together, known as the “New Majority,” 
included the party of the man defeated in the 2002 elections (Alvaro Noboa and the Institutional 
Renewal Party of National Action, PRIAN) and the party of exiled former president Abdalá 
Bucaram (the Roldosista Party). After the failed impeachment process, Gutiérrez called a session 
of Congress, in which he claimed that the courts were biased in favor of the opposition parties, 
especially the PSC, and would need to be purged to recalibrate the judicial system. Between 
November and December 2004, Gutiérrez used the alliances he built with the Roldosistas and 
PRIAN in Congress to remove and replace “five of seven members of the Supreme Electoral 
Council, eight of nine members of the Constitutional Tribunal, and 27 of 31 members of the 
Supreme Court” (Shifter 2004). 
 The removal of the justices and appointment of new ones were met with widespread 
condemnation from across civil society in Ecuador, including the Catholic Church, local 
chambers of Commerce, the National Association of Mayors, and legal and political experts 
(Edwards 2005, 5). As part of these protests against the court purges, El Comercio, one of the 
country’s major newspapers, updated its headline each day with the number of days that had 
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passed “since the unconstitutional overthrow of the Supreme Court” (Edwards 2005, 2). Protests 
against the government became commonplace by mid-February 2005 (Levitt 2007, 232).  
 Despite the protests, the Organization of American States and the Permanent Council of 
the Organization were largely silent regarding the issue of the Courts. The OAS Permanent 
Council did not meet to discuss the situation and the Acting Secretary-General of the OAS did 
not issue any press releases or statements regarding the issue.30 The United States also remained 
quiet on the issue, only responding publicly regarding the situation after a scathing op-ed in the 
Los Angeles Times by Michael Shifter. In the public statement, the United States Embassy in 
Ecuador stated that U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador, Kristie Kenney, had spoken with Gutiérrez and 
“communicated her concerns” (Edwards 2005, 6). Beyond that, the United States remained 
relatively quiet on the issue, refraining from outright condemnation of the Ecuadorian 
government for the purges.   
 In spite of the reluctance of the OAS or the United States to publicly respond to the crisis, 
several of the removed judges petitioned the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) of the OAS and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. These 
institutions allow for individuals to petition for an investigation into claims of abuse or human 
rights violations by governments. The Inter-American Commission held hearings regarding the 
removals of the justices and issued a strongly worded statement in March of 2004 indicating 
concern regarding the situation in the country. However, the process of hearing a case under the 
IACHR is an extended one and despite the petition by the justices on December 30 for a case, the 
IACHR did not adopt the admissibility report until February 27, 2007 and did not refer the case 
                                                 
30
 The OAS was undergoing a period of uncertainty during this time due to corruption allegations against the new 
Secretary General, Miguel Ángel Rodríguez. Luigi Einaudi, the assistant Secretary General, assumed the office in 
the interim period between the resignation of Rodríguez and the election of José Miguel Insulza in May 2005. 
However, the Permanent Council did meet regarding other issues and the Acting secretary general issued press 
statements on other concerns.  
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to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights until 2011 (IACHR Case No. 12,600; Edwards 
2005, 8).  
The United Nations Commission responded much more quickly, mainly due to the 
publicized plea to the Ecuadorian government by the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers, Leandro Despouy, to allow the mission in earlier than the government-
suggested date in May. With the authorization of the Gutiérrez government, Special Rapporteur 
visited Quito between the 13 and 18 of March to perform an in situ evaluation of the situation. 
He issued two reports, neither of which was particularly favorable to the government. The 
preliminary report, released on 29 March 2005, noted numerous violations committed by the 
Congress in removing the judges, including the failure to allow for a defense by the judges and 
the lack of constitutional authority for Congress to appoint and remove members of the Supreme 
Court.  The final report was not released until 2006 (Despouy 2005, 2006).   
The UN Reports stated that the dismissals of the judges were unconstitutional, but the 
reports focused mainly on the role of the Congress in the unconstitutional behavior, not on the 
role of President Gutiérrez. In the reports, Special Rapporteur Despouy made a series of 
recommendations designed to help Ecuador “secure the full restoration of the rule of law” but 
did not have any capacity to punish Ecuador’s institutions for unconstitutional behavior beyond 
the publication of the report and a series of recommendations. 
 Although there was movement from parts of the international community to step in to the 
situation where the OAS Permanent Council had not, the protests against the Gutiérrez 
administration continued into April. At the end of March, the president of the Supreme Court, 
Guillermo Castro, issued a resolution annulling the corruption charges against former Presidents 
Bucaram, Noboa, and former vice-President Alberto Dahik (Latin American Weekly Report 05-
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13, 1). The return of Bucaram and the idea that he would not be tried for alleged embezzlement, 
corruption, and other crimes committed during his term as president were major concerns for the 
opposition parties and were fiercely rejected by much of the Ecuadorian population. 
 Over the week of April 15-22, the institutional majority created by Gutiérrez began to fall 
apart and Gutiérrez became more isolated. On April 15, Gutiérrez issued an executive decree that 
dismissed the Supreme Court created on December 8, 2004 and declared a state of emergency.  
In spite of the emergency decree, protests continued throughout the night. The following day 
Gutiérrez rescinded the state of emergency. On April 20, a group of rioting students managed to 
access the Congressional building and set it on fire (Latin American Weekly Report 05-16, 1). 
Sixty-two members of Congress, all from the opposition parties and excluding allies of 
Gutiérrez, met in a special session at another location and declared that Gutiérrez had 
“abandoned his post,” despite the fact that he was sitting in the presidential palace at the time. 
The Congress then voted unanimously to remove Gutiérrez from the office of President and 
replaced him with the Vice President, Alfredo Palacio, as the President. Gutiérrez initially 
rejected the removal and denounced it as unconstitutional, but once the military leadership 
announced a few hours later that it would be withdrawing its support for Gutiérrez, he had little 
option but to flee (LAWR 05-16, 1). An arrest warrant was issued for Gutiérrez, who fled with 
his family to Brazil to seek exile.  
5.5 The OAS Response to the Removal of Gutiérrez 
 The OAS Permanent Council was already meeting in a regularly scheduled session on 
April 20th when the situation became more acute (Levitt 2007, 233). The Ambassador to the 
OAS from Ecuador, Marcelo Hervas, explained the situation in terms of the economic and 
political situation Gutiérrez inherited when he took office. Hervas argued that Congress 
dismissed the judges and Gutiérrez followed their actions. He also argued that it was well known 
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that the judiciary was biased and the public had called for those institutions to be depoliticized 
and the independence of the judicial system guaranteed. However, the dispute was over how to 
make those changes and the debates that were occurring were democratic and had not arrived at 
levels of “intolerance and political violence” (“OAS Meeting Minutes CP/ACTA 1477/05” 2005; 
Levitt 2006, 233). In addition, Hervas stated that in the current political crisis, they were “all 
committed to defending democracy” (CP/ACTA 1477/05, 20). He concluded with the statement 
that the Ecuadorian government viewed the situation as one in which there were disputes but that 
the government was open to dialogue to discuss the concerns of the population. As part of his 
conclusion, Hervas read a note from the UNASUR countries sent by Brazil the day before, in 
which the foreign ministers expressed their concern for the situation in Ecuador and reaffirmed 
the preference for a peaceful solution that respected the democratic order. The letter also 
reiterated the support of UNASUR for governments elected by the popular will and for the rule 
of law.  
 In response to the report given by the minister from Ecuador, the United States expressed 
its appreciation for the information and the support of the U.S. to Ecuador’s government, 
emphasizing that the United States supports “all of its [Ecuador’s] institutions, from the 
Congress to the judicial system to the presidency- a democratically elected president” 
(CP/ACTA 1477/05, 22; Levitt 2007, 234). After the United States spoke, the meeting continued 
as outlined by the agenda until the final minutes, when the President of the PC announced that 
the situation had become more complicated and suggested that the member-states suspend the 
session and reconvene the next day after talking to their home governments and attaining more 
information. The member states agreed to a suspended session and planned to meet again the 
following day. 
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By the time the member states reconvened on April 21st, Gutiérrez had been removed 
from office and was on his way to exile in Brazil. The change in government was also 
demonstrated by the presentation of the Ecuadorian situation by an alternate ambassador, Jaime 
Augusto Barberis Martínez. He explained that the situation in Ecuador was the result of 
“political instability in Ecuador” that had been resolved by the “constitutional process” of 
declaring that the president had vacated his seat pursuant to Article 167 of the Ecuadorian 
Constitution. He also stated: “the situation which has occurred in the past few hours is in no way 
a case of unconstitutional alteration, seriously affecting the constitutional order. It is, on the 
contrary, a case of presidential succession in the framework established in the constitution and 
laws of the Republic of Ecuador” (“OAS Meeting Minutes CP/ACTA 1478/05” 2005, 3). In 
concluding, the ambassador stated that Ecuador was “ready and open to receive collaboration 
from the OAS to consolidate the rule of law, promote dialogue and a national settlement” 
(CP/ACTA 1478/05, 4).  
 Many delegations expressed concern and frustration over the report given by Ambassador 
Barberis. The Panamanian ambassador expressed his concern over the events and stated “there 
were facts that escaped his understanding” (CP/ACTA 1478/05, 4). He also directly challenged 
the report given by the Ecuadorians and asked: “how was it that you came to the conclusion that 
the seat was vacated?” In response the Ecuadorian ambassador referred again to Article 167 of 
the Constitution and requested a short break so the member states could have time to “digest” the 
information and for the Ecuadorian delegation to put together a resolution to be presented 
(CP/ACTA 1478/05, 4). The Argentine delegation agreed with the request by Ecuador to recess 
until later. Peru indicated it wanted to speak before the recess and made the point that Panama 
had made earlier: how was it that the president had “abandoned his seat?” In a forceful moment, 
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the Peruvian ambassador stated “we cannot accept the predicament (“predicamento”) that 
‘nothing has happened’ and that this is something normal” (CP/ACTA 1478/05). He also 
challenged the Ecuadorian ambassador regarding the vote to remove Gutiérrez, pointing out that 
38 members of Congress were missing from the meeting that removed Gutiérrez and wanted to 
know why.   
 The ambassador from Ecuador started to respond and claimed he wasn’t stating that 
nothing had happened in Ecuador. He was then interrupted by the President of the session who 
stated that the decision on the floor was whether to take a recess and reconvene later. The 
delegation from Grenada expressed its support for a recess, but also expressed concern that the 
Permanent Council was moving forward without knowing the correct procedures for how to deal 
with the situation. He stated that “more focused information on what exactly is going on should 
be gathered” and that there was “no need for this Council to appear to be debating uncertainties” 
since they “do have instruments” with which to respond to crises, hinting that the primary 
democratic instruments could be used (CP/ACTA 1478/05, 8; Levitt 2007, 235). The 
ambassadors of the member states all agreed with the proposal for a recess to gather more 
information, with St. Kitts and Nevis also requesting a mechanism for gaining additional 
information regarding crises rather than relying on “external assessments or opinions” 
(CP/ACTA 1478/05, 9). Venezuela noted that the ambassadors from Chile, Venezuela, and 
Brazil were also working together to formulate a response from UNASUR and would appreciate 
time to complete that statement (CP/ACTA 1478/05, 8; Levitt 2007, 235). The President of the 
session informed the member states that he would be in contact with the Department for 
Democratic and Political Affairs to have an updated report of the facts presented by Ecuador for 
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the meeting tomorrow. The Permanent Council took a recess and reconvened the next day, April 
22.  
 On the 22nd, the number of representatives from Ecuador to speak to the Permanent 
Council had expanded significantly. Newly installed President Palacio sent a delegation 
composed of Dr. Blasco Peñaherrera Padilla, former Vice President and former Ambassador for 
Ecuador to the OAS, Dr. Edgard Terán, a former minister of foreign relations and former 
ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Mario Alemán, a former vice minister of foreign 
relations and former ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, and finally, Dr. Gil Barragán, 
an expert on Law and Constitutionality, a former President of the Tribunal of Constitutional 
Guarantees, and a former government minister. Peñaherrera gave the presentation, stating that as 
a former ambassador to the OAS, he had worked on the development of the IADC during one of 
its stages, and as a result was most suited for the presentation. Peñaherrera then described the 
actions led by Gutiérrez and his alliance in Congress, calling the dismissal of the judges in 2004 
“an assault on the democratic institutions” in Ecuador (CP/ACTA 1478/05, 16). He also pointed 
to the role of civil society by arguing that the mass mobilizations against Gutiérrez were some of 
the largest he had seen in Ecuador. To back up his claim, he presented a series of press clippings 
and news stories that described the protests and the unconstitutional behavior of Gutiérrez. 
Peñaherrera argued that the behavior of Gutiérrez in 2004 had “destroyed democratic 
institutionalization” and that the OAS failed to step in then (CP/ACTA 1478/05, 16). He also 
noted the states of emergency and the allegations that Gutiérrez was behind the pardoning of 
Bucaram, despite the existence of photos and videos of Bucaram fleeing the presidential palace 
in 1997 carrying “sacks of money” meant for the central bank (CP/ACTA 1478/05, 18). In 
closing, Peñaherrera blamed Gutiérrez and his unconstitutional actions for the breakdown in 
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confidence and support in his government. Without support from the citizens, from the Congress, 
from the police, or the military, the removal of Gutiérrez was necessary and constitutional. He 
asked for support from the OAS, in conformity with the IADC, to help Ecuador restore the 
judiciary in the country. 
 The response from the Permanent Council member states was relatively mixed. The 
Panamanian ambassador noted that he was President of the PC in 2004 and the only notification 
he had received had been from the President of the Chamber of Commerce in Quito and that it 
did not appear it gave him reason to call a meeting of the Permanent Council at that time 
(CP/ACTA 1478/05, 20). He also stated that the goals of the organization were not to “take sides 
in these inter-institutional standoffs” (Levitt 2006, 236). Finally, the Panamanian ambassador 
suggested that, in response to the request made by the Ecuadorian representative, it was worth 
sending a mission to Ecuador from the OAS to look into the crisis, a suggestion supported by the 
majority of the member states. The Panamanian ambassador then sent around a resolution drafted 
by his delegation that included an authorized mission to Ecuador to gather further information, 
noting the “deterioration in the institutional life, democracy, and in the political life in Ecuador” 
(CP/ACTA 1478/05, 20). Nicaragua agreed with a mission but wanted to be sure the mission 
didn’t “prejudge” so that it could speak with all the parts of Ecuadorian society.  
 The Department of Democratic and Political Affairs representative then discussed his 
report, which outlined the series of events leading up to the 20th of April, starting with the 
removal of the justices in December 2004. In his discussion, he supported many of the arguments 
made by the Ecuadorian delegation: that Congress had the ability to meet extraordinarily and in 
alternate locations, as long as an absolute majority agreed to the new location, that the actions by 
Gutiérrez could be considered unconstitutional and a violation of the separation of powers, and 
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that Congress had the ability to remove the president for abandoning his office.  The report by 
the Department of Democratic and Political Affairs seemed to give justification to many of the 
arguments that Gutiérrez’s removal was not unconstitutional (Levitt 2006, 235).  
 Although most of the member states supported a political mission to Ecuador to gather 
more information, Venezuela was more hesitant. The ambassador for Venezuela argued that the 
OAS should “listen to the voice of the people” and that the popular uprising was a representation 
of a new kind of democracy in the region (CP/ACTA 1478/05, 25). Despite this hesitation, 
Venezuela was willing to work on a draft resolution to address the situation based on the 
resolutions presented by the Panamanian and Ecuadorian delegations.  
 The delegations agreed to hold a parallel drafting session for a resolution to combine the 
proposals by the Panamanian and Ecuadorian delegations, and any others that might come up 
during the drafting process. Paraguay noted that the Ecuadorians had made an offer to invoke the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter and wanted to be sure that was included in the resolution. 
After a single draft resolution had been composed and passed, a number of member states took 
turns speaking. The United States ambassador argued that although the situation appeared to be 
stabilizing, that the Organization should “proceed with caution” (CP/ACTA 1478/05, 36). He 
also stated that the United States delegation “thinks that this Council must act in the spirit of the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter” and that the United States supported “measures under the 
Charter, particularly Article 18,” to work towards a constitutional solution to the crisis 
(CP/ACTA 1478/05, 36). He also offered direct U.S. assistance if Ecuador requested it. 
 By the end of the day on April 22nd, the Permanent Council passed Resolution 880. The 
resolution invoked Article 18 of the IADC, with the consent of the Ecuadorian government, 
which authorized a mission to the country to follow up on the events and submit a report to the 
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Permanent Council on the mission’s efforts.  In closing remarks, the president of the session 
remarked on the amount of time it took to respond to the crisis and argued that, although it took a 
long time to come to an agreement on a resolution, it was necessary for an “institution of this 
type” to take the time to produce a resolution that “reflects the consensus” of America. He also 
praised the member state delegations for their work and ended the session.  
 The mission completed its visit to Ecuador between April 26 and 30, 2005. The report 
included a summary of the crisis and a discussion regarding the viewpoints of the various civil 
society and government officials with which the mission members met. As Levitt (2006) notes, 
the report on the events is as neutral as possible, although the concerns and recommendations at 
the end of the report incensed the Ecuadorian government, which claimed the OAS report went 
too far in criticizing Ecuador’s government. Of particular note in the report is the mission’s 
summary of the viewpoints on the removal of the judges and the removal of Gutiérrez. The 
players in Ecuador agreed on the timeline of events, but for nearly all of the events, there was 
typically a lack of agreement on whether the actions were constitutional or not. According to the 
mission report: “a broad majority appear to recognize the irregularity” of the removal of the 
members of the courts. On the other hand, there were “questions about the legitimacy of the call 
issued to Congress” for the removal of Gutiérrez as well as questions regarding the 
“interpretation given to the term ‘abandoning his post’” (OAS Mission to Ecuador 2005). The 
one point on which “almost all the people with whom the Mission spoke” deemed irregular was 
the dismissal of the Supreme Court members by executive decree on April 15.  
 The report contained a number of recommendations, including the recommendation that 
there be a process of broad and urgent dialogue, that the authorities should agree on a formula for 
“guaranteeing appropriate integration of the judiciary…free from the vagaries of party politics 
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and conflicting vested interests” and a reminder of the “preventive mechanisms built into the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter to prevent a deterioration of the political system” (OAS 
Mission Report- Ecuador 2005).  Despite the resistance from Ecuador regarding the report’s 
analysis of the events and its recommendations, the member states passed Resolution 883 in an 
ordinary session of the Permanent Council in May 2005, which called for the Secretary General 
to remain involved, “with the consent of Ecuador” in the country and to make available the 
resources of the OAS in order to assist Ecuador in reinforcing its democracy. In July 2005, the 
new Secretary-General, José Miguel Insulza, visited Ecuador and offered technical support to 
assist the judicial reforms process, including the sending to two legal scholars to “observe the 
recomposition of the Supreme Court” (Levitt 2006, 239).  
In the end, the response to the crises of 2004 and 2005 in Ecuador included two resolutions, 
one including the invocation of Article 18 of the IADC. As part of the invocation of Article 18, 
the OAS sent a political mission to Ecuador to follow up on the events in the country. The 
mission released a report, discussing the events and the interpretations of the events by key 
actors in the country, and finally, the OAS remained involved in the crisis throughout the 
restructuring of the judicial branch. Compared to the response by the OAS to the crisis in Bolivia 
just two years before, the response to the crisis in Ecuador was significantly more involved. 
5.6 Severity in Ecuador: An Explanation for the Variation in the Responses to Bolivia 2003 
and Ecuador 2004-05 
 
 Although both crises can be considered “near-coup crises,” I argue that the understanding 
of the Ecuadorian crisis and the potential that the removal of Gutiérrez was an unconstitutional 
alteration of the democratic order made the Ecuadorian crisis one of greater severity, leading to a 
more involved and in-depth response by the OAS. With the resignation of Sánchez de Lozada 
from office and the constitutional succession of Vice President Carlos Mesa to the presidency, 
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the severity of the crisis in Bolivia was reduced and the influence of time, polarization, 
uncertainty, and information became greater and limited a response from the Organization of 
American States.  
 For the Bolivian crisis, although it was clear that a crisis was occurring, it was not clear 
as to whether the crisis merited the application of the primary democratic instruments. The 
Bolivian delegation specifically did not request the invocation of Article 17 of the Inter-
American Democratic Charter, and without the consent of the Bolivian government for a visit to 
the country under the auspices of Article 18, it was not applied. Although the language used by 
the Bolivian Ambassador, especially at the second meeting, indicated that the crisis was a threat 
to democracy, there had not been an unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order. In other 
words, the Permanent Council member states could not invoke Articles 20 or 21 to address the 
crisis unless the crisis passed from a threat that an alteration could happen to one that actually 
occurred. By the third meeting of the OAS, the immediate crisis was over, Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada reduced the severity of the crisis by resigning from office and implementing the process 
of constitutional succession. Due to the lack of clarity on whether Articles 20 and 21 could be 
invoked and the reduction in severity after the resignation of Goni, the influences of polarization, 
time, uncertainty, and information were more important.  
 Although the United States and other member states pushed for the invocation of the 
IADC, other member states were hesitant to pressure Bolivia to include more than what it had 
included in its own version of the resolutions. As a result of this difference in opinion on whether 
to invoke the IADC and the request on the part of Bolivia to wait to invoke the IADC, the 
response to the Bolivian crisis was one in which the parties satisficed, i.e. accepted the minimally 
acceptable response to the crisis. In addition, due to the lower levels of severity for the Bolivian 
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crisis, the Permanent Council accepted the reports presented by the Bolivian foreign minister and 
the Secretary General. The member states appeared willing to accept the reports from the 
Bolivian delegation and in line with bounded rationality, did not seek disconfirming or alternate 
evidence to the information presented to them. Goni’s resignation on the 17th of October not only 
reduced the severity of the crisis, but also limited the timing for the OAS to act. It wasn’t until a 
regularly scheduled meeting, five days after Goni’s resignation, that the OAS Permanent Council 
addressed the succession to Mesa.  
The impact of timing due to the decision of Goni to resign is a similar situation to 
Ecuador 2000. With the decision by the Presidents in Bolivia (2003) and Ecuador (2000) to 
accept the constitutional succession, they effectively close the window for the Organization to 
respond with greater force. They end, or in many cases, defer, the crisis to another time. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the role of uncertainty is key with regards to 
Bolivia. For many of the key actors in Bolivia, it was obvious that attempting to keep Goni in the 
office of President would be worse than pushing for a resignation. In a personal interview, 
former President Carlos Mesa (the Vice President under Goni) stated “The president had the law 
in his hand, there were people dead from his actions, and it was impossible that he could remain 
the president without more repressive action” (Mesa 2011). Without the explicit acceptance of 
the visits authorized by Article 18 of the IADC, the actions of the Permanent Council were 
limited. However, the concerns that the crisis point could become a greater threat to Bolivian 
democracy and could become one in which Goni was removed unconstitutionally meant the 
OAS was still able to pass resolutions per Bolivia’s requests. In the case of Bolivia, as with many 
other cases that come before the OAS, uncertainty was too high to push for measures that would 
violate the sovereignty of the embattled crisis state. John Maisto, the U.S. ambassador to the 
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OAS during the Bolivian and Ecuadorian crises stated that: “the caveat is always the same one: 
The state in question has to be more than agreeable. It has to accept it, want it. Take the lead in 
asking for it, or if it doesn’t take the lead, at least acquiesce” (Maisto 2014).  
In the absence of a clear, present, unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the 
democratic order, there are too many barriers in invoking the primary democratic instruments 
without the express consent of the embattled state. The reduction of severity in the crisis in 
Bolivia after the resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada and the hesitation by the Bolivian 
government to invoke the IADC led to a greater impact of polarization, time, uncertainty, and 
information.  
On the other hand, the Ecuadorian crisis was more severe, although the reasons 
underlying the crisis were not clear at first. There were two potential explanations for what had 
happened April 20th: the opposition unconstitutionally removed President Gutiérrez from the 
executive office, in which case the crisis would constitute an unconstitutional alteration of the 
democratic order and merit the invocation of Articles 20 and 21 of the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter. Alternatively, it could be that the opposition constitutionally removed 
President Gutiérrez due to his undemocratic behavior in violating the separation of powers, 
which would constitute an instance in which the OAS would support the reinstatement of the 
democratic order through the removal of Gutiérrez. If the latter was true, the management of the 
crisis had been handled in a democratic framework. However, if the former were true, a 
democratically elected president had been removed in an institutional coup and would need to be 
reinstated. Although the clarity on whether or not the crisis merited the invocation of the primary 
democratic instruments was low since it wasn’t clear which of the stories was more accurate, the 
allegations of undemocratic behavior from both sides of the divide in Ecuador and the possibility 
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of an unconstitutional removal of the president in Ecuador, raised the level of severity to one in 
which the OAS Permanent Council responded with greater force. Member states of the 
Permanent Council pressured the Ecuadorian delegation for more information, for access to 
conduct a mission, and, most importantly, for the invocation of the IADC. Polarization, although 
at similar levels as the Bolivian (2003) crisis, did not impede the passage of a resolution 
invoking Article 18 and authorizing a mission to investigate the crisis in Ecuador. The higher 
levels of severity in the Ecuadorian crisis (regardless of which side was behaving 
“undemocratically”) led to a greater response from the Organization of American States.  
It is additionally important to note that the mission did indeed uncover multiple instances 
of undemocratic behavior in Ecuador, and as a result, continued to provide missions, technical 
assistance, and support to Ecuador long after the removal of Gutiérrez. This involvement 
demonstrated that the higher levels of severity also gave the Organization more time to assist in 
the rebuilding of Ecuador’s democracy. As Simon Pachano, a prominent scholar located at 
FLACSO in Ecuador stated in a personal interview, the 2004-05 crisis in Ecuador was a “golpe 
contra un golpe-a coup against a coup” (Pachano 2014). As a result, the multiple types of severe 
undemocratic behavior in Ecuador led to a greater ability for the regional IGOs to intervene. 
One of the key questions to ask about the Ecuadorian crisis is the relationship of Lucio 
Gutiérrez and the Organization of American States. Why didn’t he instruct his ambassador to ask 
for the invocation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter at the regularly scheduled meeting 
on the 20th, hours before his removal? In a personal interview, Gutiérrez stated that the OAS was 
polarized and as a result, ineffective (Gutiérrez 2014). He claimed that he was not responsible for 
the dismissal of the judges and that the Congress had dismissed the judges democratically and 
constitutionally because the judges had overstayed their designated terms. Gutiérrez simply 
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approved, publically, of the purges by Congress because the courts were politicized and a change 
was needed. He also blamed the OAS for being favorable to Hugo Chávez and 21st Century 
Socialism. When asked about the response of the OAS to his removal, he referred to Wikileaks 
articles linking Venezuela, Cuba, and the FARC to the “coup plot”. Due to the beliefs held by 
Gutiérrez regarding the role of Venezuela and the polarization in the OAS, for Gutiérrez, the 
OAS was part of the problem, not part of the solution.  
5.7 Conclusion 
 The comparison of the near coup crises in Ecuador 2004-2005 and Bolivia 2003 
demonstrates a pattern of responses from regional IGOs to democratic crises in Latin America: 
when a crisis is clearer and more severe, regional IGOs are more likely to respond with 
declarations, resolutions, and, in some instances, the invocation of the primary democratic 
instruments. Although the crisis in Ecuador was unclear as to whether a party involved in the 
crisis had violated the primary democracy clauses of the Organization, the threat to democracy if 
the violation was either a kind of autogolpe (according to the opposition) or a coup d’etat under 
an institutional guise (according to Gutiérrez) meant that the threat to democracy was high. As a 
result of lower levels of clarity and higher levels of severity, the member-states of the 
Organization pressured the Ecuadorian government for more information and eventually 
succeeded in invoking Article 18 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in a Permanent 
Council Resolution, gaining authorization to conduct a political mission to gather more 
information. When the mission returned, it was clearer that numerous violations of the 
democratic order had occurred, mainly by Gutiérrez, and additional resolutions from the 
Permanent Council authorized further intervention in the domestic political order for the OAS. 
 However, when severity and clarity were reduced, as in the case of Bolivia, the influence 
of the intervening variables of time, uncertainty, polarization, and information increased. In the 
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case of Bolivia, it was not clear that the crises constituted a violation of the primary democracy 
clauses of the OAS. However, since the crisis was being following by the Secretary General and 
the OAS received updates from the Bolivian ambassador, additional information regarding the 
nature of the crisis was not necessary. Additionally, although there were concerns that the 
protests constituted threats to democratic stability if they continued, without the authorization 
from the Bolivian government to invoke Article 18 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter 
and without a clear alteration of the democratic order, the Permanent Council of the OAS was 
limited to Resolutions and statements of support from the democratic order. However, due to the 
concerns that the threat was a danger to the underlying foundation of democracy, the Permanent 
Council took action by passing resolutions expressing support for the Goni government and 
intent to invoke the primary democratic instruments if the situation merited.   
 The case studies in this chapter demonstrated that the theory of high levels of clarity and 
severity lead to more in-depth responses from the Organization of American States holds for 
near-coup crises as well. They also demonstrate the influence of uncertainty, time, information, 
and polarization when clarity or severity are reduced. It is also important to note the influence of 
the embattled state’s government representatives at the OAS and how, when a crisis is not a clear 
violation of the primary democratic instruments, the Permanent Council is limited in its ability to 
invoke various parts of the IADC. This has serious implications for the ability of the OAS, and 
other regional Organizations with similar democracy clauses, to respond to democratic crises 
when the crisis is caused by the abuse of power by the executive. How has the OAS responded to 
instances of presidential abuse of power? In what ways do the OAS and other regional 
Organizations limit the ability of embattled opposition forces from seeking assistance to defend 
democracy? It is to this question that I now turn. 
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6 Chapter Six: Clubs of Presidents - The Influence of the Executive Branch in Regional 
Intergovernmental Organizations 
6.1 Introduction 
 Are regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) little more than extensions of the 
executive branches of their member states? If so, does that help explain the variation in responses 
from regional IGOs to democratic crises in the region? The argument has often been made that 
the major regional IGOs in Latin America, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), 
the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), and the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR), are “clubs of presidents” that tend to privilege the executive branch over the other 
branches of government and opposition forces in the member states.31 However, there has been 
little scholarly research demonstrating empirical evidence of this assertion for Latin America. In 
this chapter, I demonstrate support for the argument that regional IGOs can be considered “clubs 
of presidents” in which regional IGOs are more likely to respond to threats to presidents than to 
punish undemocratic behavior by presidents. 
 This argument has serious implications for our understanding of the role of the major 
regional IGOs in promoting and defending democracy. If regional IGOs, where the norms 
regarding the defense of democracy have been institutionalized the deepest, are dominated by the 
executive branch of the member states, then the organizations are not likely to be protecting 
“democracy,” but rather are likely to be protecting the interests and preferences of the executives 
in each country. The only caveat to this argument is the punishment of the most severe and clear 
instances of undemocratic behavior by an executive (“autogolpes” or “self-coups”). However, 
even in those cases we still see the power of the executive in a crisis country managing to exert 
                                                 
31
 See for example: Leonardo Vivas (2011): “Honduras: Back to the Future,”; The Washington Post 2009 “OAS 
Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza Has Made The Honduran Crisis Worse,”; and MercoPress.com 2012 
“UNASUR Ratifies Sanctions-Paraguay President More Concerned with OAS Position.” 
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his influence to reduce the power of the regional response from the IGOs. In the absence of more 
severe undemocratic behavior by an executive, regional IGOs are less likely to take action 
against the behavior, leading to situations where an executive is able to slowly and steadily erode 
the quality of democracy over time. Even in less severe cases (i.e., not autogolpes) when 
undemocratic behavior by the executive is mentioned in a meeting at a regional IGO, the norm of 
consensus decision-making, non-intervention, and levels of polarization within the organizations 
are likely to hamper a strong or in-depth response to the violation. However, even in cases that 
could questionably be considered threats to the executive, the regional organizations often hold 
meetings at the request of the executive and pass resolutions defending the president. 
 In order to demonstrate the argument, I look at a variety of different crises, broadly held 
under two categories. The first category, “Presidential Overreach,” consists of cases in which the 
executive behaves undemocratically and includes electoral fraud, violations of the separation of 
powers, conflicts over constituent assemblies, and autogolpes. The second category, “Threats to 
the Executive,” consists of coups d’etat (both attempted and successful), mass protests against 
the executive with demands for the president to resign, and questionable impeachment 
proceedings. In the following section, I summarize the theoretical argument for the Club of 
President’s hypothesis, demonstrating the link between the regional IGOs and the executives and 
how that affects the variation in responses from regional IGOs to threats to democracy in the 
region. I then turn to a series of cases from the two categories, demonstrating both the nature of 
the crisis as well as the response from regional IGOs to the crises. I choose cases of overreach by 
executives on both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum. I then turn to an analysis of 
the variation in responses, drawing on interviews conducted with prominent ambassadors, 
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analysts, and political leaders to demonstrate the strength of my argument. Finally, I conclude 
with a brief summary of the chapter and a few thoughts about the future of the OAS. 
6.2 Clubs of Presidents: A Theoretical Framework 
 Theoretically, why would it be the case that these regional intergovernmental 
organizations can be characterized as clubs of presidents? There are a variety of reasons for the 
relationship between the regional IGOs and the executive branches, including the way member 
states are represented at the various IGOs, the role of the Secretary General in each organization, 
the procedural rules in each organization, and finally, the understanding of the applicability of 
the various defense-of-democracy documents in the organizations. I will discuss each of these 
factors in turn, starting with an overview of the OAS. 
 In the majority of states in the inter-American system, the ambassadors to the OAS are 
nominated or appointed by the executive and fall under the direction of the Executive branch. 
The Ambassadors of the member states represent their governments at various meetings held in 
the Organization, including in the Permanent Council meetings. At the General Assembly, the 
Foreign Ministers of the countries represent the member states. However, the ambassadors and 
foreign ministers are generally not considered representatives of civil society or the opposition 
parties in their countries, but rather are considered to be representatives of the presidents, 
receiving their direction from the executive branch. As a result, the ambassadors to the OAS tend 
to represent the executive and his or her policy preferences, not the policy preferences or 
concerns of other branches of government. 
The Secretary General (SG) of the OAS is elected by the member states (represented 
through their Foreign Ministers or other appointed officials) in special sessions of the General 
Assembly, where each member state has a seat and a vote. The Charter of the OAS gives the 
Secretary General a small degree of autonomy, although the use of that autonomy has varied 
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with the leadership style of each Secretary General. According to the OAS Charter, the SG can 
“bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council any matter which in 
his opinion might threaten the peace and security of the Hemisphere or the development of the 
member states” and can “participate with voice but without vote in all meetings of the 
Organization” (Charter of the Organization of American States, Article 110). Although the SG 
can speak out about issues regarding democracy in member states, the movement towards further 
action (such as the passage of a resolution or the undertaking of a mission) is limited to 
acceptance of the actions by the member states in their capacity as sovereign entities in an IGO. 
In other words, the SG can speak out against what he perceives as undemocratic behavior by an 
actor in society, but he cannot unilaterally require the member state to address his concerns nor 
can he unilaterally punish a member state for undemocratic behavior. 
Although civil society groups have access to parts of the OAS, they do not have the same 
rights or role as member states. They do not have the power of a vote and are only allowed to 
attend committee meetings with the authorization of the Secretariat, although they are authorized 
to submit reports on areas of expertise if an item that falls under that expertise is already on the 
agenda. Civil society organizations are also able to give presentations at Permanent Council 
meetings, but only with the authorization of the appropriate committee in advance. Finally, civil 
society organizations are not allowed to “participate in deliberations, negotiations, or decisions 
adopted by member states” (“OAS CP/Res.759 (1217/99)” 1999). In some cases, civil society 
organizations are present for meetings discussing concerns over democracy or democratic crises 
in a member country, but again, they have no ability to require a member state to accept 
mediation or good offices, nor do they have the ability to invoke the primary democratic 
instruments. In other words, although there is some room for civil society organizations to have a 
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voice in the Organization, their access is limited by the member states and the Secretariat. The 
only members that have the right to both voice and vote are the member states themselves, as 
represented by the ambassadors appointed by the executives of each member state.  
 The structure of UNASUR and Mercosur are slightly different than the OAS and the 
leadership structures of these two organizations provide even greater theoretical backing to the 
“club of presidents” argument. The heads of state directly play a much larger role in both 
UNASUR and Mercosur than in the OAS. For example, the Secretary-General of UNASUR is 
elected to a two-year term on a consensual basis by the heads of state of each member state (as 
opposed to the election by secret vote of the SG by the proxies of the executive at the OAS). The 
President Pro-Tempore of UNASUR is designated on a rotating basis among the heads of state of 
the member states. The President Pro-Tempore presides over meetings and represents the 
organization at international events. The Presidents of the member states within UNASUR also 
meet at regularly scheduled meetings once a year, compared to the Summits of the Americas of 
the OAS, which have been held every three years since 1994. The Presidents of UNASUR can 
also meet in extraordinary meetings, whereas the extraordinary meetings of the Permanent 
Council of the OAS are at the ambassador-level and the meetings of the General Assembly of the 
OAS are at the foreign minister level. The comparison of the representation at meetings of 
UNASUR and the OAS demonstrate a strong bias towards the executive in both organizations, 
but an even greater bias towards the executives in UNASUR. 
 The Council of Heads of State is the most senior committee in UNASUR’s structure, and, 
as its name indicates, is composed of the Heads of State (Flannery 2012). The other committees 
in UNASUR are the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Council of Delegates. These 
committees are responsible for implementing the decisions of the Council of Heads of States. 
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Based on the structure of UNASUR, it is clear that the heads of state are the most influential 
actors in the Organization. As a result, UNASUR is likely to represent the preferences of the 
executives in the Organization since they are the ones that have the ability to vote and are the 
main players at the key institutions within UNASUR. 
In the same vein as UNASUR, the make-up of Mercosur prioritizes the executive branch 
in decision-making roles. Mercosur was created in 1990 after the signing of the Treaty of 
Asunción and is primarily an economic union between the countries of Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, although numerous states are associate members (Bolivia, 
Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru). In 1998 a democracy clause for the union was created with 
the signing of the Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment32. The Protocol allows the 
organization to suspend a member state from the Union for a “rupture in the democratic order” in 
one of the states (Article 3). As with UNASUR and the OAS, foreign ministers and the heads of 
state of each member state are the key decision-makers in Mercosur. For example, the most 
important institution of Mercosur, The Council of the Common Market (known simply as “The 
Council”), is composed of the Foreign Relations and Economic Ministers of the member states 
and is the council responsible for the political leadership of integration, for making decisions to 
ensure compliance with the Treaty of Asunción, and for the supervision of other Mercosur 
institutions, with the ability to modify or eliminate them (Porrata-Doria 2005, 28). Although 
Mercosur does have a Joint Parliamentary Commission and plans to evolve it into a Mercosur 
Parliament, as of 2015 the body is limited to an advisory function (Porrata-Doria 2005, 31). As 
with the OAS and UNASUR, the decision-making bodies in Mercosur are dominated by the 
representatives of the executive branch of each member state. 
                                                 
32
 The Protocol of Ushuaia on Democratic Commitment in Mercosur is also commonly known as the “Protocol of 
Ushuaia.” I will refer to it from this point in its shortened form.  
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 Based on the structure of the decision-making bodies, it is clear that executives are over-
represented compared to the other institutions of government. With an over-representation of the 
viewpoints and preferences of the executives of each state, the regional intergovernmental 
organizations are more likely to act based on the preferences of the executives. This structure 
incentivizes the executives of each member state to focus on threats to executives and to 
minimize instances of executive abuse. As a result, the norm is one where presidents are 
protected from threats but refrain from criticizing or punishing each other for undemocratic 
behavior, lest they later be criticized or punished themselves. Said another way, presidents are 
likely to support each other in protecting their positions in power: holding extraordinary 
(unscheduled) Permanent Council meetings, invoking the democratic defense mechanisms, or 
issuing official declarations of support from the Permanent Council when a president is 
threatened. However, they will also either ignore acts of presidential overreach to reduce the 
impact of the regional IGOs in addressing presidential overreach. 
 With regards to procedural rules, there are a number of reasons regional organizations 
prioritize not only sovereignty, but also the role of the executive branch in each country. Unless 
there is an alteration or interruption of the democratic or constitutional order, regional 
organizations are limited in the interventions they can take. The definitions of these terms are 
vague and ambiguous, a concern noted by McCoy (2001), Cooper (2004), and Cameron (2012). 
At the OAS, for example, in the absence of an alteration or interruption of the democratic order, 
the member state must give its consent to the visits or other actions authorized by Article 18 of 
the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) to address a democratic crisis. Even if a member 
state requests the invocation of the IADC, any further involvement in the country by the regional 
IGO is continually subject to the receptiveness of the member state. This is important not only 
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because it allows member states to actively limit the role of intergovernmental organizations, but 
it is also built on the idea that the member state (as represented by an ambassador accountable to 
the executive branch) can limit the use of the primary democratic instruments in cases that are 
not clearly coups d’etat or autogolpes. Without the authorization of the member state, regional 
IGOs are limited to responding to the most egregious instances of democratic crisis and are 
unable to address the lower level attacks on the democratic order which reduce the quality of 
democracy over time.  
 It is also important to note the role of voting on measures in the Permanent Council and 
General Assembly of the OAS and how that can reduce the ability of the regional organizations 
to respond to democratic crises. In order to make decisions in the Permanent Council and 
General Assembly, either an absolute majority or a 2/3 vote, depending on the issue, is required 
of the member states, although there is an informal norm that votes should be consensus (OAS 
Charter, Articles 59 and 89). Naturally, if a member state is being accused of undemocratic 
behavior, the ambassador of the member state is not likely to vote for the condemnation of his or 
her own president or government. It requires the political will of the other member states to 
override the preferences of the member state in question, which during cases of presidential 
abuse is less likely to occur as compared to cases of threats to an incumbent executive. In 
Mercosur and UNASUR, actions require a consensus vote, making action even less likely in the 
case of presidential overreach. 
 Finally, the development of the mechanisms for the defense of democracy paradigm 
demonstrates a trend towards sovereignty and the types of events that are considered crises. The 
OAS has the longest history of a defense of democracy paradigm, so I primarily address that 
history, although I will also note the key democracy documents of UNASUR and Mercosur and 
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the ways in which the documents demonstrate a preference towards the role of the executives in 
responding to democratic crises. 
 The promotion of democracy in the region accelerated following the end of the Cold 
War, when security concerns regarding communism and the influence of the Soviet Union 
declined dramatically. In the early 1990s, in addition to the creation of the Unit for the 
Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now known as the Democracy Program Unit, the OAS General 
Assembly passed Resolution 1080, which created a mechanism to respond to “sudden or 
irregular interruptions of the democratic political institutional process.” The mechanism was 
(theoretically) meant to be immediate, and the Secretary General would convene the Permanent 
Council, which would examine the situation and recommend a meeting of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs or the General Assembly, if warranted, within ten days of the crisis (OAS 
AG/Res. 1080; Boniface 2007). Although Resolution 1080 articulated the mechanisms for a 
response in the event of an interruption of the democratic institutional process, the consequences 
for a member state in the event of a crisis were not articulated clearly in Resolution 1080. In 
1992, the Washington Protocol was added to the OAS instruments, which established the 
potential consequences for a crisis in which a “democratically constituted government has been 
overthrown by force.” If a crisis occurs in which there is an overthrow of the government by 
force, the response may entail suspension from the OAS “with a two-thirds vote in the General 
Assembly” (Boniface 2007, his emphasis). In other words, even if a crisis occurs that falls under 
the bounds of Resolution 1080 and the Washington Protocol, a suspension is not necessarily an 
immediate or foregone conclusion.  
 The same is true for the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) of the OAS. In 
2001, the IADC was signed by the member states of the OAS, which “superseded and potentially 
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widened the scope” of Resolution 1080 (Boniface 2007: 45). The IADC authorizes any member 
state or the Secretary General to convene the Permanent Council to undertake a “collective 
assessment and appropriate diplomatic initiatives” in the case of an “unconstitutional interruption 
of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that 
seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state” (Articles 19 and 20). Unless there is 
an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the 
constitutional regime, the member state of the crisis country must request the invocation (Article 
18).  
 For Mercosur and UNASUR, the most important documents with regards to democracy 
are the Protocol of Ushuaia (1998) and the Democracy Clause of the Constitutive Treaty of 
UNASUR (2010), respectively. Both clauses allow for the activation of the defense-of-
democracy mechanisms in the event of a “rupture” in the democratic process in their states. 
UNASUR’s democracy clause states that the mechanism will be activated in the event of a 
“rupture or threat of a rupture to the democratic order, a violation of the constitutional order, or 
to any situation which presents a risk to the legitimate exercise of power and the validity of 
democratic values and principles” (Article 1). The Protocol of Ushuaia states that “a rupture of 
the democratic order” allows for the member states to convene and initiate diplomatic 
mechanisms to address the rupture. If diplomatic initiatives fail, the member states can then 
suspend the crisis state with a consensus vote (Articles 4 and 5). The creation of and application 
of new mechanisms with which to support democracy demonstrate a regional trend towards the 
development of a defense-of-democracy regime, although there are still important caveats 
regarding the application of the defense-of-democracy instruments. 
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 For example, a key concern with the democracy clauses and agreements of the regional 
IGOs has been the use of a variety of terms to define the conditions under which the primary 
democratic instruments could be invoked. Terms such as “unconstitutional interruption,” 
“alteration,” and “rupture” do not clearly define the instances in which the democracy clauses 
can be activated. As a result, it is not explicitly clear which cases fall under the definition of 
“alteration” or “rupture.” Therefore, the ability of the regional IGOs to respond to crises depends 
on the understanding of the meaning of the wording of the democracy clauses. As Boniface 
(2007) notes in his analysis of OAS responses from 1990-2007, the general consensus in the 
literature and in practice has been that military coups that unseat elected presidents are instances 
of democratic crises that clearly fit into the definition of “sudden or irregular interruption,” along 
with “self-coups (autogolpes) by elected presidents that nullify legislative and judicial checks 
and balances, and civil-military crises in which there is a credible threat of a military coup” (46). 
However, failed coup attempts, electoral failures, and constitutional crises do not appear to fit the 
criteria determined by the democracy clauses (Boniface 2007: 47). In other words, with the 
exception of autogolpes, the clauses and agreements that make up the defense of democracy 
paradigm in Latin America are limited to crises in which presidents are threatened, and less 
severe crises in which presidents overreach their authority but where their actions do not amount 
to autogolpes do not fall under the jurisdiction of the democracy clauses, despite the reality that 
many of the actions serve to reduce the quality of democracy over time. The lack of agreement 
and understanding on what constitutes a violation of the democracy clauses provides an 
additional theoretical basis for the hypothesis that the regional organizations in Latin America 
can be described as “clubs of presidents.”  
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 The role of the OAS in responding to autogolpes deserves a brief special mention, as 
autogolpes represent a type of crisis in which the OAS has responded relatively forcefully, in 
spite of the idea of the OAS as a “club of presidents.” In the two instances of autogolpes in the 
early 1990s, Peru 1992 (President Alberto Fujimori) and Guatemala 1993 (President Jorge 
Serrano), the OAS SG convened a meeting of the Permanent Council, where the member states 
rejecting the undemocratic actions in each member state, invoked Resolution 1080, authorized 
missions, and worked with the governments of the crisis states to find a resolution to the crisis. 
Although the final outcome of each crisis varied- in Peru, Fujimori was able to use the strong 
public support for his autogolpe and convinced the OAS to accept a proposal where the people 
would vote for a congress to work on a new constitution, whereas in Guatemala the autogolpe 
was unpopular move and Serrano was forced to resign- the OAS did respond to the crises in 
ways that demonstrated the rejection of this form of presidential abuse of power. 
 When considering the way member states are represented at the various regional 
organizations (a focus on the executive branch), the procedural rules for invoking the primary 
democratic instruments (consensus decision-making), and the language of the democracy clauses 
(lack of clear understanding of what constitutes a violation and a focus on only the most severe 
types of violations), it is clear there is a link that preferences the role of presidents in the use of 
the primary democratic instruments for responding to democratic crises. As a result, the 
organizations tend to preference the desires and expectations of the executive branches of each 
member state and minimize undemocratic behavior by executives. My hypothesis for this 
relationship can thus be stated as: 
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Hypothesis 3: When a crisis presents a threat to the president, regional intergovernmental 
organizations are more likely to respond with a greater range of actions than when the crisis is 
the result of presidential overreach. 
 As stated above, the crises have been categorized into two broad categories, presidential 
overreach and threats to the executive. The dependent variable “Responses from Regional 
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)” includes Permanent Council meetings (OAS) or 
meetings of the heads of state or foreign ministers (UNASUR/Mercosur), resolutions or official 
statements from the decision-making bodies of the IGOs, political missions (fact-finding, 
mediation, or good offices) and finally, sanctions or threat of sanctions. In the next section, I 
demonstrate the theoretical basis underlying “the Club of Presidents” argument is supported by 
an analysis of a series of case studies of democratic crisis in Latin America.  
6.3 Cases of Presidential Overreach 
6.3.1 Nicaragua 2008- Electoral Fraud at the Municipal Level 
 The Nicaraguan municipal elections in 2008 present a poignant case study for 
demonstrating the power of executives to limit actions from regional intergovernmental 
organizations in the Americas. Although the United States delegation and Secretary General Jose 
Miguel Insulza of the OAS tried to address the issue of possible electoral fraud in Nicaragua 
within the Organization, the Nicaraguan government and President Daniel Ortega’s ambassador 
at the OAS were able to stymie any in-depth action from the OAS. As a result, the case of 
Nicaragua demonstrates a key example in which, even when an executive is accused of 
undemocratic behavior and the evidence provides a strong backing for the accusation, the 
mechanisms and procedures of the OAS limit the ability of the Organization to respond 
effectively to presidential overreach. Before demonstrating the limitations of the OAS in 
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responding to electoral fraud in Nicaragua, it is important to understand the background of the 
crisis.  
  In 2008, the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) of Nicaragua barred international election 
observers from observing municipal elections in the country, despite the fact that independent 
international election observers had been able to monitor every election in the country since 
1990. 146 mayorship positions were at stake in the elections on November 9th, including the 
mayorship of Managua, the country’s capital and one of the most important local offices in the 
country. Although international election observers were barred from observing the vote, national 
observer groups (such as Etica y Transparencia (Ethics and Transparency) and Instituto para el 
Desarrollo y la Democracia (IPADE-Institute for Development and Democracy)) posted 
observers outside of polling centers and compiled evidence that President Daniel Ortega and his 
party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (whose members are known as Sandinistas), 
manipulated the election. The manipulation led to a “victory” for Sandinista candidates in 105 of 
146 municipalities, a huge win for Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista party, despite his slumping 
popularity ratings.33  
Despite the alleged victory, reports of vote tampering and other fraudulent electoral 
behavior were widespread. According to a report written for the Inter-American Dialogue by 
Nicaraguan journalist Carlos F. Chamorro (2009), the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) “never 
reported the official voting records from a total of 660 polling places, equal to 120,000 votes or 
30% of all votes in Managua.” Since the Sandinista candidate for mayor in Managua, former 
world boxing champion Alexis Arguello, narrowly defeated Eduardo Montealegre for the 
mayorship with only 51% of the vote, the uncounted votes in Managua could have potentially 
                                                 
33
 Leading up to the Municipal elections, polling firms showed Daniel Ortega’s popularity rating hovering near 25% 
(Chamorro 2009, 3). 
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tipped the scales in favor of Montealegre. Other allegations included the dumping and 
destruction of marked ballots, the refusal of access for opposition party members to some of the 
vote counts, and an alteration in tallies at many of the polling offices (LA Times 2008). In 
addition, prior to the election the CSE had ruled that two opposition parties failed to file their 
paperwork properly and therefore were ineligible to run for office (The Economist 2008). Most 
observers of Nicaraguan politics agreed that the outcome of the 2008 election was potentially 
fraudulent and that claims of electoral irregularities should be addressed. As a result, calls for an 
investigation into the claims of fraud were numerous, coming from both intergovernmental 
organizations as well as non-governmental organizations34. For example, the Atlanta-based 
Carter Center issued a statement calling for “all actors, leaders, and civil and state authorities to 
seek an expeditious, legitimate, and mutually respectful solution to the claims of electoral 
irregularities and doubts” (The Carter Center 2008).  
In the weeks following the elections, protests and violence from both opposition and 
government supporters filled the streets, prompting the CSE to announce a recount of the votes, 
although again international observers were to be barred from observing the recount. SG Insulza 
issued a press statement a few days after the elections expressing concern over the allegations of 
fraud, noting that “one of the advantages of electoral observation missions is that they help dispel 
any doubts whenever election results are close” (Organization of American States E434/08 
2008). He called for the dispute to be resolved peacefully and argued that the principles 
“enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter” should be respected and followed. In 
press statements from the State Department from before and after the date of the elections, the 
United States also expressed concerns about the quality of the elections. One press statement, 
                                                 
34
 This list is not exhaustive, but the list of the groups calling for a recount of the elections included: Freedom 
House, Washington Office on Latin America, the Catholic Church, The Carter Center, and the Secretary General of 
The Organization of American States. 
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issued on the day of the elections, noted concerns about “reports by domestic election 
observation groups and opposition parties of widespread irregularities at voting stations” and 
reminded Nicaragua of Article 23 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which “holds 
member states responsible for ‘ensuring free and fair elections’” (“U.S. State Department Press 
Release 2008/942” 2008).  
In response to the statements by the United States and the Secretary General, the 
Nicaraguan delegation requested that they be given time to speak at the next session of the 
Permanent Council to present a report regarding the “Act of Interference (Injerencia) of Certain 
International Organisms, of the Department of State of the United States and of the Secretary 
General of the Organization of American States.” On November 20, 2008, eleven days after the 
elections, the Permanent Council held a meeting for the Nicaraguan delegation to present its 
report against the United States and Secretary General and to hear a response from the accused 
parties. 
In the Permanent Council meeting, the Nicaraguan delegation attacked the comments 
regarding the elections from the United States and the Secretary General of the OAS, claiming 
that the United States had been on a campaign since 2006 to destabilize the government of 
Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega (“OAS Meeting Minutes CP/ACTA 1671/08” 2008, 6). The 
Nicaraguan delegate went on to describe the statements by the United States and the Secretary 
General as a campaign to “destabilize and collapse the institutions of the State, and, in particular, 
[to ensure] the overthrow of the Government of Reconciliation and National Unity of Daniel 
Ortega (9). The ambassador also defended the elections in Nicaragua, arguing that Nicaragua is a 
“free, independent, and sovereign state” (9). With regards to the statements by the SG on the 
validity of the elections, the Nicaraguan ambassador stated that the SG had “overreached in his 
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functions” and that it was inconsistent with the OAS Charter, which does not give any authority 
to the SG to intervene in “issues of internal jurisdiction in member states” (11). In closing, the 
Nicaraguan representative presented a request for a resolution that called for the United States to 
cease in its violation of the sovereignty of Nicaragua, reminded the North American 
governments to not use economic pressure and to refrain from resorting to the threat of the use of 
force against the Nicaraguan government and state, and finally, that the member states of the 
Organization of American States would reaffirm the respect for sovereignty for the Nicaraguan 
state, its institutions, the democratic participation of its citizens, and its desire for peace (11).  
 After the Nicaraguan ambassador spoke, the floor was given to the Ambassador of the 
United States to respond. The United States ambassador stated that the member states had been 
convened to “talk about a constructive way forward to support democratic governance in 
Nicaragua” (12). He noted the specific articles in the IADC that address the role of elections, 
such as Article 23 (“member states are responsible for organizing, conducting, and ensuring free 
and fair electoral processes”) and Article 3 (“essential elements of representative democracy 
include…access to and the free exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, the holding 
of period free and fair elections…” (12). He then mentioned the fact that the 2008 municipal 
elections were the first since 1990 where the Nicaraguan government refused to allow 
international election observers and that fact, combined with reports of “widespread 
irregularities” and violence in the country, indicated a need for concern regarding the democratic 
process in Nicaragua. The U.S. ambassador proposed a “full and transparent audit of the results 
of the municipal elections” so democracy could be further strengthened “in coordination with the 
Democratic Charter” (13). He also emphatically rejected the resolution proposed by Nicaragua, 
stating, “we do not and will not support that draft resolution for many reasons” (14). He closed 
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by saying the United States had an alternative draft resolution to support democratic governance 
in Nicaragua and that the response to the electoral situation in Nicaragua was not interference but 
rather, “demonstratively the opposite” (14).  
After the two delegations spoke, numerous member states took the opportunity to 
comment on the reports from Nicaragua and the United States. The ambassador from Panama 
emphatically defended the role of the OAS, and in particular the SG, in defending democracy. 
The Panamanian ambassador stated that, without reference to specific cases, he believed the SG 
“can and should express opinions, make suggestions, comments, and considerations aimed at the 
preservation and strengthening of the political and legal institutions of the OAS, along with the 
Charter and the IADC” (16). Panama then stated they could not support the draft resolution 
proposed by Nicaragua. 
The Venezuelan ambassador spoke next. He first recounted a history of intervention by 
other member states (notably the United States) and a lack of response from the OAS in the face 
of dictatorships and the removals of democratically elected presidents in the past (such as 
Salvador Allende of Chile and Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala). He also stated that in some cases 
there are “undemocratic opposition groups, coup-plotters (golpistas), who will never accept the 
new tendencies in the continent” (19). With a clear preference towards sovereignty and the 
Nicaraguan delegation’s account of events, the Venezuela delegate ended his comments noting 
that the OAS and the member state delegations should not “fall into the temptation to become 
judges of those whom we cannot, and should not, have the right to judge” (20).  
Honduras spoke after Venezuela, offering a middle-of-the-road approach to the two 
viewpoints of the United States and Nicaragua. On the one hand, the Honduran ambassador 
stated that he would not comment on either of the resolutions. First, because the one proposed by 
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United States was distributed only in English and that “speaks of the paternity [que eso habla de 
la paternidad],” a reference to the historical hegemonic role of the United States. Second, he 
stated that he did not believe the Nicaraguan resolution contributed to Nicaraguan democracy 
and only served to deepen the differences in the Organization, therefore Honduras would not 
support that resolution either (20). In an important expression of support for the SG, the 
Honduran ambassador also stated that Honduras had “confidence in the Secretary General of the 
Organization and would not go against him in any form, in any way” (21).  
Canada acknowledged the civil society organizations from Nicaragua that had presented 
written reports to the delegates of the Permanent Council and noted concerns regarding the 
violence, the irregularities in voting procedures, and the lack of independent observers to the 
elections. The Canadian ambassador did not endorse either resolution, but did state in closing 
that Canada “expresses its support for a constructive role by the OAS and its Secretary 
General…in line with the Inter-American Democratic Charter, to which we have all signed on” 
(22).  
The Mexican delegation was more supportive of Nicaragua’s position, cautioning the 
member states to not move too quickly, especially since the Nicaraguan institutions had not had 
sufficient time to address the situation. Although the Mexican delegation supported the ability of 
the SG to address concerns he may have, stating that they agreed with the general objective of 
the press releases from the SG, they also argued it would have been preferable for the SG to 
speak directly with the member states instead of making a public announcement (21). Guatemala 
spoke on behalf of the Organization and its efforts in observing elections, noting its own history 
of working with the Organization for electoral observation. The Guatemalan ambassador 
expressed his support for the SG and argued that the member states should not be able to qualify 
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their own elections, as “the promotion and consolidation of representative democracy” are 
essential parts of the various resolutions and agreements passed by the member states (23). 
Colombia agreed with the vision of Guatemala, Canada, and the United States, arguing that the 
OAS would become a useless organization if the SG were unable to speak out against matters of 
importance to the OAS, including the development of democracy. This vision of the role of the 
SG was shared by many other member states, including Argentina, Costa Rica, Peru, Paraguay, 
Chile, Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, and El Salvador.  
Although the view that the Secretary General had the right to comment on concerns 
relating to democracy was held by a large group of member states, for many of those states the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention were also highly important. For example, Peru’s 
delegation spoke of the “essential objectives of the Organization, which includes the promotion 
and consolidation of representative democracy within respect to the principle of non-
intervention” (27). Brazil similarly agreed that democratic defense was an important principle 
but that it must be balanced with sovereignty and equanimity. Ecuador also reaffirmed the 
preference of some of the member states for sovereignty over democratic defense. The 
Ecuadorian ambassador stated that the member states needed to respect the norms of sovereignty 
and of non-intervention in member states, noting that each member state should have “the right 
to choose, without external interference, its political, economic, and social system” (31). 
Noting the divisions in opinion among the various member states who had spoken, the 
representative of Guyana made a point that is decidedly key for the discussion on the role of 
procedural norms in the OAS: that it was obvious that neither of the two draft resolutions would 
be passed by the Permanent Council, because “it should be obvious that draft resolutions that are 
presented that call on any country, in effect, to censure itself, are not going to prosper and not 
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going to go forward” (35). The representative of Guyana made an additional point to support the 
SG and cautioned against attacking him in a way that might “erode his authority, diminish his 
standing, or impugn his character” (35).  
The SG was then invited to speak by the President of the Permanent Council. The SG 
defended his record of promoting democracy and argued that a major part of his career had been 
focused on the defense of democracy. As a result, he would continue to speak about the issues 
facing the member states in the region. After his remarks, the Nicaraguan ambassador spoke 
briefly, simply stating they would not be supporting the resolution proposed by the United States 
and they would be continuing the conversation with those who wished to speak to them. Since it 
was clear to the member states that neither draft resolution had unanimous support from the 
member states, the meeting was adjourned. No resolutions were passed and no further action was 
authorized for the Organization of American States to take any additional steps to address the 
allegations of electoral fraud in Nicaragua. 
The United States and the European Union responded to the electoral fraud unilaterally 
by imposing economic sanctions on the Nicaraguan government. In spite of these sanctions, 
according to the U.S. State Department’s report on human rights the CSE had still not conducted 
a recount by the end of 2008. Despite the ability of the United States to impose unilateral 
sanctions on Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan government was able to avoid any further sanctions from 
the OAS due to the internal mechanisms of the OAS, the limitations on passing resolutions that 
criticize member states, and the divisions within the OAS regarding the balance of sovereignty 
and democratic defense. The example of the limited OAS response to electoral fraud in 
Nicaragua demonstrates a case in which executive overreach is able to go unpunished, even 
when the incident is discussed at the Organization. This trend towards protection of executives 
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during instances of overreach can also be demonstrated by looking at a case of a violation of 
freedom of expression in Venezuela.  
6.3.2 Venezuela 2007- Chávez Government Refuses to Renew License of Opposition Media 
Channel 
 In May of 2007, one of the major opposition media enterprises in Venezuela, RCTV 
(Radio Caracas Television) was forced to shut down after the government of President Hugo 
Chávez refused to renew its broadcasting license. As part of the closure, RCTV was required to 
cease its broadcasting operations and hand over control of its production equipment and the 
“roughly 60 transmitters it controlled nationwide” to the state-run TV channel that was replacing 
it (Corrales 2009, 70; Taipei Times 2007). The closure of RCTV left Venezuela with only three 
private television stations: Venevisión, Televén, and Globovisión. Globovisión did not have 
national coverage and Venevisión “carried little political coverage,” meaning the closure of 
RCTV dramatically reduced coverage of opposition viewpoints (Corrales 2009, 72).  
 The closure of RCTV was predicated on the idea that the channel had supported the 
short-lived coup against Hugo Chávez in 2002 and had also supported the general strike against 
Chávez in 2003, although there had not been a judicial process regarding the station’s support for 
the coup and strike (BBC News 2006). President Chávez had repeatedly threatened to close 
RCTV before 2007, claiming the channel was a “coupist TV channel” and that it would not be a 
violation of the freedom of expression to close down the channel due to its behavior “against the 
people, against the nation, against national independence, against the dignity of the republic” 
(BBC News 2006). However, the government did not officially rescind broadcast rights for 
RCTV until May 2007, when RCTV’s broadcast license expired. 
 Despite the assertion by Chávez that the closure of RCTV would not be against the 
freedom of expression, major international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) disagreed 
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with that assessment. Reporters Without Borders issued a report in 2008 condemning the shut 
down of RCTV and alleged that part of the reason behind the closure of RCTV was not revenge 
for the broadcasting decisions of RCTV during the 2002 coup, but rather a “move by Chávez to 
take over the country’s media.” The Americas director at Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a 
statement that the “shutdown of RCTV is a serious blow to freedom of expression in Venezuela” 
(Human Rights Watch 2007). The Carter Center also issued a statement acknowledging the role 
the public and private mass media had played in “reflecting and contributing” to political 
polarization in the country, but spoke out against the decision to reject the broadcast rights for 
RCTV without going “through the justice system before a decision is made” (The Carter Center 
2007).  
 The United States responded both unilaterally and multilaterally to the closure of RCTV. 
The State Department issued a press release expressing concern regarding the limitations of 
freedom of expression in Venezuela and the U.S. Senate approved Senate resolution 211 (S.Res 
211), by unanimous consent, which expressed “profound concerns regarding freedom of 
expression in Venezuela and the government’s decision not to renew the license of RCTV” 
(Menendez and Rubio 2014). In a regularly scheduled meeting of the Permanent Council of the 
OAS, the United States delegation referenced the Senate resolution in its remarks and asked that 
the resolution be placed in the records of the OAS (Organization of American States 2007). The 
Venezuelan delegation responded to the U.S. delegation by saying that the matter was an internal 
one for Venezuela and that Venezuela would not accept the violation of its sovereignty (66). 
There was no further discussion in the Permanent Council regarding the closure of RCTV 
beyond that brief exchange. However, other countries spoke out independently against the 
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decision to not renew the license of RCTV, including Chile, Brazil, Canada, Guatemala, Peru, El 
Salvador, and the European Union (CRS Report for Congress 11 January 2008).  
 The SG of the OAS also issued a statement expressing concern about the decision to not 
renew the broadcasting license of RCTV and expressed hope that the action would be reversed 
(Organization of American States Press Release E-001/07). The Special Rapporteur for Freedom 
of Expression of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) also issued a press 
release expressing concern regarding the situation and argued that the major concern is the 
possible deprivation of “possible access to a medium with editorial views critical of the 
government” (PREN-161-E). However, despite these public expressions of concern from OAS 
officials, little more could be done to respond to the crisis without the explicit invitation from the 
government of Venezuela. For example, at the OAS General Assembly meeting in early June, 
the United States delegation, citing Articles 4 and 18 of the IADC, urged the SG to “visit 
Venezuela to consult, in good faith, with all interested parties, or consider other actions to 
address the situation, and to make a full report to the foreign ministers through the Permanent 
Council at the earliest opportunity” (OAS Press Release E0171/07; General Assembly Minutes 
OEA/Ser.P/XXXVII-O.2). In response to this request, the SG noted that the application of 
Article 18 requires the “consent of the government concerned” and, after consulting with 
Venezuela, the SG told the US that the OAS “could not meet such a request” (Organization of 
American States Press Release E0171/07). The Venezuelan government responded to the OAS 
request at the General Assembly meeting by suggesting the United States be investigated for 
numerous human rights violations, including violations at Guantanamo, and later told the OAS 
SG that it deemed the request to invoke Article 18 and visit Venezuela as “totally unacceptable” 
(Organization of American States General Assembly Meeting Minutes OEA/Ser.P/XXXVII-O.2; 
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E-171/07). A resolution was passed at the General Assembly meeting reaffirming the “Right to 
Freedom of Thought and Expression and the Importance of the Media” but the resolution did not 
specifically mention the Venezuelan government or the situation with RCTV (OAS General 
Assembly Resolution AG/doc.462/07). After the remarks from the SG regarding the 
inapplicability of Article 18 of the IADC, there were few alternatives for the member states or 
the SG to take. 
 Although the OAS was limited in its ability to respond, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR) did receive a request from the shareholders, journalists, and 
executives of RCTV to look into the violations of their human rights in the closure of RCTV 
(IACHR Report No. 114/11). The IACHR is an autonomous institution of the OAS and has the 
power to hear complaints from citizens against their governments. However, the ability of the 
IACHR to punish states is limited in comparison to the OAS Permanent Council and General 
Assembly. The IACHR did accept the request, conducted an investigation into the situation and 
filed a case against Venezuela at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. However, the 
process took many years: the IACHR did not rule on admissibility until 2011 and did not file a 
case at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights until 2013. In other words, the institutions 
that have the ability to respond without the direct authorization of a member state were unable to 
do so in a timely manner to address the crisis. Between 2007 and 2013, the government of Hugo 
Chávez continued to restrict freedom of expression and slowly reduced the quality of democracy 
in Venezuela. In spite of repeated instances of executive overreach, the OAS has been limited in 
its ability to respond to the erosion of democracy in ways that go beyond statements from the SG 
or individual states in Permanent Council or General Assembly meetings. The OAS has been 
unable to punish Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, and other executives in the region, for cases of 
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presidential overreach that fall short of autogolpes, but still represent a threat to democracy. The 
limitations inherent in the regional IGOs provide space for executives in Latin America to 
overreach in the use of their executive powers. 
6.3.3 Panama 2009-2010- Executive Wiretaps Information Released in Wikileaks 
 The overreach of executive authority has been exhibited in many ways, such as electoral 
fraud, the closing or reduction of opposition media, and the jailing of opposition members. In the 
Panamanian case of executive overreach, President Ricardo Martinelli was accused of 
wiretapping his political opponents. However, in spite of the allegations and the clear violation 
of individual rights if the allegations were true, the Organization of American States was silent 
on the issue.  
 Ricardo Martinelli, the center-right candidate of Democratic Change, assumed office as 
President of Panama in 2009 after winning the 2008 elections. Shortly after assuming office, 
Martinelli allegedly requested assistance from the United States in setting up a more extensive 
wire-tapping system, presumably to assist the United States with the war on drugs, but the 
system he requested could have potentially allowed him to spy on the opposition and other 
political enemies (a key concern for the United States). After the United States rejected the 
request, Martinelli met with representatives of the Israeli government, who agreed to the request 
and set up a more extensive wiretapping program (Johnson 2015a). The wiretapping program 
allowed Martinelli to monitor “not only cell and fixed-line telephone calls and emails, but also 
Whatsapp and Blackberry texts. Moreover, the techs could burrow into hard drives and extract 
data and video, and remotely activate functions” (Johnson 2015).  
 The revelations regarding the wiretapping request to the United States and the eventual 
assistance from Israel in expanding the wiretapping service were released in 2009 in one of the 
Wikileaks documents. The opposition was also aware of the wiretapping by the government 
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during Martinelli’s administration. After the release of the Wikileaks documents, Francisco 
Sanchez Cardenas, the leader of the opposition Democratic Revolutionary Party, told a reporter 
“This affair leaves the president looking very bad. This goes outside the bounds of democratic 
practices.” (The Huffington Post 2010). Guido A. Rodríguez, a former editor of the Panama 
America newspaper, stated that politicians were aware of Martinelli’s behavior and “they would 
leave their cell phones outside the room” when meeting and that it was “almost like a ritual” to 
prevent Martinelli from being able to hear and record their conversations (Johnson 2015b).  
 The Wikileaks revelations and the awareness from observers of Panamanian politics and 
opposition leaders demonstrate knowledge of undemocratic behavior by President Martinelli, yet 
there was no response from regional intergovernmental organizations regarding the behavior. 
There were no press releases from the SG or the OAS regarding the allegations or the 
implications of the allegations if true. Additionally, in Permanent Council meetings and the 
General Assembly meetings, there was no mention of the allegations. Overall, the OAS was 
silent on the issue of wiretapping of the political opposition by the executive in Panama. 
 As more recent revelations regarding the wiretapping scheme have come about since 
2014, there has been some international response, although the response has not been from the 
OAS. José Miguel Vivanco of Human Rights Watch has stated that the “matter must be 
thoroughly examined” and the former Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Catalina Botero, has expressed concerns 
regarding the wiretapping and its effects on right to privacy (La Prensa 2015). However, since 
Martinelli finished his term in 2014, it is unlikely regional IGOs will be able or willing to punish 
him after the fact.  
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 Panama represents a case where allegations of undemocratic behavior- the wiretapping 
and spying on opposition figures in a country- were ignored and left unexplored and unpunished 
by regional intergovernmental organizations whose charters and agreements support the 
consolidation and defense of democracy in the face of democratic crises.  
6.3.4 The Constituent Assembly in Ecuador- Conflicts between Executive and Opposition 
 Although the process of writing a new constitution often represents an inherently 
conflictual endeavor, the creation of Ecuador’s 2007 Constituent Assembly (CA) presents a vital 
case to review in terms of the response of regional intergovernmental organizations to crises 
where an executive is accused of overreaching his authority and violating the separation of 
powers by another branch of government. In the Ecuadorian crisis, the Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal (TSE) and the president sparred with Congress and the Courts over the ability of the 
TSE to dismiss members of Congress. However, in spite of the ongoing crisis, the response from 
regional IGOs was limited to press releases, most of which were supportive of the process and of 
the Correa government. In order to understand the responses from the OAS, it is important to 
give a brief background on the 2007 Ecuadorian crisis.  
 On the 15th of January in 2007, President Correa signed Executive Decree No. 2, which 
determined that the TSE would organize a popular referendum to ask the voters if they supported 
the convocation of a Constituent Assembly with full powers in order to compose a new 
constitution.35 On the 23rd of January, the TSE sent the decree to Congress for approval and on 
February 13th, with a vote of 57-1 (out of 100 congressmen), Congress approved the popular 
referendum but only after changing a portion of the electoral statutes (the signature threshold to 
be able to run for the CA elections). Lawmakers from the opposition parties walked out of the 
                                                 
35 The full question was: “Do you approve the convocation and installation of a Constituent Assembly with full 
powers, in conformity with the Electoral Statutes that are attached, in order to transform the institutional framework 
of the State, and to manufacture a new Constitution?”  
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assembly without voting. The opposition gave two major reasons for their rejection of the CA 
and their refusal to vote for its convocation: first, they wanted to limit the ability of the CA to 
have plenipotentiary powers (which would give it the ability to dissolve Congress and other 
institutions of government), and second, they felt that the CA was unconstitutional since, 
according to their interpretation of the Constitution of 1998, the only body authorized to start 
reforms to the Constitution was Congress, not a special body. On February 28th, President Correa 
issued Executive Decree No. 148, which reinstated the text from the electoral statutes removed 
by the Congress.  
 On March 1, the TSE established a referendum date and approved the referendum 
question posed by President Correa in his decree. On the 6th of March, in response to the 
establishment of the referendum date which the opposition believed was unconstitutional, 57 of 
the 100 members of Congress voted to dismiss four members of the TSE, including the president 
of the TSE, Jorge Acosta. In response, on March 7th the TSE removed the 57 legislators in 
Congress that had opposed the referendum and voted for the removal of the TSE members and 
replaced them with their alternates. The alternates then ratified the position of the TSE president.  
 On March 9th, the OAS Secretary General released a press release stating that he and the 
Permanent Council were “following the ongoing developments in Ecuador.”  The press release 
did not directly address the 57 dismissed lawmakers. However, it did mention that the Secretary 
General “expressed his support of President Rafael Correa’s efforts to advance the constitutional 
process that seeks to put an end to the chronic instability of the last decades” and that it was 
“crucial for all political and social sectors to participate in this process in a calm and harmonious 
environment” (Organization of American States Press Release E-074/07).  
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 Despite the appeals for calm from the OAS SG, the situation escalated. On the 13th and 
14th of March, the dismissed lawmakers tried to enter the Congressional building, but were 
blocked by the police and protestors, some of whom violently attacked the lawmakers. A few 
days later, 21 of the alternates of the 57 were smuggled into Congress for a swearing-in session, 
which officially gave Congress a quorum. Members of the 57 attempted to enter Congress that 
morning to stop the session, but were blocked from entering by the police on orders from 
President Correa. 
  Noting that their attempts to enter the Congressional building had failed, the removed 
lawmakers appealed to the judiciary. On the 27th of March, a judge in Guayas province ruled that 
the lawmakers should be reinstated. The president of Congress, Jorge Cevallos, accepted the 
ruling and suspended the congressional session being held so the 57 could return. However, 
before the 57 were able to retake their seats, the TSE determined that the judge in Guayas “was 
not competent to make a ruling on the lawmakers” and fired the judge (Los Angeles Times 
2007).  
 In spite of the repeated back-and-forth between the TSE, the 57 lawmakers, and Correa, 
the referendum was held on schedule and was approved by 82% of the electorate. Following the 
referendum, the SG of the OAS released a press statement that praised the vote and “the calm 
atmosphere and free participation of voters” and stated that the SG “trusts that all actors in 
Ecuador will know how to conduct themselves” (Organization of American States Press Release 
E-102/07). Again, there was no direct mention of the situation involving the 57 lawmakers or the 
inter-institutional conflict.  
 After the victory from the court in Guayas province, the 57 lawmakers appealed to the 
Constitutional Court for reinstatement. The Constitutional Court reinstated the 57 lawmakers, 
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calling their removal unconstitutional. In response to the decision by the Constitutional Court, 
President Correa said the decision was “shameless” and that the congressmen were dismissed for 
incompetence and did not deserve their jobs back (BBC News 24 April 2007). A day later, a 
local news channel caught the alternates of the 57 dismissed lawmakers meeting in a hotel with 
the Minister of Government, Gustavo Larrea. The implication was that the government was 
making deals with the alternates of the 57 in order to secure their support for whatever measures 
the Correa administration wanted from them. The alternates left the hotel meeting covering their 
faces with napkins and tablecloths, earning the Congress in which they participated the nickname 
“El Congreso de los Manteles” (the Congress of the Tablecloths).  
 The day after the hotel meeting with the Correa administration, the “new” Congress (with 
the alternates of the removed 57 lawmakers) met and dismissed the Constitutional Court Judges, 
asserting that their terms expired in January. Correa again instructed the police to block the 57 
lawmakers from reentering Congress, stating that if any tried they would be sent to prison. The 
federal prosecutor, Elsa Moreno, then ordered the arrest of 24 of the 57 deputies on charges of 
sedition, forcing several of the lawmakers to flee to Colombia. 
 In spite of the support the dismissed lawmakers received from the courts, the inability to 
secure a solid, irreversible outcome prevented the lawmakers from taking their seats in Congress. 
The elections for the CA, which were monitored by the OAS and The Carter Center, were held in 
September 2007. The party of President Correa, Alianza País, won 74 out of 130 of the seats in 
the CA. In November of 2007, the CA convened and one of its first acts of business was to 
dismiss Congress on charges that it was corrupt. 110 of the 129 delegates present voted for the 
dismissal of Congress and on November 30, Jorge Cevallos agreed to the dismissal of the 
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Congress. The new constitution was approved in a referendum on September 28, 2008, winning 
approval from 69% of the voters. 
 It is important to note two key discrepancies between the government and the opposition 
in this crisis that reflect a major difference in how the disparate groups viewed the crisis. The 
major question in the crisis resolved around whether either group, and if so, which one, was 
behaving unconstitutionally. The opposition members of Congress claimed that President Correa 
and the TSE were behaving unconstitutionally, as the 1998 Constitution stipulated that only 
Congress is authorized to undertake reforms to the constitution. They also argued that the TSE 
did not have the authority to remove members of Congress and as a result, the executive and the 
TSE had essentially overreached their authority by removing those members from their seats in 
Congress. For the opposition, the removal of the 57 lawmakers was a violation of their 
democratic rights and the rights of those who elected them into office. On the other hand, the 
President and the TSE claimed the opposition was behaving unconstitutionally, as they had no 
right to vote to remove the president of the TSE from office and, although part of the fault lied 
with the TSE in “erroneously interpreting the Constitution”, the Congress did not have the 
constitutional right to approve the referendum question nor did they have the right to reform 
content in the Executive Order (Ecuador Embassy Report 2007).  
 Second, the opposition parties to Correa were the dominant part of Congress, and their 
concern was that if the CA was given plenipotentiary powers, the CA would dissolve Congress 
and, as a result, the dissolution of Congress would limit the ability of the Congress to act as a 
“check” on the Correa administration. However, for many of the pro-Correa politicians, the idea 
of full powers for the Constituent Assembly was an indisputable and foregone conclusion. In a 
personal interview, Alberto Acosta, the President of the CA remarked “Of course the CA should 
177 
 
have plenipotentiary powers. They are fundamental” (Acosta 2014). With regards to the process 
being a crisis, Maria Paula Romo, a representative of the CA and political leader, stated that “the 
removal of the 57 was a crisis, but it was because when an electoral tribunal removes half of the 
Congress, it is an institutional crisis” (Romo 2014). However, Romo also made the point that the 
TSE had the ability to make the decision based on the electoral laws. 
 The dispute over which actor had behaved undemocratically meant the situation was less 
clear in terms of whether there was a violation of the constitution and how to respond as a result. 
However, this lack of clarity could have been addressed by the OAS, but it was not, primarily 
because the Secretary General of the OAS and the member states paid deference to the executive 
of Ecuador as opposed to the opposition, only reviewing documents from the opposition outside 
of structured meetings. A similar lack of clarity in response to the impeachment and removal of 
President Lugo in Paraguay led to multiple meetings of the OAS Permanent Council, a fact-
finding mission headed by the SG of the OAS, and the suspension of Paraguay from UNASUR 
and Mercosur- a drastically more in-depth and comprehensive response to crises with similar 
levels of constitutional and democratic ambiguity. 
 The response from the OAS to the conflict between the institutions in Ecuador was 
mostly limited to press releases from the Secretary General urging the parties in the conflict to 
behave democratically and praising the Correa government for his movements towards a CA. 
Representatives from the group of the 57 legislators traveled to Washington D.C. to meet with 
the Secretary General, but according to one of the members, Luis Fernando Torres, the meeting 
with the SG “didn’t produce any results” and the “OAS and SG Insulza legitimized the 
unconstitutional behavior of the electoral tribunal instead of defending democracy” (Personal 
Interview 17 June 2014).  
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 The issue of the 57 was very briefly mentioned during a report regarding the OAS 
observation of the 15th of April CA referendum vote. The ambassador from Guatemala stated 
that the Permanent Council member states had been “following with great interest the situation 
of Ecuador” and asked the SG to share his impressions regarding the conversation he had with 
the 57 lawmakers the day before.  The SG responded that he was reviewing the materials 
presented by the 57 lawmakers after meeting with them the day before and all of the materials 
the 57 had presented would be available to the other member states if they requested. The 
Ecuadorian delegate mentioned that the government of Ecuador had already delivered a 
document regarding the situation in Ecuador with the 57 lawmakers and that any delegations 
wishing to understand more could read the document to understand the “legal situation” of the 57 
lawmakers (13). After that discussion, the topic was not broached again in the OAS, despite the 
request by the 57 lawmakers to look into the case. 
 A majority of the lawmakers did appeal to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights to look into their case, submitting a request for review on the 16th of October in 2007. 
However, as of 2013 the IACHR had not ruled on the admissibility of the case (El Mercurio 14 
November 2013).  
 The Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly crisis represents an illustrative case of a failure of 
the international community to look more deeply into events in a crisis state, even though a 
request from the embattled opposition members to review the case and comment publicly on it 
was made. Representatives of the 57 lawmakers actively petitioned the international community, 
including the OAS, for assistance in responding to what they perceived to be the unconstitutional 
dissolution of their positions. Despite the requests from the opposition, the OAS failed to look 
more deeply into the crisis, limiting the response to broadly worded press releases regarding the 
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Constituent Assembly process. Since either the SG of the organization or a member state is 
required to request a meeting of the Permanent Council or General Assembly, the lawmakers 
were not able to secure a response in the form of a meeting or the invocation of the democracy 
clauses from the OAS. Based on the statement from the Ecuadorian ambassador to the OAS 
regarding the documentation already provided to the OAS discussing the situation with the 57, it 
is highly unlikely that the government of President Correa would have authorized additional 
actions looking into the crisis in Ecuador. In effect, the procedural norms and structure of the 
OAS gave deference to the President of Ecuador, and the potentially unconstitutional behavior of 
President Correa and institutions allied with the government were not examined in more detail. 
6.4 Threats to the Executive 
6.4.1 Ecuador 2010 
 The case of the attempted coup d’etat in Ecuador 2010, referred to as the “30th of 
September” in Ecuador, offers a strong example of the variation in the responses of the OAS to 
cases of presidential overreach as compared to cases that represent a threat to the executive. The 
30th of September offers a key insight into the ability of executives to harness the regional 
organizations to support their standing as executive and the role of regional organizations in 
protecting presidents when under threat.  
 Rafael Correa was elected president in 2006 after years of tumultuous politics in Ecuador. 
In spite of the unstable history of executives in the country since 1997 (the country has had 8 
different presidents since 1997), Correa has been able to maintain high popularity ratings, 
remaining consistently above 50%, and has taken advantage of a surge in oil prices to fund social 
spending. However, a number of his policies had been met with opposition, most notably a major 
protest against austerity measures affecting the police and military in 2010. On the 30th of 
September, after the passage of a law by the National Assembly that reduced the values of 
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pensions for the National Police and changed the bonus structure for promotions, members of the 
National Police began to protest the law by occupying police barracks and the National 
Assembly building, setting up road blocks across the country, and taking over the main airport in 
Quito. In an effort to calm the protesting police and discuss the new law with them, President 
Correa went to the main police barracks to meet with the police. The reception towards Correa 
was highly negative, and protestors, some in their police uniforms, pushed and shoved the 
President. The president then challenged the police, yelling: “Gentlemen, if you want to kill the 
president, here he is, kill him, if you have the guts” and then grabbing to rip off his shirt and tie 
(Semana.com 30 September 2010). After this exchange, a tear gas canister was fired at President 
Correa and he was forced to flee the barracks wearing a gas mask. He was taken to the police 
hospital, where, because he was not able to leave the hospital, he claimed to have been 
kidnapped by the police. From the hospital, Correa declared a state of emergency and said that 
the crisis was a “coup attempt” and that the opposition was behind the crisis. After ten hours at 
the police hospital, soldiers raided the hospital where Correa was located and were able to extract 
him from the hospital and escort him back to the presidential palace. By the next day, the 
military was able to regain control of the streets, the airport, and the National Assembly, and the 
situation was defused within 24 hours of its start. 
 The international response to the crisis was immediate and supportive of President 
Correa. The Secretary General of the OAS issued a press release stating his “full support” for 
Correa and noted that he had spoken to President Correa about the situation that day 
(Organization of American States Press Release E-357/10). At the request of the Ecuadorian 
government, the OAS Permanent Council also met in a special session on September 30th, where 
they passed a resolution supporting the Correa government and authorizing a mission for the 
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Secretary General to travel to Ecuador (Organization of American States CP/Res. 977). The 
conversation regarding the situation and the passage of the resolution was unanimously in 
support of the government of Rafael Correa and there was no dissent on the passage of the 
resolution.  
 The SG left for Ecuador the following day (October 1st), once again issuing a press 
release expressing his “support and solidarity for the Constitutional President of Ecuador, Rafael 
Correa and inform him about the Organization’s determination to demand the rebellious sectors 
of the public forces to observe the principals and norms set forth in the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter” (Organization of American States Press Release E-361/10, emphasis 
added). The other Presidents of UNASUR also met in an emergency session in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina on the day of the crisis, issued a statement “condemning the attempted coup and the 
kidnapping of Rafael Correa,” and authorized a mission of the foreign ministers of UNASUR to 
meet in Quito on October 1st. Finally, the declaration included the intention to pass a democracy 
clause for UNASUR, which was signed in November of 2010.  
 Since the crisis was defused within 24 hours and President Correa was able to regain 
control in Ecuador, the crisis was generally considered to have been resolved. In comparison to 
cases where the president is accused of overreach or undemocratic behavior, whether it was 
fraud in municipal elections, the violation of the freedom of expression, of even the removal of 
opposition members in the National Assembly during the rewriting of a constitution, the 
response of the regional intergovernmental organizations to the threat to the president in Ecuador 
was significantly larger, more in-depth, and more comprehensive.  
6.4.2 Paraguay 2012: Impeachment or Coup D’etat? Comparing the Responses of UNASUR 
and Mercosur to those of the Organization of American States  
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 The crisis in Paraguay 2012 presents an ideal case with which to compare the responses 
of Mercosur and UNASUR to those of the OAS in the face of a threat to the executive. The 
response of Mercosur and UNASUR to the removal of President Fernando Lugo from office was 
immediate and strong in its condemnation of the crisis. Although the response from the OAS was 
not as forceful as that of Mercosur and UNASUR, the response still represents a case in which 
we see a broad range of action from the OAS as compared to crises of presidential overreach, 
further confirming the argument that the OAS is more likely to respond with greater range and 
depth to a crisis which represents a threat to the executive than to presidential overreach. 
 On June 22, 2012, in response to a clash between police and land-occupying peasants that 
resulted in several deaths, the traditional parties in Paraguay’s Congress began the process of 
impeachment against President Lugo. Although the Congress has the constitutional right to 
impeach the president, the way in which the impeachment process occurred- President Lugo was 
given less than 24 hours to prepare his defense against the charges of malfeasance in office and 
the trial in the Senate lasted for only two hours- raised concerns for many states and 
organizations in the region  (McCoy 2012). Both chambers of Congress voted overwhelmingly to 
impeach President Lugo, with a vote of 76-1 in the Chamber of Deputies and a vote of 39-4 in 
the Senate. President Lugo initially accepted the impeachment, stating, “I say goodbye as 
president” but added that Paraguay’s democracy “has been deeply wounded” (TheGuardian.com 
2012). Vice President Federico Franco was sworn in as Lugo’s replacement shortly after the 
conclusion of the impeachment proceedings. 
 The response of the international community, especially from sub-regional IGOs, was 
immediate. After the announcement by the Lower Chamber of Congress in Paraguay on June 21st 
that there would be an impeachment trial, UNASUR dispatched a delegation of foreign ministers 
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to Paraguay to try to intervene. The foreign ministers also called the impending impeachment “a 
rupture of the democratic order by not respecting due process” (coha.org 2012). UNASUR also 
authorized a high-level group to monitor and assess the situation in Paraguay after the 
impeachment. Brazil suggested that Paraguay could be suspended from both Mercosur and 
UNASUR, and within a week both regional organizations voted unanimously to suspend 
Paraguay, citing the democracy clauses in the suspensions.36 UNASUR member states refused to 
recognize the new government and those with embassies in Paraguay withdrew their 
ambassadors. The responses from Mercosur and UNASUR were immediate and represented the 
most in-depth and comprehensive responses the organizations had available. The immediate and 
decisive responses of the sub-regional Organizations stand in contrast to the more delayed and 
reduced, albeit existent, response of the Organization of American States.  
 On June 22nd, the day of the impeachment conviction by the Senate, the SG of the OAS 
issued two press releases and convened the Permanent Council of the OAS in an extraordinary 
meeting to discuss the situation occurring in Paraguay. In the press releases, SG Insulza stated 
his “firm conviction that the institutional stability that has been achieved in the region must be 
protected, safeguarding respect for due process, not only in form, but also in substance” and 
added “that implies the proper assessment of the evidence of the accusation and the application 
of terms that allow the adequate preparation and presentation of the arguments of the accused in 
plain exercise of their right to defense” (OAS Press Release E-226/12). He also announced the 
appointment the Permanent Representative from Uruguay to follow up on the conflict in situ and 
help in its resolution (OAS Press Release E-228/12).  
                                                 
36 Mercosur met and suspended Paraguay from the organization on 29 June 2012. UNASUR met and suspended 
Paraguay from the organization on 30 June 2012. 
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    According to SG Insulza, the meeting of the Permanent Council was called to allow for 
more information regarding the events as they unfolded in Paraguay (OAS Permanent Council 
Minutes 1856/12). The major concern in the meeting was whether President Lugo had been 
given the rights of due process and defense, as the time to respond to the impeachment 
proceedings and the allegations against him was extremely limited (less than 24 hours). The SG 
noted that the process had occurred quickly and he had seen time-limited impeachment 
proceedings in the region, but “none were as short as this” (5).  
 The representative from Paraguay was also given time to speak, noting that although the 
process did technically occur constitutionally- the chambers of Congress followed constitutional 
procedure, the trial was occurring remarkably quickly. He also noted the President Lugo had 
requested extra time to prepare a defense, but was denied. Despite the update on the 
constitutionality of the impeachment, the statement from the Paraguayan representative was 
neither overtly pro-Lugo nor pro-Congress.  
 A number of the leftist states in the region, such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, 
unequivocally categorized the events as a coup d’etat. The Nicaraguan delegate stated the 
member states were standing in front of the materialization of a “new coup d’etat by other 
methods” (8). The Dominican Republic added to the group of states calling the events a coup 
d’etat and suggested the invocation of Article 20 of the IADC. However, other states were 
hesitant to call it a coup d’etat, instead insisting that the major concern was the respect for due 
process and the right to a defense. The United States, Colombia, Brazil, and Canada all stated 
they were concerned about the events and would be monitoring the situation closely. Due to a 
desire for more information on the events, the SG and President of the Permanent Council closed 
the session of the Permanent Council with the plan to meet again in the following days. 
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 On June 26th, four days after the impeachment proceedings in Paraguay concluded, the 
OAS Permanent Council met again in an extraordinary session called by the Secretary General. 
At the beginning of the session, the President of the Permanent Council announced that the goal 
of the meeting was to reflect on the information gathered thus far and then determine what 
decision the member states should adopt.37 The SG presented a brief review of the known facts 
of the crisis and then stated that the Organization “has many paths to follow” (4). He noted that 
technically the Congress does have the right to impeach, however, it was also important to 
remember other rights and norms of the Paraguayan Constitution and International Law, such as 
the right to due process and the right to defend oneself (3).  
 The ambassador from Paraguay appointed by Lugo spoke and noted that he was now 
acting as a representative of the Franco government, stating that the new government had asked 
him to stay in his post at the OAS. He reviewed many of the details of the situation, focusing on 
the deaths of the peasants and the fears, held by many in the government, that a delayed or long 
impeachment trial would cause more instability and deaths. He argued that although President 
Lugo had created various mechanisms with which to investigate the deaths, they were not 
sufficient to calm the population. The ambassador also argued that the reason President Lugo 
was given so little time to organize a defense was due to a trial against former President Raul 
Cubas, who was given five days to organize his defense, during which time additional violence 
broke out causing the deaths of five people (7). In addition, the ambassador argued that Lugo’s 
defense team did not use the full two hours given to them for the defense, and instead finished 
fifteen minutes before their designated time. 
                                                 
37 The President or Chair of the Permanent Council is held on a rotating basis by the ambassadors of the member 
states. During these sessions, the ambassador from Honduras, Leónidas Rosa Bautista, held the Presidency of the 
Permanent Council from Honduras.  
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 The response from the rest of the member states was deeply divided. On one side were 
member states that characterized the events as a clear coup d’etat and, as a result, wanted to 
invoke the IADC, convene the General Assembly, and suspend Paraguay from the Organization 
of American States. Nicaragua proposed to draft the resolution calling for the suspension of 
Paraguay in a General Assembly meeting and was supported by numerous states, including 
Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia, and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. Brazil and Uruguay also expressed concerns about the process and that it was 
potentially a rupture of the democratic order, but wanted the OAS to wait to issue a response 
until after Mercosur and UNASUR met at the end of the week. Brazil argued that the Permanent 
Council of the OAS should defer to the information and knowledge of the sub-regional 
organizations, since they were the ones that had “greater specificity and were more directly 
involved in the matter” (24).  
 On the other side of the divide were the member states that, although all were concerned 
about the lack of due process and right to defense, were much more hesitant to label the events as 
a coup d’etat or to invoke the democracy clauses to respond to the crisis without more 
information regarding the process. Honduras led this group and proposed the authorization of a 
fact-finding mission by the Secretary General and a team to Paraguay to gather more information 
and report back to the Permanent Council so they could then make a decision with all the 
information available. A majority of member states agreed to this proposal, including the United 
States, Canada, El Salvador, Jamaica, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Panama (among many others). 
In particular, Panama stated it was almost “impossible” to make a well-informed decision 
without more information (34).  
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 The debate between these two disparate groups became heated at times. The Venezuelan 
and Nicaraguan delegations challenged the presence of the Paraguayan ambassador, with 
Venezuela questioning whether his presence demonstrated implicit “acceptance” of the coup and 
whether that would affect the standing and “ethics” of the OAS (15). The Venezuelan 
ambassador also noted that, contrary to the general understanding of the responsibility of 
ambassadors to the executive branch, it appeared that “not all representatives at this meeting of 
the OAS are connected in hierarchical flow or due obedience and respect to the Heads of State” 
(15). The Canadian ambassador cautioned against “rash remarks” or “premature positioning” as 
the atmosphere in Paraguay was “relatively calm at the moment” and the member states should 
be cautious against fueling tensions (22).  
 The representative from Paraguay agreed to a fact-finding mission in the country, arguing 
that the process had been constitutional and that President Lugo had full rights- both in terms of 
the trial but also in terms of post-impeachment, since he was freely visiting supporters and giving 
interviews (38). He also stated it would be an open invitation to whichever member states wanted 
to participate in the mission (39).  
 The ambassador from Argentina noted there was not consensus among the member states 
for either a resolution condemning the coup d’etat or for a resolution authorizing a fact-finding 
mission. Uruguay seconded this statement- arguing that the lack of consensus was going to 
impede action from the OAS. The President of the Permanent Council responded by 
summarizing what he felt was the position of the Permanent Council members that they would 
support the SG on his fact-finding mission. Venezuela and Nicaragua disputed this summary of 
the viewpoints of the various member states, arguing that they were in favor of a resolution 
condemning the coup d’etat and beginning the processes outlined in the IADC and had not given 
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official support to a fact-finding mission of the SG, since they felt the crisis was a coup d’etat. 
Venezuela noted that they did not want the Permanent Council to issue a resolution or official 
statement regarding the fact-finding mission when there wasn’t consensus on whether the crisis 
was a coup (43).  
 In response to the debate about whether or not to vote on a resolution to authorize a fact-
finding mission, SG Insulza spoke and stated that his goal for the meeting was not to get a 
resolution passed, but rather to update the states and explain the intention of the SG to conduct a 
fact-finding mission. According to his interpretation of the Charter and the IADC, along with the 
invitation by Paraguay to conduct a fact-finding mission, he was authorized in his capacity as 
Secretary General to conduct a mission without the authorization of the Permanent Council. He 
said they “do not have to call it a mission,” but that regardless of the chosen path- to invoke the 
IADC or not, the outcome would be the same- “to form a mission and send it”- since the IADC 
stipulates that a General Assembly meeting to consider suspension would occur after diplomatic 
missions (45).  
 The member states backing Nicaragua’s proposal began to soften their stance on the 
mission, arguing that they were not necessarily against the mission itself or the authority of the 
SG to conduct a mission, but rather they were upset that the President of the Permanent Council 
had suggested passing a resolution that failed to acknowledge a lack of consensus on how to 
define the events in Paraguay. Chile noted that the concern was that if the Permanent Council 
started to issue resolutions based on majority votes instead of consensus, it would indicate that 
the entirety of the Permanent Council backed the resolution and would not acknowledge the vital 
role consensus has played in the OAS (53). Nicaragua stated that the SG would be going on his 
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own faculties and capacities, but that they wanted “to make it clear that there that many states 
have expressed concerns and have said it is a coup d’etat, an illegitimate government” (56). 
 The Chair of the Permanent Council responded to the Nicaraguan delegation by stating 
that perhaps Nicaragua didn’t hear him correctly and he had reformed the proposal, but 
Nicaragua seemed to him to agree on the point that the SG could conduct a mission without the 
express authorization of the Permanent Council to do so (57). The Secretary General gave the 
final words before the meeting was adjourned, in which he stated he would be organizing a 
mission to visit Paraguay and would deliver a report to the Permanent Council on his return. He 
also said that while the mission would not wait for the meetings of Mercosur and UNASUR to 
take place, he would work with the leaders of those organizations closely and that failure to do so 
would result in a “grave, grave error” (57). Finally, he noted that he would prefer a delegation 
with people from different countries so that the mission would be composed of a group of 
persons representative of the region (57).  
 Although the Permanent Council did not formally approve the mission, the Secretary 
General acted within his purview as the SG and with the invitation from the government of 
Paraguay to conduct a mission to the country. Along with the mission team assembled from 
various countries in the region, the SG traveled to Paraguay from July 1st to 3rd and presented his 
report on July 10th. The report covered much of what had already been discussed in the 
Permanent Council meetings prior: that the impeachment process was technically constitutional, 
however, the “speed with which the impeachment was conducted was highly unfortunate and 
created an aura of illegitimacy surrounding the process, whatever the text of the Constitution 
might say” (OAS Mission Report CP/doc.4786/12 rev.1, 8). Although the impeachment 
proceedings were concerning, the report also noted that President Lugo had accepted the 
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proceedings and originally accepted the outcome, although he did later retract that acceptance 
and filed a case with the Supreme Court of Paraguay for a review of the impeachment 
proceedings. A final point regarding the events noted the willingness of the majority of social 
and political actors to accept the elections scheduled to be held in April 2013 (ten months from 
the month of the crisis) and at those elections both the President and the Congress would be 
elected.  
 In closing, the SG made a number of suggestions. The first was for the OAS to follow the 
outcome of the Supreme Court case and at the IACHR should Lugo decided to file a case with 
that institution. The second was that the OAS should deploy an electoral mission to observe the 
April 2013 elections and facilitate dialogue before and after those elections. Finally, the SG 
addressed the decisions taken by the sub-regional organizations to suspend Paraguay. The SG 
argued that “the adoption by the OAS of a similar measure would not contribute to the 
achievement of our objectives” but rather would contribute to the deepening of the political crisis 
and prevent the OAS from helping Paraguay maintain the current situation of “political, social, 
and economic stability” (Mission Report 2012, 10). However, he did suggest that Resolution 
1080 offers the ability to convene the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to consider the situation in 
Paraguay and would potentially offer the ability of the OAS to achieve its goals in Paraguay.  
 In the following discussion, although many of the member states still expressed concern 
over the events, the general agreement was to review the report with the home governments and 
then later decide on a course of action. Paraguay accepted the invitation for electoral observation 
and political dialogue. However, Venezuela, Brazil, and Nicaragua continued to describe the 
events as a parliamentary coup and referred to the actions by UNASUR and Mercosur to address 
the situation in Paraguay as the correct course of action. Despite the insistence from these 
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countries that the crisis was a coup d’etat and should be treated as such, the delegations of all of 
the member states agreed to take the time to review the mission report and make a decision on a 
response later.  
 On August 22, 2012, the OAS Permanent Council met to discuss the Paraguayan 
situation once more. The same divisions present in the majority of the prior discussions were 
present again- Venezuela, Brazil, Nicaragua, and most of the other leftist South American States 
argued the events had constituted a coup and the lack of suspension of Paraguay by the OAS 
served to reinforce the legislative coup. On the other hand, the other member states argued that 
while the events were clearly not within the spirit of democracy, the constitution had been upheld 
and the focus was on helping Paraguay develop a stronger institutional framework for the future. 
The lack of consensus on a final decision to respond to the crisis with the invocation of the IADC 
or Resolution 1080 or with an electoral mission meant that a resolution from the Permanent 
Council was not passed. However, the Paraguayan government accepted the electoral mission 
and the OAS provided the mission.  
 After elections were held in April 2013, UNASUR and Mercosur agreed to lift the 
suspension for Paraguay. Paraguay rejoined UNASUR and Mercosur in 2013. Although the 
reaction from the OAS to the crisis in Paraguay did not consist of sanctions, the multiple 
meetings, the fact-finding mission, and the electoral mission demonstrated an intense concern 
and preoccupation with the state of democracy in Paraguay in the face of a threat to the 
executive.  
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6.5 The Club of Presidents: An Overview of the Cases and Additional Evidence Supporting the 
Argument 
 The case studies presented demonstrate a variation in responses to democratic crises in 
the region. Table 6.1 below demonstrates the variation in responses for crises of threats to the 
executive compared to cases of presidential overreach.  
Table 6: Comparison of the Responses from IGOs to Threats to the Executive and Cases of 
Presidential Overreach 
Presidential 
Overreach 
Responses Threats to the 
Executive 
Responses 
Nicaragua 2008 OAS: Permanent 
Council Meeting 
(requested by Nicaragua 
to condemn U.S. 
intervention in domestic 
affairs), Press statements 
expressing concern 
Ecuador 2010 OAS: Permanent 
Council Meeting, 
Resolution, Good 
offices, Statements of 
support for President 
Correa 
 
UNASUR: Statements of 
support, Emergency 
summit, Adoption of 
democracy clause after 
coup 
Ecuador 2007 Press releases calling for 
dialogue among 
conflicting powers, 
Election-monitoring  
  
Venezuela 2009 OAS: Statements of 
concern; Request by 
United States to apply 
Article 18 of IADC, 
Secretary General stated 
Venezuela did not give 
prior consent, which is 
required per Article 18 
 
 
Paraguay 2012 OAS: Multiple 
Permanent Council 
meetings, Fact-finding 
mission 
 
Mercosur/UNASUR: 
Diplomatic missions, 
Suspension of Paraguay 
from organizations  
Panama 2009-2010 None   
 
During crises that presented threats to the executive, the responses from regional 
organizations were significantly greater and more in-depth, with a number of official meetings, 
discussions, statements, and, in the case of the impeachment of Paraguayan President Lugo in 
2012, the suspension of Paraguay from Mercosur and UNASUR. On the other hand, responses to 
crises in which the president overreached in his executive authority, regional organizations were 
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either silent or responded with far less depth. Although the final outcome, particularly for the 
OAS, may not be in absolute favor of the executive, the response from the Organization does 
represent a preference towards investigating and understanding all of the facts on the ground to 
ensure that an undemocratic rupture had not occurred. A clear comparison is the response of the 
OAS to the crises in Paraguay 2012 and Ecuador 2007. In both cases the main question was 
whether and which actor(s) had behaved undemocratically in an inter-institutional conflict. In 
both cases, democratically elected leaders were removed from their positions by another branch 
of government. However, in the case of the removal of the executive in Paraguay, the 
international community responded immediately and with greater depth, including multiple 
Permanent Council meetings, a fact-finding mission, and the consideration of the invocation of 
the IADC and Resolution 1080. However, in the Constituent Assembly crisis in Ecuador 2007, 
despite the possibility that the removal of the 57 opposition legislators was an undemocratic 
removal (potentially even amounting to a self-coup by the President and institutions favorable to 
him), the response from the regional Organizations was limited. There were no meetings set to 
address the crisis, no fact-finding missions, and no press releases in favor of finding further 
information.  
 In personal interviews with former and current ambassadors, politicians, presidents, and 
prominent scholars of democratization, the general understanding of the Organization of 
American States and other regional organizations confirms the conclusions from the case studies. 
John Maisto, who served as Ambassador of the United States to the OAS from 2003 to 2006, 
stated that in the OAS “sovereignty, non-interference, etc trump human rights and democracy” 
and as a result, the OAS is limited in how it can respond to crises in member states (Personal 
Interview 30 May 2014). Diego Zorilla, the current resident coordinator of the United Nations 
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Development Program in Ecuador, stated that “intervention by the UN Secretary General or the 
Department of Political Affairs of the UN would really be predicated only in cases where there is 
a major threat to the constitutional order in the country or a big civil disturbance” (Personal 
Interview, 06 July 2014, Quito, Ecuador). Zorilla added that the UN is able to “monitor low level 
conflicts that might happen in the country with a view to offer our services as a potential 
interlocutor” but, again, without the express invitation from the government, the UN and its 
agencies are limited in what they can provide and how they can respond. The implication is that 
the government, and particularly the president of a country, can limit how international 
organizations function in their countries, using the norm of sovereignty as a way to control 
access into the internal workings of their country. Without a “clear, major threat” to the 
constitutional order, international organizations are limited in their ability to respond. As stated 
before, the disputes over what constitutes a “clear, major threat” or an “unconstitutional 
alteration or interruption,” international organizations are generally limited in responding only to 
those crises that are the most severe and clear (traditional coups d’etat and autogolpes). As a 
result, low-level threats to the quality of democracy originating with the executive are less likely 
to receive in-depth responses from regional organizations, resulting in deterioration in the quality 
of democracy in the region. 
 Former President of Ecuador Osvaldo Hurtado (1981-1984) noted that the “OAS is a club 
of presidents” and asked “Why did the OAS intervene in Honduras (2009)? Why in Paraguay 
(2012)? And why, here in Ecuador (2010), when the President challenged the police and 
provoked a state of public upheaval, and he only, because of his decisions created a conflict that 
put at risk his own life. He called it a coup. He asked the OAS to come here. The OAS came 
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here, the Secretary General intervened and said ‘yes, there had been an attempted coup!” 
(Personal Interview 18 June 2014).  
6.6 Conclusion 
 The argument that the regional organizations in Latin America can be considered “clubs 
of presidents” is supported by a review of the case studies and quotes from prominent political 
players in the region. Although the OAS, particularly through the role of the SG, has made some 
progress in terms of addressing and noting instances of undemocratic behavior, the rules and 
norms within the OAS often prevent in-depth responses from occurring during periods of 
executive overreach. However, when a crisis is a threat to an executive, the OAS and the other 
regional organizations respond swiftly and broadly- employing a wide range of responses to the 
crisis.  
 Elections for a new Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General for the OAS were 
held on March 18, 2015. As the second term of current SG Insulza came to a close, he became 
more vocal and active in finding ways to meet with other groups and institutions of government. 
In response to the 2014-2015 violent protests between President Maduro in Venezuela and the 
opposition there, the OAS SG met repeatedly with representatives of the opposition and has 
publicly stated his concerns regarding the responses of the Venezuelan government. However, 
without the explicit acceptance from the Maduro government for a political mission from the 
OAS, and without a clear, unconstitutional alteration or rupture of the democratic order in 
Venezuela, the OAS has been limited in its ability to respond to the crisis. Venezuela has 
rejected offers of assistance and mediation from the OAS, instead preferring to work with the 
sub-regional organizations such as UNASUR to respond to the crisis. Whether the new OAS SG 
will continue to follow in his predecessors footsteps in encouraging a more vocal role for the SG 
in the face of democratic crises is yet to be seen, but for a fundamental change to occur in how 
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the regional organizations address threats to the quality of democracy, high levels of 
polarization, conflict, and deep-seated fears must be overcome.   
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7 Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I sought to explain the variation in responses from regional 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to democratic crises in Latin America, with special 
focus on the Organization of American States (OAS). I argued the variation in responses is the 
result of three key factors: the clarity of the crisis (how clearly the crisis is a violation of the 
primary democracy clauses of the regional IGOs), the severity of the crisis (the extent to which 
the crisis threatens the fundamental foundation of democracy in the crisis state), and whether the 
crisis was a threat to the executive in office or whether the crisis was an instance of presidential 
overreach. Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, I have found high 
levels of support for the arguments put forth in this dissertation. As a result, this dissertation adds 
new dimensions and a deeper understanding to the variation in responses from regional IGOs in 
Latin America to democratic crises in their member states. 
 In the first chapter, I discussed the existing literature regarding the relationship between 
IGO responses and democratic crises and demonstrated that although the literature tells a partial 
story regarding the variation in responses, touching on the ideas of the type of crisis or the nature 
of the crisis, the literature fails to account for the severity of the crisis, the way the member states 
understand the crisis and, finally, the influence of the executives of each member state in the 
regional organizations. I also noted that the literature fails to address the variation in crises that 
do not amount to autogolpes or coups d’etat. Until this dissertation, the extant literature was 
lacking a theoretical framework for the variation in crises of low severity and clarity. 
  In the second chapter, I offered the theoretical background for why crises of high severity 
and clarity receive more extensive and in-depth responses from regional IGOs as compared to 
crises of low severity and clarity. I argued that high levels of clarity and severity reduce the 
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mitigating effects of polarization/polarization, uncertainty regarding the consequences of 
responding to a crisis in a member state, time, and imperfect information. However, when clarity 
or severity is low, those effects matter more- leading to a reduction in the likelihood that the 
regional IGOs will respond to the democratic crisis. 
 In Chapter Three, I used cross-tabulations and Pearson’s chi-squared tests to demonstrate 
the strength of my arguments. I also tested the alternate theories of linkage and insulation as 
explanations for the variation in responses to democratic crises in Latin America. The cross-
tabulations provided strong support for my arguments regarding clarity and severity, as well as 
for the “club of presidents” hypothesis, with the majority of the models being statistically 
significant. The models also demonstrated that the variables of linkage and insulation have a 
limited impact on the variation in responses. This minimal impact of linkage and insulation on 
the variation in responses is an important relationship to address, and should be noted when 
discussing the role of oil exports in Latin America. In future research, I plan to further expound 
on the variation of linkage and insulation in the region and look at the impact of variations in oil 
prices over time to continue to review the impact of the notion of insulation in Latin America. In 
summary, the empirical chapter demonstrated the strength of the theoretical arguments I provide 
as an explanation for the variation in responses from regional IGOs to democratic crises in Latin 
America. 
 In Chapters Four and Five, I used paired case studies (Ecuador 2000 and Honduras 2009; 
Bolivia 2003 and Ecuador 2004-2005) to demonstrate how the variation in clarity and severity 
affected the responses from regional IGOs. Although both Ecuador 2000 and Honduras 2009 can 
be considered cases of high clarity and severity, the responses from the OAS varied. In Ecuador, 
although the OAS met and passed resolutions regarding the crisis, ultimately the OAS accepted 
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the transition from President Mahuad to Vice President Gustavo Noboa and did not invoke 
Resolution 1080. In Honduras, the OAS not only met and passed resolutions condemning the 
coup d’état in Honduras, but also invoked the IADC and eventually suspended Honduras from 
the OAS. I argued the variation in the responses was the result of a reduction in severity in the 
Ecuadorian crisis due to the intervention of the armed forces to ensure a constitutional succession 
of the vice president to the presidency, which meant the intervening variables of polarization, 
time, uncertainty, and imperfect information had a greater impact on the response from the OAS. 
On the other hand, the severity of the crisis in Honduras increased over time, especially with the 
suspension of civil liberties in Honduras by the coup government and the difficulties in securing 
an agreement between Manuel Zelaya and the coup government. As a result, in spite of high 
levels of polarization in the Organization, the member states of the OAS suspended Honduras 
from the Organization. 
 In the “near-coup” crises in Bolivia 2003 and Ecuador 2004-2005, the variations in 
clarity and severity meant greater influence for the intervening variables of polarization, 
uncertainty, imperfect information, and time. With the request from the Bolivian delegation to 
refrain from invoking the primary democratic instruments to respond to the mass protests, the 
OAS was limited in its ability to respond. Although the invocation of the IADC was discussed, 
various member states, including Bolivia, expressed their preferences to see how the events in 
Bolivia played out before deciding on a course of action in the face of uncertainty regarding the 
crisis. The polarization in the Organization also led to a divide between a bloc led by Venezuela, 
which wanted to emphasize the role of poverty and inequality in causing the crisis, and other 
states that wanted to focus on the political crisis at hand. This polarization between these two 
blocs also hampered the ability to pass a clear, cohesive resolution regarding the crisis. President 
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Sánchez de Lozada eventually resigned, putting an end to that immediate crisis, although his 
Vice President and successor would later face a similar fate.  
The crises in Ecuador 2004-2005 demonstrate two parts of my argument: the idea that the 
OAS is a “club of presidents” as well as the use of a greater range of actions in the face of an 
unclear but potentially severe crisis. The OAS Permanent Council and Secretary General did not 
respond to the replacement of the justices on the Constitutional Court and Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal, nor to the dismissal of the Supreme Court Justices and the eventual dissolution of the 
Supreme Court. The United Nation’s Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers pressured President Gutiérrez to allow him into the country to conduct an investigation 
and the Special Rapporteur completed an investigation, leading to a scathing report, but he was 
unable to do much more than the report to punish the Gutiérrez government. However, after 
major street protests against Gutiérrez and a decision by the Congress to remove President 
Gutiérrez from office for “abandoning his post,” the OAS Permanent Council met, passed 
resolutions, and eventually, when many of the member states expressed their concerns about the 
potential that the crisis was a coup d’etat, a fact-finding mission was sent to the country under 
the auspices of Article 18 of the IADC.  
A comparison of the crises in Bolivia and the two in Ecuador demonstrate a tendency 
towards the protection of the executive (multiple meetings and resolutions in response to threats 
to the president, and in Ecuador 2005, the invocation of the IADC and a fact-finding mission) 
and the tendency of the OAS to fail to investigate instances of presidential overreach (the lack of 
a response to the overreach of president power in Ecuador in 2004). The comparison of cases 
also demonstrates that the OAS was likely to respond with a wider range of responses to a crisis 
that was potentially more severe. On the other hand, since the Bolivia 2003 crisis had not 
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reached the threshold to be considered a severe crisis, the intervening variables of uncertainty, 
polarization, time, and information played a greater role. In summary, the two paired-case study 
chapters offered in-depth evidence and support of my argument.   
 In Chapter Six, I argued that the OAS, and especially the other sub-regional IGOs, can be 
characterized as clubs of presidents which are more likely to respond to threats to the executive 
than to condemn instances of presidential overreach. I demonstrated that the structures of the 
IGOs, the voting rules, leadership roles, and the language of the primary democratic instruments 
create a system in which the executive is relatively protected from shaming during instances of 
presidential overreach or abuse of power, but during crises that threaten the president’s position 
in power, the regional IGO is likely to take a wide variety of actions to protect the president. I 
then summarized a number of cases to demonstrate the variation in responses to cases of 
presidential overreach as compared to threats to the executive. The summaries of the cases 
showed that the OAS, and especially UNASUR and Mercosur, were much more likely to 
respond to threats to the president. I also demonstrated that in some cases of presidential 
overreach, the IGOs were completely silent on the issue. The discussion and case summaries 
demonstrate the limitations of the defense-of-democracy regime in Latin America. 
 This project has made a number of contributions to the literature and to our broader 
understanding of the role of international actors in the process of democratic defense. This 
project not only built on the idea that the type of crisis drives the response, but expounded on the 
reasons for why the type of crisis matters: the clarity and severity of the crisis drive the response. 
The explanation I provided also helps to explain the variation in responses to similar type crises, 
such as the coups d’etat in Honduras 2009 and Ecuador 2000, an explanation that has previously 
been inadequately addressed. In addition, while the previous literature argued that crises that are 
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neither clear nor severe are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, I countered that argument by 
pointing to the influence of the components of bounded rationality- ideological polarization, 
uncertainty, time, and imperfect information. As decision-makers in the regional Organizations 
deal with crises that aren’t clear or severe, the importance of polarization, uncertainty, time, and 
information become more important. This is one of the first projects that addresses the role of 
these factors in responding to democratic crises in Latin America, and this explanation deserves 
further examination in future projects. 
 Finally, this project adds to the literature by providing empirical evidence of the assertion 
that the OAS and other regional IGOs in Latin America are “clubs of presidents.” This assertion 
is made for many regional IGOs, spanning from ASEAN in Asia and the African Union in 
Africa, but the testing of the assertion is even more important for Latin America since the region 
also has one of the most developed defense of democracy regimes in the world. The empirical 
evidence generally supports the “clubs of presidents” argument and demonstrates that although 
the regional IGOs in Latin America have made huge gains in signing declarations of support for 
democratic regimes and promising to defend them in the case of alterations or interruptions, 
there is still a great chasm amongst the member states about the manner in which those 
declarations should be applied and when. The “clubs of presidents” argument also demonstrates 
the limitations of the regional IGOs in responding to requests by other actors in the member 
states, including other branches of government, such as the legislatures and courts. Since the 
representatives at the organizations are either the executives themselves or ambassadors 
appointed by the executives, the executives have inordinate influence in the organizations vis-à-
vis the decision-making process in the organizations. The result is a focus on protecting the 
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executives in the organizations during threats to their positions as executives while ignoring or 
reducing the responses to instances of presidential overreach.  
 In terms of policy implications and the future of the defense-of-democracy regime in 
Latin America, this project offers some critical evaluations of the current policies of the OAS 
and the other regional IGOs. The other branches of government and the opposition in member 
states, such as the Supreme Court, Congress, and even sub-national actors, such as governors and 
mayors, should have should have greater access to the regional IGOs when they are threatened 
due to presidential overreach. This access should not just be through institutions such as the 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, but also greater access to the institutions with 
greater influence and sanctioning-power, such as the Permanent Council. The argument that 
regional organizations are “clubs of presidents” demonstrates that these IGOs allow executives to 
essentially act as “gatekeepers” to the organizations, limiting the influence of opposition actors 
and non-governmental organizations. OAS Secretary General (SG) José Miguel Insulza has been 
actively commenting on and pushing for a larger role for the SG in addressing concerns 
regarding the quality of democracy in a number of countries, the SG is still limited by 
sovereignty, polarization, and the decision-making mechanisms of the OAS. Executives remain 
able to “hide” behind the claims of sovereignty and ambiguous understandings of democracy to 
erode the quality of democracy in their countries. A clear, unambiguous, and concise 
enumeration of the definition of democracy and the rights and responsibilities of the regional 
organizations in terms of ensuring and defending democracy should continue to be a goal for the 
region.  
 As with all projects, there are a number of limitations this dissertation faces. The first is 
that a deeper and more complex analysis of the decision-making process of the key actors would 
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give greater nuance and depth to the analysis. Although I was able to interview many of the key 
players in the crises described in this dissertation, a good amount of time has passed between the 
crises and the interviews. Their memories could be colored by new information, perceptions of 
the crises in light of the events after the crises, and finally, by the difficulty of remembering 
one’s own thought processes during an event. Another major limitation of the project is the fact 
that many of the alternate regional IGOs are relatively new. As these organizations continue to 
develop and become established, we will have more instances in which the organizations can 
respond to issues within the member states. As a result, we will have more data with which to 
make stronger conclusions. However, with the data we currently have, it appears that the trend 
towards protection of the executives in these sub-regional organizations will likely continue. 
Future research will address the expanding role of these sub-regional organizations and the 
impact their rise has on the role of the OAS and the United States in the process of consolidation 
and defense of democracy.  
  This project also does not evaluate the impact or results of the variation in responses to 
democratic crises in-depth. Although I argue in the “clubs of presidents” chapter that the lack of 
responses to instances of presidential overreach mean that the quality of democracy may be 
affected over time, I do not analyze in detail the effect of either responses or non-responses from 
regional IGOs. Future research will also seek to address the impact and consequences of the 
responses from regional IGOs and look into whether the regional IGOs help or hinder the 
resolution of crises. In a future project, I will also seek to answer which responses are most 
helpful in resolving democratic crises in the region. Despite the caveats and limitations of this 
dissertation, the project provides a solid and unique foray into the literature regarding democratic 
crises and the responses of regional IGOs in Latin America. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Resolution 1080 (Organization of American States) 
AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-O/91) 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
(Resolution adopted at the fifth plenary session, held on June 5, 19991) 
WHEREAS: 
The Preamble of the Charter of the OAS establishes that representative democracy is an 
indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and development of the region; 
Under the provisions of the Charter, one of the basic purposes of the OAS is to promote and 
consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of non-intervention; 
Due respect must be accorded to the policies of each member country in regard to the recognition 
of states and governments; 
In view of the widespread existence of democratic governments in the Hemisphere, the principle, 
enshrined in the Charter, that the solidarity of the American states and the high aims which it 
pursues require the political organization of those states to be based on effective exercise of 
representative democracy must be made operative; and 
The region still faces serious political, social, and economic problems that may threaten the 
stability of democratic governments,  
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
RESOLVES: 
1. To instruct the Secretary General to call for the immediate convocation of a 
meeting of the Permanent Council in the event of any occurrences giving rise to 
the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional 
process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected 
government in any of the Organization’s member states, in order, within the 
framework of the Charter, to examine the situation, decide on and convene and ad 
hoc meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or a special session of the 
General Assembly, all of which must take place within a ten-day period. 
2. To state that the purpose of the ad hoc meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or 
the special session of the General Assembly shall be to look into the events 
collectively and adopt any decisions deemed appropriate, in accordance with the 
Charter and international law. 
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3. To instruct the Permanent Council to devise a set of proposals that will serve as 
incentives to preserve and strengthen democratic systems, based on international 
solidarity and cooperation, and to apprise the General Assembly thereof at its 
twenty-second regular session. 
Appendix B: Inter-American Democratic Charter of the OAS 
Lima, September 11, 2001 
 
INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC CHARTER 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 
 
CONSIDERING that the Charter of the Organization of American States recognizes that 
representative democracy is indispensable for the stability, peace, and development of the region, 
and that one of the purposes of the OAS is to promote and consolidate representative democracy, 
with due respect for the principle of nonintervention; 
 
RECOGNIZING the contributions of the OAS and other regional and sub-regional mechanisms 
to the promotion and consolidation of democracy in the Americas; 
 
RECALLING that the Heads of State and Government of the Americas, gathered at the Third 
Summit of the Americas, held from April 20 to 22, 2001 in Quebec City, adopted a democracy 
clause which establishes that any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic 
order in a state of the Hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the participation of 
that state's government in the Summits of the Americas process; 
 
BEARING IN MIND that existing democratic provisions in regional and subregional 
mechanisms express the same objectives as the democracy clause adopted by the Heads of State 
and Government in Quebec City; 
 
REAFFIRMING that the participatory nature of democracy in our countries in different aspects 
of public life contributes to the consolidation of democratic values and to freedom and solidarity 
in the Hemisphere; 
 
CONSIDERING that solidarity among and cooperation between American states require the 
political organization of those states based on the effective exercise of representative democracy, 
and that economic growth and social development based on justice and equity, and democracy 
are interdependent and mutually reinforcing; 
 
REAFFIRMING that the fight against poverty, and especially the elimination of extreme 
poverty, is essential to the promotion and consolidation of democracy and constitutes a common 
and shared responsibility of the American states; 
 
BEARING IN MIND that the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and the 
American Convention on Human Rights contain the values and principles of liberty, equality, 
and social justice that are intrinsic to democracy; 
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REAFFIRMING that the promotion and protection of human rights is a basic prerequisite for the 
existence of a democratic society, and recognizing the importance of the continuous 
development and strengthening of the inter-American human rights system for the consolidation 
of democracy; 
 
CONSIDERING that education is an effective way to promote citizens’ awareness concerning 
their own countries and thereby achieve meaningful participation in the decision-making process, 
and reaffirming the importance of human resource development for a sound democratic system; 
 
RECOGNIZING that a safe environment is essential to the integral development of the human 
being, which contributes to democracy and political stability; 
 
BEARING IN MIND that the Protocol of San Salvador on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights emphasizes the great importance of the reaffirmation, development, improvement, and 
protection of those rights in order to consolidate the system of representative democratic 
government; 
 
RECOGNIZING that the right of workers to associate themselves freely for the defense and 
promotion of their interests is fundamental to the fulfillment of democratic ideals; 
 
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT that, in the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal 
of the Inter-American System, the ministers of foreign affairs expressed their determination to 
adopt a series of effective, timely, and expeditious procedures to ensure the promotion and 
defense of representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention; and 
that resolution AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-O/91) therefore established a mechanism for collective 
action in the case of a sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional 
process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically-elected government in any 
of the Organization's member states, thereby fulfilling a long-standing aspiration of the 
Hemisphere to be able to respond rapidly and collectively in defense of democracy; 
 
RECALLING that, in the Declaration of Nassau [AG/DEC. 1 (XXII-O/92)], it was agreed to 
develop mechanisms to provide assistance, when requested by a member state, to promote, 
preserve, and strengthen representative democracy, in order to complement and give effect to the 
provisions of resolution AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-O/91); 
 
BEARING IN MIND that, in the Declaration of Managua for the Promotion of Democracy and 
Development [AG/DEC. 4 (XXIII-O/93)], the member states expressed their firm belief that 
democracy, peace, and development are inseparable and indivisible parts of a renewed and 
integral vision of solidarity in the Americas; and that the ability of the Organization to help 
preserve and strengthen democratic structures in the region will depend on the implementation of 
a strategy based on the interdependence and complementarity of those values;  
 
CONSIDERING that, in the Declaration of Managua for the Promotion of Democracy and 
Development, the member states expressed their conviction that the Organization’s mission is 
not limited to the defense of democracy wherever its fundamental values and principles have 
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collapsed, but also calls for ongoing and creative work to consolidate democracy as well as a 
continuing effort to prevent and anticipate the very causes of the problems that affect the 
democratic system of government;  
 
BEARING IN MIND that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Americas, at the thirty-first 
regular session of the General Assembly, held in San Jose, Costa Rica, in keeping with express 
instructions from the Heads of State and Government gathered at the Third Summit of the 
Americas, in Quebec City, accepted the base document of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter and entrusted the Permanent Council of the Organization with strengthening and 
expanding the document, in accordance with the OAS Charter, for final adoption at a special 
session of the General Assembly in Lima, Peru; 
 
RECOGNIZING that all the rights and obligations of member states under the OAS Charter 
represent the foundation on which democratic principles in the Hemisphere are built; and 
 
BEARING IN MIND the progressive development of international law and the advisability of 
clarifying the provisions set forth in the OAS Charter and related basic instruments on the 
preservation and defense of democratic institutions, according to established practice, 
RESOLVES: 
 
To adopt the following: 
 
INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC CHARTER 
I 
Democracy and the Inter-American System 
Article 1 
The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation 
to promote and defend it. 
Democracy is essential for the social, political, and economic development of the peoples of the 
Americas. 
 
Article 2 
The effective exercise of representative democracy is the basis for the rule of law and of the 
constitutional regimes of the member states of the Organization of American States. 
Representative democracy is strengthened and deepened by permanent, ethical, and responsible 
participation of the citizenry within a legal framework conforming to the respective 
constitutional order. 
 
Article 3 
Essential elements of representative democracy include, inter alia, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, 
the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as 
an expression of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of political parties and 
organizations, and the separation of powers and independence of the branches of government. 
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Article 4 
Transparency in government activities, probity, responsible public administration on the part of 
governments, respect for social rights, and freedom of expression and of the press are essential 
components of the exercise of democracy. 
The constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally constituted civilian 
authority and respect for the rule of law on the part of all institutions and sectors of society are 
equally essential to democracy. 
 
Article 5 
The strengthening of political parties and other political organizations is a priority for 
democracy. Special attention will be paid to the problems associated with the high cost of 
election campaigns and the establishment of a balanced and transparent system for their 
financing. 
 
Article 6 
It is the right and responsibility of all citizens to participate in decisions relating to their own 
development. This is also a necessary condition for the full and effective exercise of democracy. 
Promoting and fostering diverse forms of participation strengthens democracy. 
 
II 
Democracy and Human Rights 
Article 7 
Democracy is indispensable for the effective exercise of fundamental freedoms and human rights 
in their universality, indivisibility and interdependence, embodied in the respective constitutions 
of states and in inter-American and international human rights instruments. 
 
Article 8 
Any person or group of persons who consider that their human rights have been violated may 
present claims or petitions to the inter-American system for the promotion and protection of 
human rights in accordance with its established procedures. 
Member states reaffirm their intention to strengthen the inter-American system for the protection 
of human rights for the consolidation of democracy in the Hemisphere.  
 
Article 9 
The elimination of all forms of discrimination, especially gender, ethnic and race discrimination, 
as well as diverse forms of intolerance, the promotion and protection of human rights of 
indigenous peoples and migrants, and respect for ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in the 
Americas contribute to strengthening democracy and citizen participation. 
 
Article 10 
The promotion and strengthening of democracy requires the full and effective exercise of 
workers’ rights and the application of core labor standards, as recognized in the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and its 
Follow-up, adopted in 1998, as well as other related fundamental ILO conventions. Democracy 
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is strengthened by improving standards in the workplace and enhancing the quality of life for 
workers in the Hemisphere. 
 
III 
Democracy, Integral Development, and Combating Poverty 
Article 11 
Democracy and social and economic development are interdependent and are mutually 
reinforcing. 
 
Article 12 
Poverty, illiteracy, and low levels of human development are factors that adversely affect the 
consolidation of democracy. The OAS member states are committed to adopting and 
implementing all those actions required to generate productive employment, reduce poverty, and 
eradicate extreme poverty, taking into account the different economic realities and conditions of 
the countries of the Hemisphere. This shared commitment regarding the problems associated 
with development and poverty also underscores the importance of maintaining macroeconomic 
equilibria and the obligation to strengthen social cohesion and democracy. 
 
Article 13 
The promotion and observance of economic, social, and cultural rights are inherently linked to 
integral development, equitable economic growth, and to the consolidation of democracy in the 
states of the Hemisphere. 
 
Article 14 
Member states agree to review periodically the actions adopted and carried out by the 
Organization to promote dialogue, cooperation for integral development, and the fight against 
poverty in the Hemisphere, and to take the appropriate measures to further these objectives. 
 
Article 15 
The exercise of democracy promotes the preservation and good stewardship of the environment. 
It is essential that the states of the Hemisphere implement policies and strategies to protect the 
environment, including application of various treaties and conventions, to achieve sustainable 
development for the benefit of future generations. 
 
Article 16 
Education is key to strengthening democratic institutions, promoting the development of human 
potential, and alleviating poverty and fostering greater understanding among our peoples. To 
achieve these ends, it is essential that a quality education be available to all, including girls and 
women, rural inhabitants, and minorities. 
 
IV 
Strengthening and Preservation of Democratic Institutions 
Article 17 
When the government of a member state considers that its democratic political institutional 
process or its legitimate exercise of power is at risk, it may request assistance from the Secretary 
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General or the Permanent Council for the strengthening and preservation of its democratic 
system. 
 
Article 18 
When situations arise in a member state that may affect the development of its democratic 
political institutional process or the legitimate exercise of power, the Secretary General or the 
Permanent Council may, with prior consent of the government concerned, arrange for visits or 
other actions in order to analyze the situation. The Secretary General will submit a report to the 
Permanent Council, which will undertake a collective assessment of the situation and, where 
necessary, may adopt decisions for the preservation of the democratic system and its 
strengthening. 
 
Article 19  
Based on the principles of the Charter of the OAS and subject to its norms, and in accordance 
with the democracy clause contained in the Declaration of Quebec City, an unconstitutional 
interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime 
that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state, constitutes, while it persists, an 
insurmountable obstacle to its government’s participation in sessions of the General Assembly, 
the Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of the Organization, the specialized conferences, the 
commissions, working groups, and other bodies of the Organization. 
 
Article 20 
In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs 
the democratic order in a member state, any member state or the Secretary General may request 
the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council to undertake a collective assessment of the 
situation and to take such decisions as it deems appropriate. 
The Permanent Council, depending on the situation, may undertake the necessary diplomatic 
initiatives, including good offices, to foster the restoration of democracy. 
If such diplomatic initiatives prove unsuccessful, or if the urgency of the situation so warrants, 
the Permanent Council shall immediately convene a special session of the General Assembly. 
The General Assembly will adopt the decisions it deems appropriate, including the undertaking 
of diplomatic initiatives, in accordance with the Charter of the Organization, international law, 
and the provisions of this Democratic Charter. 
The necessary diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to foster the restoration of 
democracy, will continue during the process. 
 
Article 21 
When the special session of the General Assembly determines that there has been an 
unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order of a member state, and that diplomatic 
initiatives have failed, the special session shall take the decision to suspend said member state 
from the exercise of its right to participate in the OAS by an affirmative vote of two thirds of the 
member states in accordance with the Charter of the OAS. The suspension shall take effect 
immediately. 
The suspended member state shall continue to fulfill its obligations to the Organization, in 
particular its human rights obligations. 
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Notwithstanding the suspension of the member state, the Organization will maintain diplomatic 
initiatives to restore democracy in that state. 
 
 
Article 22  
Once the situation that led to suspension has been resolved, any member state or the Secretary 
General may propose to the General Assembly that suspension be lifted. This decision shall 
require the vote of two thirds of the member states in accordance with the OAS Charter.  
 
V 
Democracy and Electoral Observation Missions 
Article 23 
Member states are responsible for organizing, conducting, and ensuring free and fair electoral 
processes. 
Member states, in the exercise of their sovereignty, may request that the Organization of 
American States provide advisory services or assistance for strengthening and developing their 
electoral institutions and processes, including sending preliminary missions for that purpose. 
 
Article 24 
The electoral observation missions shall be carried out at the request of the member state 
concerned. To that end, the government of that state and the Secretary General shall enter into an 
agreement establishing the scope and coverage of the electoral observation mission in question. 
The member state shall guarantee conditions of security, free access to information, and full 
cooperation with the electoral observation mission. 
Electoral observation missions shall be carried out in accordance with the principles and norms 
of the OAS. The Organization shall ensure that these missions are effective and independent and 
shall provide them with the necessary resources for that purpose. They shall be conducted in an 
objective, impartial, and transparent manner and with the appropriate technical expertise.  
Electoral observation missions shall present a report on their activities in a timely manner to the 
Permanent Council, through the General Secretariat.  
 
Article 25 
The electoral observation missions shall advise the Permanent Council, through the General 
Secretariat, if the necessary conditions for free and fair elections do not exist. 
The Organization may, with the consent of the state concerned, send special missions with a 
view to creating or improving said conditions. 
 
VI 
Promotion of a Democratic Culture 
Article 26 
The OAS will continue to carry out programs and activities designed to promote democratic 
principles and practices and strengthen a democratic culture in the Hemisphere, bearing in mind 
that democracy is a way of life based on liberty and enhancement of economic, social, and 
cultural conditions for the peoples of the Americas. The OAS will consult and cooperate on an 
ongoing basis with member states and take into account the contributions of civil society 
organizations working in those fields. 
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Article 27 
The objectives of the programs and activities will be to promote good governance, sound 
administration, democratic values, and the strengthening of political institutions and civil society 
organizations. Special attention shall be given to the development of programs and activities for 
the education of children and youth as a means of ensuring the continuance of democratic values, 
including liberty and social justice. 
 
Article 28 
States shall promote the full and equal participation of women in the political structures of their 
countries as a fundamental element in the promotion and exercise of a democratic culture. 
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Appendix C: List of Crises Demonstrating Variations in Clarity and Severity 
                                                         Clarity 
 High Low 
Severity  
High Ecuador 2000, Guatemala 
1993, Honduras 2009, 
Paraguay 1996, Peru 1992, 
Venezuela 1992 
Ecuador 2005, Paraguay 
2012, Venezuela 2002 
Low Bolivia 2003, Ecuador 
2010, Nicaragua 2005, 
Paraguay 2000, Peru 2000 
Argentina 2001; Bolivia 
2005, 2006, 2007; Ecuador 
1997, 2004, 2007; 
Nicaragua 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011; Panama 2009; 
Peru 2004; Paraguay 1999; 
Venezuela 2007, 2009, 
2010 
 
 
